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ABSTRACT
The three studies in this dissertation explore the relationship between Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP). CSR consists of social,
ethical, and environmental performance dimensions that have not traditionally appeared in
mandated financial reports and largely reflect societal expectations for corporate behavior
beyond legal and regulatory constraints. CSR is reflected in both corporate actions (performance
outcomes) and voluntary reporting (disclosure), and the two are not necessarily equivalent due to
managerial discretion in disclosure. Although the mechanisms remain unclear, the general
consensus is that there is a positive relationship between CSR and CFP. In considering the
drivers and goals of CSR, two themes emerge and are used to inform these papers: a stakeholder
view of organizational relationships and the need to signal legitimacy in the face of changing
social norms. A stakeholder view asserts that a wide range of groups across society are
important to the long-term success and health of the organization. Legitimacy theory provides
the explanation of why the stakeholder view is important to organizational success and can
produce significant strategic advantages.
The first study utilizes archival data in an exploration of how to model the relationship
between Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and CFP. Using independent evaluations of
organizational CSP from KLD STATS, I explore the CSP-CFP relationship at four different
levels (overall CSP, component CSP, directional component CSP, and issue-based component
CSP). I consider the effect of CSP on a range of outcome measures of CFP performance, at
different levels of aggregated performance measures and linkage to stakeholder groups. Finally,
I explore the pattern of significant CSP components on individual CFP outcome measures to
iii

determine if there is evidence for changing associations based on relevant stakeholder groups, in
answer to concerns raised by prior research (Wood and Jones 1995; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and
Rynes 2003). I find that (a) stock market measures are extremely insensitive to CSP; (b) the
appropriate measurement level of CSP varies with the degree to which the CFP measure is
aggregated and attributable to a more focused group of stakeholders; and (c) significant CSP
aspects and associated CFP outcomes do vary in patterns and sensitivity.
The second study examines the role voluntary social disclosure plays in economic
performance through an attribute I term resilience. Resilience influences stakeholder resource
allocation decisions in the face of unexpected poor performance attributable to an exogenous
shock and is associated with perceived organizational legitimacy. To test this model, an
experiment is conducted in which participants are asked to assess the perceived legitimacy of an
organization based on information characteristics of voluntary CSR disclosure and then to make
reallocation decisions in the face of poor performance caused by an industry crisis not involving
the underlying organization. I find that high quality disclosure (driven by reporting accuracy) is
significantly associated with greater perceived legitimacy. In turn, the legitimacy construct is
significantly associated with resilience following an exogenous shock.
The final study considers organizational choices in CSR disclosure to preserve credibility
in the face of a crisis threatening the legitimacy of the institutional framework. Using qualitative
data surrounding the turbulent 2001 – 2002 period encompassing the Enron and WorldCom
scandals and the fall of Andersen, I examine organizational voluntary disclosure decisions to
ascertain how they sought to preserve their own informational credibility and legitimacy in the
face of a threat that did not directly involve their actions. I find that organizations responded
iv

throughout this period by increasing signals of both transparency (greater CSR disclosure) and
credibility (greater use of external sources of assurance of that disclosure). I also find that thirdparty assurance was not widely used, and remained at a steady, minimal percentage over time.
Overwhelmingly, organizations turned to the implementation of an independent, external
reporting framework (e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative’s widespread guidelines) that provided
consistency and comparability in their reporting, made use of standardized measurements and
definitions, and required specific items and measures.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Introduction

Increasingly, social and environmental performance dimensions are becoming a factor of
organizational life. Whether one believes with Friedman (1970) that a concern for anything
other than stockholder profits represents a socialistic appropriation of wealth or with Freeman
(Freeman 1984; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007) that globalization and technology have
rendered the “stockholder centered” model obsolete, observation of the behavior of public
companies demonstrates the astonishing number and diversity of firms claiming to be “green,”
“sustainable,” or otherwise environmentally and socially responsible. Prior research has debated
the reasons for firms engaging in Corporate Social Performance (CSP) reporting,1 from both a
theoretical and a practical standpoint. Although the mechanisms remain unclear, and temporal
relations are cloudy, the general consensus is that CSP is associated with an economic benefit
and that the stakeholder model is an important factor in this relationship (Jones 1995; Porter and
van der Linde 1995; Wood and Jones 1995: Cormier and Magnan 1999; Ruf et al. 2001;
Margolis and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003; Barnett 2007; Margolis,
Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Doh et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011).
The purpose of this stream of research is to explore the relationship between Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) and organizational economic performance. CSR is reflected both in
corporate actions (social performance) and in reporting (social disclosure). As CSR disclosure is

1

CSP reflects actual performance outcomes; Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reflects the organization’s
stated policies and positions on these issues. CSP (or CSR) is comprised of social, environmental, and governance
elements.

1

largely voluntary, the lack of standardization and the degree of managerial discretion as to what
is reported and how it is measured (and defined) can result in image management and noncredible information (more of “spin” than signaling) and what is disclosed might not truly reflect
performance (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). Both social disclosure and social performance
might affect economic performance (Ullmann 1985), and the mechanisms among these three
aspects of organizational behavior and outcomes are still not clearly understood. To add to the
complexity, CSR does not consist of a single factor, and the factors might not be weighted
identically or reflect the interests of identical groups of stakeholders.
Two themes emerge within the stream of CSR literature and are used to inform these
papers. A stakeholder view asserts that a wide range of groups across society are important to
the long-term success and health of the organization, and addressing their needs and interests can
produce significant strategic advantages (Hill and Jones 1992; Jones 1995; Freeman 1984;
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007). Legitimacy theory (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) provides
an explanation of why a stakeholder view of the firm is important to organizational success.
Society controls the allocation of scarce resources (capital, labor, markets for goods, raw
materials) and constrains organizational behavior via regulation to ensure that organizational
processes and outcomes reflect and incorporate societal norms, values, and goals. Legitimacy is
a continuum, however, rather than an absolute state. Basic legitimacy depends on organizational
competence and compliance with institutional norms and expectations reflected in laws and
regulation and upheld by industry and professional association conventions (Suchman 1995).
Full legitimacy goes “above and beyond” these minimal requirements and reflects a broader,
non-codified range of social and economic values, thus reflecting a longer-term relational
2

commitment, as opposed to an exclusively profit-centered, transactional emphasis. Where an
organization lies on the legitimacy continuum is dependent on how much of the “legitimacy gap”
between basic and full legitimacy it chooses to close (Lindblom 2010).
Mandatory disclosure establishes basic legitimacy. Voluntary disclosure, however,
moves the organization beyond basic legitimacy and towards full legitimacy. The degree to
which the legitimacy gap is closed is dependent on voluntary disclosure credibility and
organizational trustworthiness. CSR disclosure predominates as this information reflects the
non-mandated, non-economic societal values and goals not incorporated into mandated financial
reporting. CSR disclosure will then logically influence resource allocation, based on the degree
to which organizations have displayed greater respect for the informational needs of relevant
stakeholder groups. Although mandatory disclosures (i.e., the financial statements) are
determined in terms of content and format, the discretionary, non-financial information desired
by the full range of stakeholders might vary widely in content, measures, and format. Some of
this variance is due to the difficulty of establishing objective measures or developing new
measurement methods; but much of this variance is also due to managerial discretion and might
be attributed to organizational attempts at impression management (Arya and Mittendorf 2005:
Cho, Roberts, and Patten 2010; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). Stakeholders are aware of
this and tend to be skeptical of organizational intentions and behaviors in the light of recent
widespread ethical scandals (Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore 2002; Bazerman et al. 2006;
Moore et al. 2006). Consequently, stakeholders assess organizational information in terms of
both content and intent, discounting corporate disclosures due to credibility issues (Barnett 2007;
Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).
3

The degree to which CSR disclosure and CSR performance correlate will determine the
credibility of the information and its ability to affect economic performance. Where there is a
low correlation (i.e., image management), the information is deemed less credible and might
result in weaker (or less persistent) judgments of legitimacy and the concomitant allocation of
resources. Consequently, organizational economic performance is partially dependent on social
performance, the degree to which social performance is credibly reflected in social disclosure,
and the degree to which various components of CSR reflect the interests of the organization’s
key stakeholders. CSR is not costless or easy to implement: therefore, organizations must
believe such activities to be demonstrably in their best interest to engage in CSR actions and
disclosures. A recent survey of top corporate officers for sustainability in major international
organizations found that nearly half of the respondents thought that “sustainable practices would
definitely improve profitability” for their companies, and one manager went so far as to state that
for every dollar spent on sustainability, the company experienced a return of $1.50 to $2.00
(KPMG 2011, 3). CEOs also believe that CSR contributes to improved overall performance and
that environmental, social, and governance factors need to be embedded within the core business
model (Accenture 2010).
The motivation behind these studies is the recent escalation in organizations involved in
reporting CSR. In an era of globalization, consumer activism, and economic uncertainty,
organizations recognize that their success depends on a broader audience with wide-spread
access to information via the Internet (KPMG 2005, 2008). These stakeholders desire
information in order to assess overall organizational performance and define this performance
much more broadly than stockholders or analysts. In response, organizations increasingly
4

engage in voluntary disclosures of CSR. KPMG reported in 2005 that 64% of the Global
Fortune 250 published CSR information in some format, and that number jumped to 83% in
2008 (KPMG 2005, 2008).2 New definitions of performance include qualitative and
“citizenship” issues such as quality, governance, employee relations, sustainability, and human
rights. Failure to address these concerns increases assessed risk and regulatory costs and
decreases available resources. In a series of surveys of multinational firms’ perceptions of their
top risks, several items pertaining to CSR performance and resource allocation found their way
into the top 10 (Ernst & Young 2009, 2010). “Access to credit” and “increased regulation and
compliance” were in the top two slots for 2008, 2009, and 2010 (Table 1), while “reputation
risks” rose to 10th place in 2009 and, specifically as “Social acceptance risk and corporate social
responsibility,” moved to 9th place in 2010. These risks reflect the influence of multiple key
stakeholder groups beyond shareholders alone.
The Internet, market liberalization, globalization, and increased activism have resulted in
a climate in which company performance (especially negative events) is quickly known around
the world (Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007). Disasters are no longer local: an oil spill in
Australia can produce demands for increased environmental monitoring and safeguards at every
company site, from North American to Africa (Deegan, Rankin, and Voght 2000) and can
directly influence other, “innocent” members of the same industry (Blacconiere and Patten
1994). Well-organized and vocal stakeholder groups and the competitive, globalized economy

2

Increasing European demand for CSR type disclosures (although this demand is not universal in terms of content,
format or whether mandatory) also is a factor in the increase in reporting across the Global 250. However, the
changes in European disclosure requirements have been greatly driven by stakeholder activism and thus also reflect
stakeholder engagement pressures.
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have produced increased public pressure and, in response, increased organizational sustainability
reporting to demonstrate legitimacy (Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 1998).
As a result, organizations face increasing pressures to disclose non-financial
performance. The pressure arises not only from stakeholder groups (and society in general), but
also from competitors who, if they are able to demonstrate greater responsiveness to societal
concerns and values, might attract stakeholder support and scarce resources away from poorer
performing organizations. Competitiveness and legitimacy have been found to be two of the
driving forces behind organizational decisions to “go green” and engage in environmental
reporting (Bansal and Roth 2000), but some organizations (e.g., Starbucks) are moving even
further and acknowledging a responsibility to account for social, environmental, and governance
performance. By voluntarily signaling long-term commitment to sustainability and stakeholder
values, these firms should be perceived as more trustworthy, enjoy greater stakeholder
commitment, and therefore have greater access to resources and less likelihood of governmental
regulation.
Ullman’s (1985) model of the possible interactions among social disclosure, social
performance, and economic performance provides a framework for these three studies (Figure 1).
Beginning with an archival exploration of the structure of the relationship between CSP and
corporate financial performance (CFP), I seek to determine the appropriate factors and
measurement level of organizational CSR. In the second study, I explore this relationship by
proposing a psychological construct based on perceived legitimacy derived from information
characteristics in voluntary disclosure (“resilience”). Resilience operates to benefit the more
legitimate organization by influencing stakeholder resource allocation decisions in the face of
6

unexpected poor performance. Finally, in the third study, I consider voluntary reporting and
external sources of credibility that are able to strengthen legitimacy following an exogenous
shock from a loss of credibility in the surrounding institutional structure.

Study One: Exploring the Interface of Corporate Economic and Social Performance: What
Matters to Whom?

Considerable effort has been expended in ascertaining what effect, if any, CSR
performance and/or disclosure has on economic performance (Cochran and Wood 1984;
Ullmann 1985; Berthelot, Cormier, and Magnan 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003;
Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007). The overall conclusion is that CSR has a positive effect
on economic performance, but the mechanisms by which this occurs remain unclear (Cormier
and Magnan 1999; Ruf et al. 2001; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes
2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Doh et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). The
uncertainty in the relationship (and variance across prior studies) includes questions of how CSR
variables should be measured and the appropriate financial outcome measures to be used.
Consequently, the first study explores measurement issues between CSR and economic
performance via the lens of stakeholder theory.
Stakeholder theory asserts that organizations are dependent on a wide range of social
groups for their success, and a myopic focus on a single group (i.e., shareholders) will result in,
at best, lack of long-term competitive advantage and decreased performance (Freeman 1984;
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). One of the chief
explanations for inconsistent results in analysis of the CSP-CFP link is that the CSP and CFP
7

variables usually chosen reflect the interests of differing stakeholder groups, weakening their
relationship (Wood and Jones 1995; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003). There have also been
indications that (a) the measurement level of CSP (e.g., aggregated, overall performance vs.
individual issues) might be a significant cause of weaker statistical relationships, (b) negative
and positive information might be weighted differently, and (c) relevant CSP factors might vary
across groups or CFP measures (Carroll 1979; Berman et al. 1999; Cormier, Gordon, and
Magnan 2004).
Using an independent assessment of CSP provided by KLD STATS and Compustat data
for a variety of organizations across industries over three years, the study tests the relationships
among different measurement levels of CSP and a range of CFP measures. Using hierarchical
regression, four different models are evaluated for their ability to explain variance and differing
patterns of CSP factors across a range of CFP outcomes designed to reflect differing stakeholder
groups. The study contributes to the literature by exploring the still nebulous structure of the
CSP-CFP relationship and the varying strength of this relationship across a broader range of CFP
outcomes. I find that the most appropriate measurement level for CSP factors varies with the
measurement level (and degree of aggregated performance) for the CFP outcome measure. For
measures of stock price, overall CSP is only occasionally significant. For measures of net cash
flow, the most appropriate CSP measurement level is directional at the individual component
level (environmental, human rights, diversity, employee relations, community relations,
governance, and product quality). For revenue, however, which is directly and clearly associated
with a single stakeholder group (customers), the most sensitive CSP measurement level appears
to be issue-based within components. Additionally, I find that the strength (and extensiveness)
8

of the association varies considerably across CFP outcome measures, and these associations
might be directly related to the stakeholder groups predominantly concerned with the given
outcome.

Study Two: The Benefit of the Doubt: Resilience in Stakeholder Assessments of Corporate
Social Performance Disclosure

The second study explores the interaction between CSP disclosure and economic
performance, specifically in the face of unexpected poor performance following an industry
crisis. High quality voluntary CSR disclosures might close the legitimacy gap between
institutional requirements and non-codified, often emergent societal norms and values by
increasing perceived legitimacy, primarily through investor assessments of information
credibility and organizational trustworthiness. When an organization demonstrates concern for
broader social values, and goes “above and beyond” in its actions and reporting, this signals a
commitment to longer-term, mutually beneficial relationships with its stakeholders. There is a
strong link between this level of “full” legitimacy and “thick trust” (Vosselman and van der
Meer-Kooistra 2009), with increases in voluntary disclosure quality leading to increased
assessments of disclosure credibility. The quality of voluntary disclosures is largely determined
by the completeness and the accuracy of the information. Higher quality disclosures will be
more complete (including both positive and negative performance reports) and more accurate
(containing more specific details and quantitative information) (Cormier and Magnan 1999;
Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). The combination of completeness and accuracy also
contributes to stakeholder perceptions of organizational intent in disclosure along the continuum
9

of impression management to transparency (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). In turn,
perceptions of intent and the extent of the disclosure will tend to produce assessments of
organizational trustworthiness (Koonce and Mercer 2005).
Greater perceived legitimacy resulting from the information characteristics used in
voluntary reporting will produce a fund of what I term “resilience” among stakeholders.
Resilience reduces volatility in the face of unexpected poor performance by absorbing a portion
of transactional or relational risk. As a result, organizations that enjoy a greater degree of
resilience should suffer less of a decline in resources in the face of bad news. The importance of
this relationship in an era of rapid, global change, technology-driven speed of communication,
and an uncertain economic environment is considerable.
The model is first tested with ANCOVA using a 2 x 2 factorial design (accuracy x
completeness) to assess information characteristics’ influence on non-professional investors’
perceptions of organizational legitimacy. Mean scores for individual items within the resilience
factor display the expected relationships across conditions, with the greatest scores in the high
accuracy/high completeness cell and the lowest scores in the low accuracy/low completeness
cell. I find that high quality voluntary disclosure characteristics significantly explain variance in
legitimacy, with accuracy driving the relationship. To test the link between perceived legitimacy
and subsequent resilience to unexpectedly poor performance, the factor score for the construct of
resilience is regressed on the factor score for the construct of perceived legitimacy.

I find that

perceived legitimacy significantly accounts for variance in the construct of resilience. Factor
scores across individual cells also suggest that reporting accuracy is associated with perceived
legitimacy and reporting completeness is associated with resilience.
10

Study Three: In Bad Company: Voluntary Disclosure and Preserving Credibility During
External Crisis

The third and final study addresses the interaction between social disclosure and social
performance through the lens of legitimacy theory. Social performance can be equated with
legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) and will range from “basic” legitimacy reflective of
competence and compliance with legal and regulatory requirements to “full” legitimacy that also
incorporates non-mandatory incorporation of societal expectations. Basic legitimacy is reflected
in mandatory disclosures, whereas the degree to which the organization covers the “legitimacy
gap” between basic and full legitimacy (Lindblom 2010) is reflected in voluntary reporting.
However, voluntary reporting can also serve another, vital function.
If basic legitimacy reflects compliance with institutional regulations and requirements,
then the credibility of mandatory reporting is supported by the legitimacy of the institutional
framework. When a critical piece of that framework suffers a credibility crisis, as occurred with
public accounting firms during the Andersen/Enron disaster, then the credibility of the
mandatory disclosures of reporting organizations also suffers, even when the reporting
organization has been uninvolved in the events surrounding the credibility crisis. In this case, I
predict that organizations will attempt to strengthen their own legitimacy by demonstrating
increased transparency and credibility in voluntary reporting, signaling both their respect for
societal norms and their difference from the failed institutional entity. In order for voluntary
disclosure to be able to fulfill this function, however, it must be perceived as credible. Because
of skepticism regarding management’s discretionary choices in what and how they report,
independent, external sources of credibility enhancement (such as a reporting framework or use
11

of a third-party assurer) are normally used (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Kothari, Li, and
Short 2009; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; O’Dwyer, Owen, and Unerman 2011;
Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011).
Using qualitative data, I examine organizational voluntary CSR disclosure choices among
S&P 500 companies during the turbulent 1998 – 2005 period. In so doing, I contribute to the
literature by shedding light on how organizations use information disclosure to protect and repair
perceptions of legitimacy and their strategies for enhancing the credibility of voluntary
disclosures. Non-parametric analysis reveals that the use of both CSR disclosure and a reporting
framework increases steadily and significantly before, during, and after a credibility crisis, while
the use of third-party assurance (and auditors, specifically, as a source of third-party assurance)
remains steady but minimal. In fact, I find that during a credibility crisis centered on the
credibility/legitimacy of public accounting firms as a component of the institutional framework,
the use of auditors is never more than 50% of overall third-party assurers and decreases during
the crisis period. I find that disclosure intensity also increases during this period, with
transparency being important immediately prior to the crisis, but transparency with at least one
means of credibility enhancement accelerating during and after a crisis.

Conclusion

The association between CSP and CFP is a complex one. CSR performance and CSR
reporting are each related to CFP, as well as to each other. CSR performance contributes to CFP,
but the strength of the relationship will vary across measures of economic outcome, as will the
individual CSR components that display an association with a given CFP factor. Additionally,
12

economic outcome measures based on stock market performance are highly insensitive to CSR
as the associated stakeholder group (shareholders) is chiefly concerned with financial
performance only. Therefore, a single, aggregated measure of CSR is not appropriate and
measures that have used a single measure, or a single component of overall CSR performance,
might explain the mixed results from prior studies.
The relationship between CSR and CFP is not necessarily a direct one. CSR might
positively affect CFP by its influence on intervening constructs. Some of the intervening
constructs mentioned in the literature include organizational learning, strategic match, reputation,
operational efficiency and effectiveness, and innovation. Organizational disclosures of CSR
performance, and the degree to which they are perceived as credible and trustworthy measures of
actual performance, also lead to stakeholder judgments of organizational legitimacy. Perceived
legitimacy then affects stakeholders’ subsequent resource allocation decisions.
The relationship between CSR performance and CSR disclosure is also an important
contributor to CFP. CSR disclosure can reflect organizational intentions and values both through
the amount of information voluntarily provided to stakeholders (transparency) and the degree to
which that information is rendered credible by the support of external, independent sources. As
such, choices in the information characteristics of voluntary CSR disclosures can help an
organization close the legitimacy gap between institutionally mandated “basic” legitimacy and
the “full” legitimacy reflective of societal norms not enshrined in regulation. More importantly,
in cases where the legitimacy of the institutional framework itself is questioned due to ethical
scandals, compromised independence, or perceptions of its failure to protect the public interest
(Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore 2002; Bazerman et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2006; Nelson
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2006), voluntary disclosure can bolster the affected mandatory disclosures of “innocent”
reporting organizations, allowing them to preserve or repair threatened legitimacy.
The stream of research represented in this dissertation seeks to shed light on this
complex, interdependent relationship through three studies examining each of the three possible
associations among CSR performance, CSR disclosure, and CFP. The next three chapters each
contain one of the studies. Chapter five concludes the dissertation, summarizing and linking the
findings from the three individual studies, and discussing the overall themes emerging from
research into organizational choices in CSR reporting and behavior.
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Tables

Table 1: Ernst & Young Surveyed Top Global Business Risks and Relationships to Stakeholder
groups
Ernst & Young Top 10
Global Risk
Access to credit
Increased regulation and
compliance
Radical greening
Non-traditional entrants
Managing talent
Executing alliances and
transactions
Reputation risks
Social acceptance risk and
corporate social
responsibility
(new in 2010)

Rank
in
2008

Rank
in
2009

Rank
in
2010

Creditors, Suppliers

2

1

2

Regulators, Government, Local
Communities

1

2

1

Consumers, Regulators

9

4

8

Competitors

16

5

7

Employees

11

7

4

Suppliers, Partners, Customers

7

8

10

All Stakeholders

22

10

Customers, Local Communities,
Regulators, Government, Society

n/a

n/a

Representative Stakeholder Group(s)

16

9
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CHAPTER TWO: EXPLORING THE INTERFACE OF CORPORATE
FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE: WHAT MATTERS TO
WHOM?
Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between Corporate Social
Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP). CSP is used as a label for
corporate social, ethical, and environmental programs, processes, and outputs which, with one
exception, are not required to be reported within the firm’s financial statements or other
mandated reports. The exception, of course, consists of the major costs and liabilities associated
with failure in these areas (e.g., fines, environmental clean-up costs, and lawsuits). Although
factors that comprise CSP might have significant impacts on overall firm performance (Litan and
Wallison 2000), many are harder to assess with standardized, quantitative measures and might
operate through implicit contracts and expectations (Cornell and Shapiro 1987). Examples of
organizational performance areas that are often affected significantly by CSP factors include
employee commitment and training, product quality, responsiveness and flexibility to market
changes, and innovation (Moore 1993; Porter and van der Linde 1995; Grow, Hamm, and Lee
2005; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Boehe and Cruz 2010). This study seeks to explore
the relationship between components of CSP and CFP and to examine the appropriate level of
measurement and range of outcome measures. The key assumptions underlying this study are
that (1) neither CFP nor CSP is adequately measured by a single variable and (2) relationships
among variables will vary across stakeholder groups and contexts (Barnett 2007; Margolis et al.
2007).
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Much ink and effort has been spent in prior research to argue for or against the role CSP
plays in contributing to CFP, but our understanding of how corporate economic performance is
affected by the interaction of stakeholder relationships and non-economic performance remains
limited. Nevertheless, an understanding of these interactions is important. Stakeholder theory
provides a meaningful theoretical base for examining the relationship between CSP and CFP
(Freeman 1984; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Barnett 2007; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks
2007; Mackey, Mackey, and Barney 2007) by explaining why performance in non-economic
areas important to key stakeholder groups will, in turn, influence economic performance via the
resources controlled by those stakeholders (e.g., labor, capital, raw materials, market share, etc.).
If an organization’s stakeholders have expectations regarding non-financial performance, and
these expectations determine subsequent allocation of resources (or willingness to forego
increased regulation or contracting costs), then management needs to monitor, plan for, and
report on the actions, policies, and outcomes affecting the relevant non-financial areas.
Stakeholders will have an impact on organizational performance as they set expectations,
evaluate outcomes, and reward or punish the firm based on that evaluation (Wood and Jones
1995; Grow, Hamm, and Lee 2005; Barnett 2007). Although stakeholder theory is the most
frequent theoretical lens used to make the business case for Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR)3, there seems to be a consistent mismatch between the stakeholder approach (requiring
consideration of multiple stakeholder groups) and the outcome measures used (which tend to
predominantly focus on the priorities of shareholders) (Wood and Jones 1995).
3

It is important to differentiate between CSR, a measure of perceived responsibility, obligation, or philosophical
orientation towards stakeholders, and CSP, a measure of actual performance, outcomes, or verifiable policies. CSP
also differs from the measurement of perceptions of an organization, which are usually captured in reputational
scores.
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In general, reviews of prior literature have found a preponderance of evidence for at least
a weakly positive correlation between CFP and CSP (Ullmann 1985; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and
Rynes 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). Study
results, however, have been mixed and are often attributed to lack of theoretical underpinnings or
methodological problems, including measurement levels, mismatch between CSP and CFP
variables, and poor measures in general (Alexander and Buchholz 1978; Ullmann 1985; Wood
and Jones 1995; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003). Most prior
research has concentrated on CFP as market-based performance measures or accounting
measures at a relatively high level of aggregation (Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007).
However, aggregated measures (or those using only a limited subset of CSP components) might
miss the relevant associations. For example, if CSP performance is strongly associated with
sales via the customer stakeholder group, the overall influence on CFP might not be apparent at
the net income or return on equity levels of CFP measurement.
A firm’s worth is reflected in both market and operational performance (Easton and
Harris 1991), so both types of CFP measurement are required to give a complete view of
organizational value. The sensitivity of some CFP measures vary depending on the time frame
or might be highly correlated with each other (McWiliams and Siegel 2000; Ruf et al. 2001).
Failure to carefully match CSP and CFP measures with the same stakeholder group orientation
has been an issue behind prior inconclusive findings (Ullmann 1985; Jones 1995; Wood and
Jones 1995; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003). This implies that different performance
measures might be associated with different stakeholder groups and might vary across context
(Carroll 1979; Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Miller and Bromiley 1990; Wood 1991; Hill and Jones
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1992; Jones 1995; Wood and Jones 1995; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; Barnett 2007;
Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007). Consequently, I use multiple CFP outcome measures to
evaluate the influence of CFP factors on performance, and to capture the interests of related
groups of stakeholders.
In this study, I use an external assessment of CSP based on organizational outcomes,
policies, and procedures, and a range of CFP measures for organizations in a variety of industries
across three years. I contribute to the literature by evaluating four different models, reflecting
different measurement levels of CSP, for their ability to explain variance across CFP outcomes.
Patterns of significance across CSP components as they differ among CFP outcomes are also
examined for potential evidence linking specific outcomes to specific stakeholder groups. I find
the appropriate CSP measurement level, and the strength of the relationship, is related to the
degree of aggregated performance in the CFP measure. I find that revenue, which is the least
aggregated measure and most predominantly associated with a single stakeholder group
(customers), has the strongest CSP-CFP relationship and is best described by the model using
issue-level CSP component measurement. Measures of net cash flows, reflecting greater
aggregated performance and two or more predominant stakeholder groups, are better described
by a directional component model and have a weaker overall CSP-CFP relationship. Change in
stock price, although associated with one predominant stakeholder group, might operate at such a
high level of aggregation that no association with CSP was found at any measurement level, or
might reflect the dominance of financial outcome goals for the associated stakeholder group
(shareholders). I also find that issues are not treated homogeneously (some are dichotomous
scales, some are measures of exposure, some are directional measures) and there are clear
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differences in sensitivity to, and associations among, CSP components across CFP outcomes.
These findings are important for researchers in helping to clarify measurement issues within the
fields of CSR research and stakeholder theory. The results are also important for managers in
understanding how CSR policies, processes, and outcomes affect different groups of key
stakeholders and CFP measures, and in clarifying why the effort to measure and voluntarily
disclose CSP is worthwhile.
The paper is organized into five sections. Section two reviews relevant literature on
stakeholder theory and the CSP-CFP link and develops the research hypotheses. Section three
describes the research design, datasets, and measures used. Section four presents the results of
testing the competing measurement models across the range of CFP outcome measures. Section
five concludes with a summary of key research findings and a discussion of the implications of
these findings for future research.

Literature Review and Research Questions

Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Social Performance

Roberts and Mahoney (2004) group stakeholder research into three levels of analysis:
managerial agency, organizational, and societal. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976)
focuses on principal-agent contracts and costs among owners, creditors, and managers, but fails
to incorporate (often implicit) contracts with other key groups (Cornell and Shapiro 1987). As a
result, stakeholder theory at the managerial agency level of analysis tends to focus on
maximizing profit for shareholders and might ignore long-term costs to the organization or
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society at large (e.g., unionization, increased governmental regulation, cleanup of Super Fund
sites, etc.) from short-sighted or irresponsible decisions (Blacconiere and Patten 1994;
McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Patten 2002; Mackey, Mackey, and Barney 2007). From a
societal level of analysis, legitimacy theory (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) posits that society
allocates scarce resources to those organizations involved in activities that are economically
viable, legal, and legitimate, with legitimacy defined as reflecting societal norms and values
(Carroll 1979). This implies that organizations are judged on more than simply maximizing
economic performance and are dependent on the judgments of society as a whole. Freeman’s
(1984) introduction of stakeholder theory, with its specific conceptualization of key stakeholder
groups affecting (or affected by) organizational performance links legitimacy theory and agency
theory and functions most clearly at the organizational level of analysis.
Stakeholder theory incorporates consideration of the values, interests, and goals of
multiple stakeholder groups. Stakeholder groups have claims on the firm, but because claims are
more implicit than explicit, stakeholder groups recognize they are vulnerable to moral hazard
(Cornell and Shapiro 1987), especially in terms of the completeness and accuracy of information
provided by management. The successful organization recognizes this and will signal its
intention (via the voluntary provision of information on performance areas of interest) to align
processes and outputs with the concerns and goals of stakeholder groups. By moving beyond
mandated performance and disclosure (agency theory) and incorporating the non-mandated
values and expectations of non-shareholder groups (stakeholder theory), the organization is able
to demonstrate its legitimacy (Lindblom 2010) and honor implicit contracts.
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Under stakeholder theory, management is faced with multiple (often competing)
stakeholder groups with differing levels of urgency, power, and importance (Mitchell, Agle, and
Wood 1997). Jones (1995) synthesized stakeholder concepts, economic theory, insights from
behavior science, and ethics in developing instrumental stakeholder theory to explain
organizational management of (and prioritization among) competing stakeholder interests. In
general, because costs are incurred to avoid opportunism, markets reward those able to contract
efficiently by providing credible information to stakeholders. Therefore, ceteris paribus,
stakeholder assessments of organizational credibility, trustworthiness, and integrity reduce
agency costs and produce a competitive advantage.4 How the organization responds to
stakeholder groups, and which groups it regards as key, will therefore influence financial
performance. The theory specifically allows for organizational behavior and relevant CSP
factors to vary across stakeholder groups, subcultures within those groups,5 and, presumably,
situations (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; Barnett 2007; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007).
Although the theoretical focus on stakeholder groups has produced a proliferation of claims for a
wide range of groups,6 this study focuses on key stakeholder groups defined as those that have
expectations of future benefit (or harm) from organizational actions or products (Donaldson and
Preston 1995).7

4

Interestingly, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) assert that firms employing CSR to manage stakeholder relationships
have higher costs, but also enjoy higher revenues because they operate on a higher demand curve at every price than
do non-CSR firms.
5
For example, an organization might have: activist and non-activist customers; suppliers determined by competitive
bid and those tightly linked into the supply chain via a strategic partnership; domestic employees and international
employees, etc.
6
Up to and including the planet itself.
7
Stakeholder groups are identified by their interests in the organization, whether or not the organization has a
corresponding interest in them. This implies that some areas of CSR that organizations currently regard as
unimportant (and consequently do not monitor or manage) might have unexpected influences on financial
performance (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007).
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Once we have accepted that other stakeholder groups beyond shareholders are important
in determining organizational performance, addressing the expectations (and subsequent
evaluations) of these stakeholders becomes necessary. These expectations usually go beyond
simple profit maximization to include questions of fairness, ethics, governance, environmental
stewardship, and so on. Stakeholder interests tend to be more complex and require tradeoffs
among multiple performance goals. Although Friedman famously equated any consideration of
goals beyond shareholder profit maximization as “theft and appropriation,” he acknowledged
that the organizational responsibility “to make as much money as possible” was contingent upon
simultaneously “conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom” (1970, 33).
Management’s choice of the appropriate CSP components to incorporate into
organizational policies and processes depends not only on their identification of key stakeholder
groups, but also on perceived effectiveness of CSP and an understanding of the salient indirect
links to CFP outcomes. Management’s evaluation of components/associations can vary from a
Friedman-like measurement of future cash flows and maximization of market value (Mackey,
Mackey, and Barney 2007) to a wider duty to society and the public good (Margolis and Walsh
2003). Carroll’s (1979) four-factor model of corporate performance (economic, legal, ethical,
and discretionary) specifically noted that relevant social issues will differ both within and across
industries, implying that (a) the significant CSP components affecting CFP outcomes will also
vary across industries and/or (b) the ability of individual managements to identify key
stakeholder groups and related critical CSP factors also varies within groups. Unfortunately,
prior research in the CSP-CFP relationship has been plagued by methodology issues associated
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with inconsistent findings (Alexander and Buchholz 1978; Ullmann 1985; Wood and Jones
1995; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003) and that have largely
not been examined beyond questions of the appropriate datasets to use for the operationalization
of CSP construct(s).

Measures of Corporate Social Performance

The measures for CSP vary widely and have not been standardized. Definitions of key
terms and operationalization of the construct(s) might be inappropriately related, ambiguous, or
inconsistent (Ullmann 1985; Wood and Jones 1995; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003). For
example, operationalizations frequently include reputational measures (often self-reported),
quantitative outcomes, categorical counts of the existence of a program/policy (regardless of
effectiveness), or qualitative textual analysis of corporate disclosures or news releases. There are
considerable differences between corporate reputation and corporate behavior, and studies that
do not consider this difference in analyzing relationships to CFP might create spurious findings.
Reputational and disclosure measures of CSR reflect internal actions and decisions. This study
focuses on the link among corporate actions or positions taken and the association with related
economic outcomes, so CSP measures are limited to those representing outcomes, policies, and
programs.
Although the overall conclusion of recent research is that CSR has at least a slight
positive association with CFP, the mechanism by which this occurs remains unclear (Cormier
and Magnan 1999; Ruf et al. 2001; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes
2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Doh et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Eccles,
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Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). A major cause of the uncertainty rests with inconsistency in the
construction or measurement level of CSP variables. Prior research has tended either to examine
a single, limited aspect of CSP (e.g., environmental performance, human rights concerns,
governance, etc.) or to use a single, aggregated measure to incorporate all aspects of CSP equally
(Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007). The CSP-CFP link might be better established using
individual measures for separate CSP components, and not all components assumed to be
significant in determining CSP might actually be so (or might vary depending on the CFP
measure used to measure CSP-influenced performance). Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003),
for example, in a meta-analysis of prior research found that environmental performance
measures had a weaker direct relationship with CFP than social performance, and Berman et al.
(1999) have found evidence that some CSP components might have an indirect relationship to
CFP by moderating the relationship between strategy and performance. A high level of
aggregation might hide significant variances in performance among individual components, and
firms might consciously use this in order to bury poor performance in a key area with multiple
reports of good performance in less important areas (Arya and Mittendorf 2005). Stakeholders
might also differentially weight aspects of CSP performance and consciously engage in tradeoffs in performance across CSP areas. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1a: CSP component measures will explain a greater amount of variance
in CFP measures than an aggregated overall CSP measure.
Negative and positive CSP might not be weighted equally: stakeholders might
overweight negative information or perceive positive information to be less credible (Patten
2002; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009; Linthicum 2010).
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Prior capital markets research has demonstrated that directional (positive vs. negative) measures
might be significantly more sensitive in establishing a statistical relation between CFP-oriented
predictors and outcomes (Ball and Brown 1968), and the same effect might exist for CSP
measures if stakeholders are more sensitive to reports of negative performance in key areas.8 As
a result, models incorporating CSP components that have different weights for positive and
negative performance or which might have only one significant directional score might be more
sensitive to the CSP-CFP link when CFP outcomes are properly matched with stakeholder
groups. As a result, I derive my second hypothesis:
H1b: Directional CSP component measures will explain a greater amount
of variance in CFP measures than aggregated CSP component
measures.
If greater disaggregation results in greater explanatory power and there are differences in
how directional measures affect the underlying component, then there might be another
measurement level to be assessed. Research has largely focused on broad categories of CSP that
are often based on reporting (or ratings agency) frameworks and that have very little variation
among number of categories or issues within categories among competing frameworks. I have
also followed this approach, adopting the seven components utilized by KLD STATS:
Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human
Rights, and Product.9 Even this level of analysis, however, might be too aggregated.
Stakeholders might focus on a specific issues or sub-categories within the CSP component scores

8

This would conform to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory explaining decision making under
conditions of risk.
9
For a more complete discussion, please see the research design section.
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(e.g., child labor under Human Rights, Superfund designation under Environment, or excessive
executive compensation under Corporate Governance). Consequently, a factor analysis of items
within the CSP components might indicate that each component actually reflects evaluations of
performance for separate groups of items (reflecting underlying key issues), leading to the third
hypothesis:
H1c: Issue-oriented CSP component measures, based on significant
factors within each component, will explain a greater amount of
variance in CFP measures than directional CSP component
measures.

Measures of Corporate Financial Performance

Another methodological issue in the determination of the CSP-CFP relationship centers
on the choice of the measure of CFP outcome and the degree to which the chosen measures
predominantly reflect the interests and influence of a single stakeholder group (Wood and Jones
1995). Prior work has focused on accounting or market-based CFP outcome variables such as
Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), stock price, or earnings (Margolis and Walsh
2001). These outcome measures reflect the performance concerns of investors and shareholders
who primarily concentrate on financial performance. Thus, associations with measures of nonfinancial performance (i.e., CSP factors) might not be significant. To adequately capture the
effect of CSP on CFP, it is necessary to choose a range of CFP measures that capture the
interests of key stakeholder groups.
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For example, in considering the appropriate CFP outcome to associate with a CSP issue
(e.g., human rights concerns for child labor in overseas sweat shops), researchers should consider
which stakeholders (1) set expectations (customers, activist groups), (2) experience the direct
effect of company behavior (suppliers, employees), (3) evaluate company performance
(customers, activist groups), and (4) take action in response to corporate behavior (customers,
activist groups) (Wood and Jones 1995). In other words, measures of whether child labor is
involved in company manufacturing activity would probably not show a clear relationship to
stock price, as the stakeholder group most clearly associated with stock price (shareholders) does
not directly experience the effect of the company behavior. The same measure of child labor
linked with sales revenue, however, should show a much clearer picture as customers set
expectations of behavior, evaluate performance, and act in response to that evaluation by making
a decision whether to boycott the company’s product.
The level of aggregated performance represented by the chosen CFP outcome measure is
also important. Measures based on stock market performance are often focused on short-term
horizons, arbitrage opportunities due to momentary – and artificial – differences in value (Zhang
2010), and economic performance indicators (e.g., analyst earnings forecasts). Stock-marekt
based measures might therefore be insensitive to the effect of CSP on intervening constructs such
as learning, operational effectiveness, or strategy and their influence on longer-term economic
performance. Accounting-based measures, such as ROA, might operate at too aggregated a
performance level – such that CSP linkages to specific, focused measures of CFP become
insignificant when those focused measures are “rolled up” into overall performance ratios.
Different CSP components (or the factor-based issues within those components) capture different
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risks to which the organization is exposed (and the degree to which organizational behavior
affects those risks), and the relationship between these CSP-determined risks and potential CFP
measures might vary based on the predominant stakeholder interest represented by the CFP
measure, because different stakeholder groups assess the same risks differently (Miller and
Bromiley 1990; Barnett 2007; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Margolis, Elfenbein, and
Walsh 2007; Lindblom 2010).10 Additionally, accrual based measures might add noise to the
analysis by increasing the difficulty of linking CSP actions and decisions to the actual, current
CFP actions and decisions. Outcome measures based on cash flow, on the other hand might be
more sensitive to CSP influence due to their capture of “real time” effects, and not the noise
caused by different recognition timelines. Net cash flow measures may also serve as a measure
of earnings quality, and earnings quality measures – with their incorporation of transparency,
honesty, and integrity – might be more sensitive to the CSP influence on CFP outcomes.
Consequently, prior conflicting or weak research findings might be related to the aggregation
level or accrual/cash basis of CFP outcomes measures, as well as to the measurement level of the
CSP measures.
In general, CSP will be positively associated with CFP as organizations are able to
demonstrate their legitimacy, and, thus, receive greater allocations of scarce resources.
Individual CSP components will vary in strength of association among CFP outcomes based on
the similarity among the predominant stakeholder group(s) represented by each measure.
Although better CSP performance will produce increased economic performance in the long run,
it is possible that there might be a negative association in the short run if current expenditures are
10

Paine (2003) seems to suggest that the ethics components of CSP specifically affect risk via information
credibility and costs, which then influence CFP.
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required to produce later efficiencies or increased profitability. This study focuses on the
business case for CSR, and the degree to which decisions and actions taken to reflect greater
CSR will be associated with concurrent greater CFP due to a greater focus on operational
efficiency and effectiveness, innovation, waste reduction, strategic matching, risk reduction, and
stakeholder engagement.
Prior research has concentrated to a large degree on outcomes related to market
performance. As such, these measures tend to concentrate on economic- and accrual-based
performance. Measures focusing on operations and cash-based performance have been
underutilized. The assumption has been that stock prices adequately reflect and incorporate
long-term value and expectations of future cash flow. However, as Zhang (2010) demonstrated,
High Frequency Trading (HFT) now predominates in the US capital markets, reducing
investment horizons to an average of seven months, and significantly distorting market
performance (specifically through the market’s inability to quickly or accurately incorporate
information). Consequently, there is valid cause for concern that market-based measures do not
reflect long-term value and growth prospects, nor do they capture CSP influence.
Stakeholder theory implies that different stakeholder groups will emphasize different
CSP concerns and goals, which implies that different CFP outcome measures might be
associated more strongly with different stakeholder groups and that there might not be a single
CFP measure that adequately captures the association between CSP and CFP outcomes for all
stakeholder groups. Prior findings have indicated that there are significant differences in
preferred outcome measures among shareholders and other stakeholder groups (Miller and
Bromiley 1990; Wood and Jones 1995; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Grow, Hamm, and Lee
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2005; Boehe and Cruz 2010; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2007). However, there has been
considerable difficulty in disaggregating the various stakeholder groups (Wood and Jones 1995).
I approach the problem from the other direction: by inspecting varying patterns of significant
CSP components loading onto a range of CFP outcome measures, I attempt to match the revealed
associations to the most likely associated stakeholder group responding to Wood and Jones’
(1995) criticism of “mismatched” CSP-CFP linkages (i.e., an “appropriate” match between CSP
and CFP measures). The mismatch appears to be based on both the overall association of the
CFP measure with CSP (i.e., does stock price reflect concerns with CSR or simply a limited
range of economic indicators?) and the appropriate match of the individual CFP measure with a
CSP measure reflecting the same predominant stakeholder group(s) (reflected in the pattern of
associated significant CSP components critical to that stakeholder group). Therefore, I
investigate two related research questions:
RQ2a: Do CFP outcome measures differ in their sensitivity to CSP?
RQ2b: Are CFP outcome measures associated with different CSP
components?

Research Design and Measures

Population and Data

The population for the study consists of organizations receiving a CSR rating from KLD
STATS across the three year period 2007 to 2009. This period was chosen to reflect years in
which the economy was good (2007), bad (2008), and recovering (2009) to address performance
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across a range of economic conditions. The designation for each year was based on the annual
percentage change in GDP: 2007 had a 2.33% increase, 2008 a 2.73% decrease, and 2009
displayed an early stage of recovery with a small, but positive, increase (0.25%).11 Across this
time period, there were 8,772 firm-years with KLD ratings. Financial performance and firm
characteristic data were then extracted from Compustat for as many of these companies as
possible, resulting in a sample size of 8,138 firm-years (2,643 in 2007; 2,723 in 2008; 2,772 in
2009).
KLD Research and Analytics’12 KLD STATS13 database provides annual ratings of
approximately 3,100 of the largest US companies by market capitalization. KLD has a strong
qualitative component and is based on independent evaluations of an organization’s degree of
exposure to risk or superior performance across CSP categories. These evaluations are based to
a large degree on the objective presence/absence of a program or involvement in (or absence of)
relevant controversies. Wood’s (1991) model of CSP based on Carroll (1979) positions CSP as
impacts, programs, or policies; consequently, KLD STATS scores for the presence/absence of
these items align well with theoretical models. Investors have been shown to prefer such thirdparty reports, even with greater information costs, due to credibility and timeliness issues
(Kothari, Li, and Short 2009); thus, KLD STATS is deemed a valid source of external
assessment of organizational CSR performance and is widely used in the literature.
The database provides scores across seven major CSR areas: Community, Corporate
Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product. A
11

The average annual percentage change in GDP from 2000 to 2006 was 2.48%.
KLD STATS has recently been purchased by MSCI ESG Research, which provides investment support tools to
clients worldwide.
13
“STATS” stands for Statistical Tool of Analyzing Trends in Social and Environmental Performance and is now
found at www.msci.com/products/esg/stats.
12
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difficulty with KLD stats in prior years arose from the change within each component as new
CSP issues arose or were resolved. For example, organizations doing business in South Africa
once received a concern score (now eliminated) and several social items have migrated across
categories. Fortunately, major shifts in composition took place in 2002, well before the study
timeframe, and categories seem to have stabilized.14 Table 2 displays the number of items across
categories which can vary considerably. Prior criticism has focused on problems with
comparability due to variance in items between and among components. After conducting tests
on summed scores, I also converted scores to percentages and conducted additional analyses with
no significant differences in findings. Summed scores are preferred as they are more easily
interpretable and provide a measure of relative exposure to CSR expectations via the number of
items within strength and concern scores for each category.

Research Model

Relationships between CSP components and CFP outcomes are tested using correlational
analysis and the competing measurement models are tested for each outcome measure using
hierarchical regression. The general model tested is (subscripts for firm-years are omitted for
simplicity):
,

(1)

where:

14

Nevertheless, two items were eliminated because they were not present in all years of the study period. Of those
three items, only one had any companies scoring positively on the item (10 in 2008, 5 in 2009).
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CFPp

= one of the group of p outcome measures (PRCHG, FINCF, INVCF, OPSCF,
REV);

Β0

= the intercept;

Γ1

= vector of slope coefficients for CSPq;

CSPq

= one of q measurement models for CSP scores (overall, component, directional,
item-based); and

ε

= error term containing CFP variance not contributed to by CSP.

Measures

Dependent Variables

Five measures of CFP outcomes chosen to potentially represent the predominant interests
of varying stakeholder groups are used within each of the four, alternate measurement models.15
The percentage price change in the closing stock price at fiscal year-end, [(Pricet – Pricet1)/Pricet-1],

captures stock market performance (PRCHG) and represents shareholders. Three

measures of cash flow are used to capture cash-based, “real time” operational performance: net
cash flows from financing activities (FINCF), from investing activities (INVCF), and from
operating activities (OPSCF). Within the cash flow measures, FINCF, in its focus on financing
decisions, might predominantly capture management’s decisions involving investors and lenders
15

While all stakeholder groups should be interested in all aspects of performance, most groups should also tend to
concentrate predominantly on a few measures due to simple heuristic and saliency effects on their decision making.
For example, shareholders will focus on quarterly earnings reports, analysts’ expectations, and share price
movements (see Zhang 2010), whereas suppliers might focus more on cash flows, inventory levels, and investment
plans. The key here is that different stakeholder groups will have different dominant concerns, even though they
might (and should) incorporate multiple aspects of financial and non-financial performance.
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as stakeholders. INVCF focuses on long-term investments in property, plant, and equipment and
might capture relationships with local communities and governments and expectations regarding
future regulation and taxation. OPSCF is used to represent relationships with employees,
suppliers, and management.16 All three measures are scaled by total assets to control for size
effects. Finally, revenue (REV) is also used as a measure of (product) market performance,
predominantly reflects actions and interests of customers, and is also scaled by total assets.
While other studies have used a relatively few measures, the range of outcome measures used in
this study is designed to respond to Wood and Jones’ (1995) call to choose financial outcome
measures that are matched to the interests, evaluations, and actions of stakeholder groups
represented by the CSP measures used.

Independent Variables

KLD STATS reports dichotomous (1 = present) scores for multiple items categorized as
“strength” or “concern” within each of seven categories:
COM =

Community (Charitable giving, educational support, disadvantaged housing
support, volunteer programs, in-kind giving, charitable drives, investment
controversies, negative economic impact, tax disputes, etc.);

CGOV =

Corporate Governance (executive compensation, ownership strength,
transparency, political accountability, public policy support, etc.);

16

OPSCF also incorporates relationships with customers, as does REV. Both measures are retained in order to
contrast the effects of aggregation level and number of predominant stakeholder groups.
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DIV =

Diversity (female/minority presence in top ranks, as CEO, on Board, or as
contractors; promotion, work/life benefits, employment of disabled, Gay &
Lesbian policies, controversies, etc.);

EMP =

Employee Relations (union relations, profit sharing program, employee
involvement, retirement benefits and pension, health and safety, workforce
reductions, etc.);

ENV =

Environment (beneficial products/services, pollution prevention, recycling, clean
energy, management systems, hazardous waste, regulatory problems, emissions,
agricultural chemicals, climate change, etc.);

HUM =

Human Rights (indigenous peoples relations, labor rights, involvement in Burma,
etc.);

PRO =

Product (quality, research and development, innovation, product safety,
marketing/contracting practices, antitrust, mission to disadvantaged, etc.).
Within each component, items are grouped into strength and concern categories and

summed (both summations producing positive values) for each firm-year. The individual
strength [e.g., HUM(+)] and concern scores [e.g., CGOV(-)] for each component are then used in
the directional component measurement model. The component strength and concern scores are
combined (strength – concern) to produce the score for the component measurement model,
which might be a positive or negative value. The seven component scores are then summed to
produce the score for the overall measurement model which might, again, be either positive or
negative. For both component and overall measurement models, a negative score represents a
preponderance of concern items. An oblique factor analysis is conducted for all items (strength
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and concern) within each component and the resulting scores for each factor are then used in the
item-based component model.

Additional Variables of Interest

This study concentrates on measurement issues, and not on the construction of a
predictive model to estimate the effects of individual firm characteristics. Consequently, certain
qualitative variables that might produce variation based on categorical membership are used to
partition the sample for sensitivity tests following the main analyses. These variables reflect
profitability (net loss/net gain for reported net income), economic conditions (based on the three
years of the study), and country of incorporation (United States or Other). The appropriate level
of measurement should remain constant across partitions, although sensitivity to and patterns
among significant CSP factors might vary.

Analysis and Discussion

An examination of descriptive statistics for each of the variables highlights some
interesting relationships (Table 3). PRCHG shows a positive mean value, but a very large
standard deviation. Mean INVCF is negative, reflecting the expected outflow of cash in
organizational investments in property, plant, and equipment, with levels very similar to OPSCF.
Overall CSP is negative, but with a fairly large range. Individual CSP components vary, with
most having negative means. At the directional level (where both strength and concern scores
are represented by a positive, summed number), there is considerable variation within the mean
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and the range of scores. All factor-based issue scores have, by construction, identical means of 0
and standard deviations of 1; ranges, however, display considerable variation.
Directional scores, although more sensitive to different weights placed on strengths and
concerns, might not sufficiently handle differences in weighting among issues. Some CSR
issues might be predominantly negative, others predominantly positive, and others might be
equally balanced. Some issues might have relatively few concern items, but those items might
be so sensitive that they become highly weighted (e.g., use of child slave labor in outsourced
production).17 If this were the case, measurement of CSP outcomes on an issue-based level
would result in greater explanations of variance for the CFP outcome measure. Principal
component analysis (PCA) was conducted on all seven of the CSP components, using oblique
rotation (oblimin) as inter-component items and factors are expected to be related to each other
(Table 4). The pattern matrix reported allows the clearest interpretation of the contribution of
individual items to each factor; although less easily interpretable, the structure matrix is reported
as it incorporates the interdependent effects of items on each other (much as multiple regression
does for a group of outcome variables).
For COM (Panel A), the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling
adequacy was .67, and all KMO values for individual items were greater than .639, which is well
above the acceptable limit of .5 (Field 2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity Χ2(55) = 3301.478, p <
.001, indicated that correlations among items were sufficiently large for the PCA. An initial
analysis resulted in three factors with eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and which, in
17

These highly sensitive items are also the most fluid and ephemeral, often representing the current public “hot
button” based on recent disasters or press releases. However, certain items are consistently of high salience and
concern and would remain on this list over time and across stakeholder groups (e.g., regulatory fines for nuclear
operators or concerns about inadequate storage of nuclear fuel rods).
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combination, explained 37.38% of the variance. After inspecting the scree plot, I retained all
three factors in the final analysis. Factor loadings after rotation suggest that COM1 represents
community support (education, volunteerism, promotion of self-sufficiency among economically
disadvantaged, affordable housing), COM2 represents the economic impact of operations on the
community (community reinvestment, negative economic effects, affordable housing support,
tax disputes), and COM3 represents charitable giving (charitable and in-kind giving, community
opposition). Because charitable giving seems to be associated with controversies mobilizing
community opposition, this is likely reactive charitable giving.
For CGOV (Panel B), after I dropped two items with inadequate individual KMO values,
the remaining ten items had an overall KMO = .65 and the lowest individual item was KMO =
.515. Bartlett’s test of sphericity, Χ2(45) = 3311.188, p < .001, confirmed sufficient inter-item
correlation for the PCA. Four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 resulted in 51.26%
combined explanation of variance. Factor loadings after rotation suggest that CGOV1 represents
accountability (transparency, political accountability, support for public policy benefitting the
environment and society), CGOV2 represents executive compensation levels (positively related
to limited compensation and negatively related to excessive compensation),18 CGOV3 represents
the (predominantly negative) tone at the top (presence of a strong corporate culture, ethics
problems, failure to support public policy benefitting the environment and society), and CGOV4
represents failure/inability to address CSR issues (presence of a weak corporate culture,
controlled by another firm with CSR problems/controls another firm with CSR problems).

18

Limited compensation is considered to be less than $500,000 per year for a CEO or $30,000 per year for outside
directors; the organization is considered to have excessive compensation when exceeding $10 million per year for a
CEO or $100,000 per year for outside directors.
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All items loaded adequately on DIV (Panel C), overall KMO = .764, individual KMO
scores > .592, Bartlett’s X2(55) = 9936.119, p < .001. Three factors explained 45.44% of
combined variation. After rotation, item loadings suggest that DIV1 represents the openness of
the work environment to the concerns of diverse groups (work/life benefits, women and minority
contracting, employment of disabled, gay & lesbian policies, commitment to diversity), DIV2
represents non representativeness (such that a minority/female CEO, promotion of
minorities/females to line positions, and presence of minorities/women/disabled on the board of
directors are negatively associated with this factor and a lack of women on the board or among
senior line managers is positively associated with it), and DIV3 represents exposure to
Affirmative Action/diversity controversies (recent substantial fines/penalties, involvement in
controversies, lack of commitment to diversity).
One item was dropped from EMP (Panel D), with the final model displaying an overall
KMO = .620, individual KMO scores > .571, and Bartlett’s X2(45) = 2748.384, p < .001. Initial
analysis extracted four factors with a combined explained variance of 50.79%. Item loadings
following rotation suggest that EMP1 represents the general work environment (good union
relations, strong health and safety programs, and recent involvement in or finds from major
health and safety controversies). Because EMP1 shows a positive correlation with recent
involvement in Health/Safety controversy, this suggests responsiveness to employee concerns.
Loadings on EMP2 suggest employee involvement (cash and profit sharing, stock options,
information sharing, and other initiatives), on EMP3 suggest poor employee relations (history of
poor union relations, other employee relations controversy), and on EMP4 suggest concerns
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about pension funding and retirement obligations (negatively correlated with retirement benefits
strength and positively correlated with underfunded or inadequate retirement benefits programs).
One item was also dropped from the original analysis of ENV. The resulting analysis
(Panel E) has an overall KMO = .796, all individual KMO measures > .692, Bartlett’s X2(66) =
10938.843, p < .001, and three factors with a combined explained variance of 42.99%.
Following rotation, item loadings suggest that ENV1 represents exposure to operational energy
and pollution concerns (hazardous waste liabilities/penalties, fines/penalties for air/water
violations, excessive toxic emissions, revenues highly related to coal/oil combustion, other
controversy, significant recent efforts to increase energy efficiency and/or use clean or renewable
fuels), ENV2 represents proactive internal operational control and efficiency (pollution
prevention programs, recycling programs, management systems and certification, proactive
activities), and ENV3 seems to represent an industrial variable, with negative values representing
oil/coal exposure and positive values representing agricultural chemical exposure.
One item was also dropped from the initial analysis of HUM. The final analysis (Panel
F) produced an overall KMO = .572, all individual KMO > .503, Bartlett’s X2(15) = 2315.845, p
< .001, with three factors with a combined explained variance of 63.73%. After rotation, HUM1
seems to represent exposure to human/indigenous rights issues (transparency/disclosure,
indigenous right concerns, other human rights controversies) and HUM2 seems to represent
exposure to offshoring or overseas outsourcing issues (transparency in disclosure and
monitoring, labor rights initiatives, labor standard controversies in supply chain). Both HUM1
and HUM2 are measures of exposure to these issues, not performance, as both strengths and
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concerns load positively on the related factors. Finally, HUM3, with its single item for
involvement in Burma, seems to be a measure of political exposure.
Finally, analysis of PRO resulted in overall KMO = .621, all individual KMO > .519, and
Bartlett’s X2(28) = 1752.560, p < .001 (Panel G). Initial extraction produced three factors with a
combined explained variance of 46.10%. Following rotation, item loadings suggest that PRO1
represents unethical treatment of consumers (product safety violations/fines, consumer fraud,
misleading advertising, antitrust violations, predatory pricing, defective products, treatment of
franchisees, etc.), PRO2 represents a reputation as a market leader in the quality and innovation
of its products, and PRO3 represents a social mission.

Evidence on Appropriate Measurement Level

Once scores were calculated for each of the four measurement models (overall,
component, directional, and item-based), a series of hierarchical regressions was conducted on
each of the five CFP outcome measures (Table 5). Overall measures of R2 are very small as
much of CFP is associated with organizational size, and is controlled for in the model by scaling
four of the five outcome variables.
Overall CSP was only able to contribute to the explanation of variance within REV but at
an extremely low level (F = 56.949, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .007). None of the measurement
levels produced a model able to explain PRCHG adequately, highlighting the poor linkage
between stock-market based performance and CSP. Component, directional, and issue based
measurement levels all produced models with significant F-values for the remaining CFP
outcomes. Change in R2 indicates that the component level of measurement was able to explain
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a greater amount of variance than an overall measure (H1a) and directional measures of CSP
explained more variance in CFP outcome than component level (H1b). Results for H1c are
mixed. The issue-based (factorial analysis of KLD STATS component) CSP measurement
model explained more variance in REV than directional scores (change in R2 = .024, p < .001,
adjusted R2 = .072), but there was no significant improvement in the directional model for
FINCF, INVCF, or OPSCF; in fact, adjusted R2 decreased slightly for FINCF and OPSCF. In
general, it would appear that CSP should be measured at the directional level for net cash flow
measures, and at the issue level for revenue, while market based measures are insensitive to the
effect of CSP on CFP.

Evidence on Varying Association with CSP among CFP Measures

Correlations among outcome variables are all well below .80 (n. r.), indicating that
multicollinearity is not an issue and different aspects of CFP are being captured by each measure.
In fact, the two outcome measures of most concern, REV and OPSCF, are only correlated at r =
.207, p < .001. Within CSP scores, all component scores are significantly (p < .001) positively
correlated with the overall score (n. r.). As would be expected within directional scores, strength
scores are significantly positively correlated and concern scores are significantly negatively
correlated with the overall score (p <.001). Strength and concern scores also load appropriately
onto each of the component scores (p < .001, n. r.), with the exception of HUM(+) which is
insignificant. There are four directional measures with very high loadings on the associated
component score (at r = .80 or better): CGOV(-), DIV(+), HUM(-), and PRO(-). The issue is
more complicated at the issue-based score level (Table 6). All three COM factors are positively
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correlated with component COM and all three HUM factors are negatively correlated with
component HUM; the other component scores have mixed correlations with their factors, but all
are at a p < .001 significance level. There are three factors with very high loadings on the
underlying component score, and which appear to be driving that component: CGOV2
(executive compensation), DIV2 (non-representativeness), and PRO1 (unethical treatment of
consumers).
Correlations among predictors and outcomes provide an insight into the conflicting
results in prior research and the degree to which CSP measurement level affects results as all
CSP measures are not correlated with all CFP outcomes, nor does a single CSP measure show
consistent directionality among CFP outcomes. The overall measure (Table 7, Panel A) is
correlated negatively to REV and uncorrelated with all other outcomes. Neither COM nor ENV
is correlated to any of the outcome measures. CGOV and DIV have opposite effects on all
measures except PRCHG (with which they are uncorrelated). EMP is negatively correlated with
PRCHG (the only component to be correlated with this outcome) and REV. Both HUM and
PRO are positively correlated with FINCF and negatively correlated with OPSCF; HUM is also
negatively correlated with REV and PRO is negatively correlated with INVCF.
There are more correlations among directional components and CFP measures (Panel B).
The outcome measure most related to shareholders and market performance, PRCHG, is only
correlated with EMP(-) (r = .037, p < .010), such that a higher concern score produces greater
change in stock price. FINCF is correlated with 13 out of 14 CSP directional scores, INVCF
with 4 out of 14, OPSCF with 12 out of 14, and REV with 11 out of 14; this partially supports
RQ2a by confirming a significant association between CSP and CFP measures, although the
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relative strength of the association is very low. There are clear differences among CFP outcomes
both in which CSP measures are significant and in the direction of the relationship, providing
support for RQ2b by confirming that outcomes are differently affected by CSP. Intuitively,
increased strengths should be associated with greater legitimacy and therefore greater resource
allocation and superior opportunities, and increased concerns with decreased legitimacy,
resource allocation, and opportunities, but many of the directional component relationships do
not reflect this expectation The counter-intuitive interpretation suggests that CSP might not be a
simple matter of the relative quantity of strengths versus concerns, but might better be measured
by issues within each component, with each issue containing some combination of strengths
and/or concerns.
Correlations among issue-based factors and CSP outcomes are displayed in Panel C.
There are different patterns of directionality and significance among individual factors and CFP
outcomes, supporting RQ2b’s assertion that CSP impacts on CFP outcomes are not
homogeneous. There are also differences in the number of significant factors (and the degree of
relationship) associated with each CFP measures, supporting RQ2a’s assertion that CFP
outcomes are not equally sensitive to CSP. For example, PRCHG proves to be uncorrelated with
any item-based measure of CSP, while FINCF is significantly correlated with 20 out of 23
factors. HUM1, HUM2, and PRO3 are uncorrelated with any of the tested CFP outcomes, while
COM2, CGOV2, DIV1, and DIV2 are correlated with all CFP measures except PRCHG. It
should be noted that the correlations, although significant, are not large (absolute values range
from .012 to .163, both for REV).
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In considering the CSP-CFP relationship when CFP is regressed on CSP at the directional
level, there are clear differences in patterns of significant CSP scores across outcomes (Table 8).
Referring back to the hierarchical regression results reported in Table 7, INVCF is the least
sensitive (adjusted R2 = .005) and REV the most sensitive (adjusted R2 = .049), with OPSCF
similar to INVCF (adjusted R2 = .009) and FINCF (adjusted R2 = .022) between INVCF and
REV (RQ2a). The very small adjusted R2 values suggest that the CFP outcome measures used
might still be too aggregated to display the influence of CSP, and a finer level of analysis might
better demonstrate the linkage.
For INVCF, only three concern scores are significant, with CGOV(-) leading to net cash
inflows and DIV(-) and ENV(-) leading to net cash outflows. For REV, both measures of COM,
CGOV, and EMP are significant, as are DIV(+) and HUM(-). EMP concerns have by far the
largest effect on REV [nearly twice the size as the next largest effects, COM(+) and COM(-)].
All four CFP measures show different patterns of significant directional scores and of the
directional scores that are associated with more than one CFP outcome, only CGOV(+) shows
the same directional relationship for all CFP outcomes. Only ENV concerns show any
significant association across CFP outcomes, with greater concerns producing greater net cash
outflows from investing activities. Likewise, only concern scores for HUM are significantly
associated with CFP, as an increase in HUM(-) results in a corresponding increase in REV.
Neither directional score for PRO is significantly associated with any CFP measures, which
would suggest that perhaps the directional score is not capturing the effect of CSP on CFP as we
would logically expect issues of product quality, innovation, and monopoly to have significant
effects on REV, at the very least.
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Issue level analysis of the CSP relationship to CFP outcomes proves somewhat easier to
analyze (Table 9). Excessive executive pay, negative tone at the top, and employee antagonism
reduce FINCF, as do good employee relations (although this latter might possibly reflect a lesser
need for increased financing due to increased operational efficiency and productivity). The more
non-representative the upper levels of the company and the more exposed the company is to
pollution concerns, the greater is FINCF. Economic impact on the community (which is largely
negative for this issue) produces net cash inflows for investing activities, as does a negative tone
at the top, the failure/inability to address CSP issues and membership in the agricultural
chemicals industry. Non-representativeness of upper management, on the other hand, seems to
increase INVCF. OPSCF is increased by a negative economic impact on the community
(including issues such as plant closings and tax disputes), by excessive executive compensation,
and by good employee relations, and is decreased by employee antagonism and nonrepresentativeness of senior management. REV is increased by negative economic impact on a
community (possibly via contracted services at unfavorable terms for the community), excessive
executive compensation, involvement in an Affirmative Action controversy, good employee
relations, employee antagonism, pension funding issues, and exposure to outsourcing/offshoring
issues. REV is decreased by community support activities, the failure/inability to address CSP
issues, non-representativeness of senior management, exposure to pollution concerns, exposure
to Indigenous/Human Rights issues, and involvement in unethical treatment of customers.
While there are several individual issues that display puzzling relationships to CFP
outcomes, the overall conclusion is that RQ2b is supported and individual CSP measures are
associated with different CFP outcomes, and in different combinations. It is especially notable
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that PRCHG, which is focused on shareholders and financial performance, does not display
significant associations with CSP issues which, nevertheless, do contribute significantly to CFP
via net cash flow measures and revenue. REV shows the greatest range of significant
relationships – the extent (and counter-intuitive directionality) might suggest the effect of
reported CSP on customer perceptions and associated factors of noise and reporting delay.

Additional Analysis of Sensitivity to Qualitative Characteristics

It is possible that the relationship between CSP and CFP is driven by overall profitability.
There has been an ongoing debate whether good CFP provides the operational slack to devote to
CSP, or whether good CSP results in improved CFP due to improved stakeholder relationships.
At least one study has also found that negative CFP might drive CSP efforts in certain highlyvisible areas as a means of restoring legitimacy (Chen, Patten, and Roberts 2003). By
partitioning the sample into net loss and net profit reporting organizations, comparisons of the
modeled relationships might be made (Table 10, Panel A). If parsimonious model selection
criteria are used (significant F-value and a significant increase in R2 from the prior level), it
appears that REV is best modeled at the issue-level of CSP for both types of organization,
echoing the overall model. However, there are some differences. Net profit organizations
appear to best model the relationship between FINCF and INVCF and CSP at the component
level and between OPSCF and CSP at the issue level. Net loss organizations, on the other hand,
model FINCF-CSP at the directional level (mirroring the overall model) but use a less-detailed
measure of CSP for OPSCF (component) and INVCF (overall) – interestingly, these
organizations also show a significant model for the relationship between PRCHG and overall
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CSP suggesting that the stock market becomes more sensitive to organizational non-financial
performance when financial performance is suffering.
It is also possible that differences in the country of incorporation might be significant.
Organizations incorporated outside the United States might place more emphasis on CSR
performance, or might emphasize different aspects of CSP. For example, organizations in
Europe have far greater regulatory and public pressure on environmental issues, as reflected in
the Kyoto protocol, the Greens party, and widespread concern with greenhouse gas emissions.
European and Asian companies also have significantly different regulations regarding employeeemployer relations and workplace conditions. Partitioning on country of incorporation (United
States or Other) and using the parsimonious model criteria from above, it appears that USincorporated organizations mirror the overall model, with the exception of INVCF that is
modeled at the component level (Panel B). Non US-incorporated organizations model the
relationship at the component level for FINCF, OPSCF, and REV, but more appropriately model
the CSP-INVCF relationship at the directional level.
Conditions in the surrounding economic environment might also affect the model. The
sample covers a three-year period, with 2007 reflecting a good economy, 2008 a bad economy,
and 2009 the beginning of an economic recovery. Parsimonious model criteria would suggest
that in years with a good economy, PRCHG is not directly associated with CSP; FINCF is
modeled at the directional level; INVCF and OPSCF at the component level, and REV at the
issues level (Panel C). During years with a bad economy, REV and PRCHG are significantly
associated with issue level CSP; FINCF, INFCF, and OPSCF are all modeled at the component
level. In years with a recovering economy, PRCHG is still associated with CSP, but at the
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overall level; FINCF at the component level; OPSCF at the directional level; REV at the issue
level; and INVCF is not significantly associated with CSP.

However, if we use a less restrictive

model (significant F-value, highest adjusted R2) to help with the lesser power caused by both the
smaller sample size and the single year in each condition, the pattern better reflects the overall
model and isolates a few interesting variations. In the less restrictive condition, INVCF is still
unassociated with CSP at any level during an economic recovery and PRCHG is significantly
associated with CSP during a poor economy (at issue level) and a recovering economy (at
directional level).
Differences in partitioned samples might also be reflected in differences in aspects of
CSP contributing to CFP. Table 11 illustrates the standardized Betas for REV regressed on CSP
issue-level measurements for the overall model and across partitions. Net profit-reporting
organizations mirror the complete model, whereas net loss-reporting organizations do not include
the significant relationships with CGOV4, DIV3, ENV1, and PRO1 found in the original model.
Additionally, the relationship for COM2 is far weaker, the relationships for DIV2, EMP1, and
HUM1 are far stronger, and there is an additional positive relationship to PRO3. Organizations
incorporated in the United States mirror the original model, whereas organizations not
incorporated in the United States display a completely different model, with almost none of the
same significant associations. Only DIV1, EMP4, ENV3, HUM2, and HUM3 are significant,
with HUM2 being far stronger than in the original model or the US-incorporated group. The
patterns of significance largely hold across all four economic conditions. In good years, CGOV4
and ENV1 are not significant; in bad years, DIV3, ENV1, HUM1, and PRO1 are no longer
significant; and in recovering years, only HUM1 and PRO1 continue to be non-significant. For
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both bad and recovering economic years, COM2 contributes much less to a variance in REV than
it does in good years or the overall model.
Table 12 provides a comparison of the standardized Betas for the net cash flow measures
regressed on CSP directional-level measures. Interpretation of FINCF is not clear-cut as the
level of cash flows can reflect a greater need for investment funds or easier access to investment
funds (or both). When FINCF is partitioned on profitability (Panel A), EMP strengths and
concerns and DIV concerns drop out of the model, most probably due to issues of power. For
profitable organizations, COM strengths and ENV concerns increase inflows, whereas CGOV
concerns and DIV strengths reduce inflows. It should be noted that ENV concerns are not
significant for either the overall model or the net loss group. FINCF for net loss firms, on the
other hand, is only significantly related to CGOV: both strengths and concerns for this
component decrease inflows. When partitioned on country of incorporation, there are clear
differences in the CSP factors contributing to FINCF. COM strengths increase inflows whereas
CGOV strengths and concerns, DIV strengths, and EMP strengths and concerns decrease inflows
for US firms’ FINCF. Non-US firms’ FINCF, on the other hand, are only significantly related to
COM concerns (decrease inflow) and DIV concerns (increase inflow). Economic conditions also
show different patterns, although these results should be interpreted with caution due to sample
size and power. In good economic years, CGOV concerns decrease and DIV concerns increase
financing inflows. In bad economic years, COM strengths increase and CGOV concerns, DIV
strengths, and EMP strengths decrease financing inflows. At the beginning of an economic
recovery, CGOV and EMP concerns decrease financing inflows.
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Net cash flow from investing is normally an outflow, and the standardized Beta values
must be interpreted accordingly (Panel B). In the original model, greater CGOV concerns reduce
investment (or increase disinvestment), whereas greater DIV and ENV concerns lead to greater
investment outflows. When the sample is partitioned on profitability, ENV concerns are no
longer significant for either net profit organizations, but PRO concerns significantly reduce
investment outflows. Net loss firms also appear to weight ENV and DIV concerns more heavily
than the overall sample whereas net profit firms weight DIV concerns less than the overall
sample. Only DIV concerns are significant for INVCF in both US and non-US incorporated
organizations (and are much more heavily weighted for non-US firms). Across economic
conditions, recovery years show no significant directional CSP relationships, and good economic
years do not show the relationship to ENV concerns from the overall model.
Interpretation of OPSCF is also confused as changes in cash flow might be the result of
increased inflows from sales or decreased outflows from greater efficiencies. In the original
model, OPSCF were increased by CGOV concerns, DIV strengths, and EMP strengths, and
decreased by COM strengths. Partitioning the sample on profitability produces very different
patterns for OPSCF (Panel C). Net profit-reporting firms are much more sensitive to COM
strengths (increasing cash outflows) and to DIV and EMP strengths (increasing cash inflows).
Additionally, DIV, EMP, and HUM concerns also increase cash inflows (or reduce outflows),
whereas COM, ENV, and PRO concerns reduce cash inflows (or increase outflows). Only
CGOV and ENV concerns are significant for net loss-reporting organizations; ENV concerns
increase inflows/decrease outflows for this group in contrast to profitable companies. Once
again, there are considerable differences between US and non-US companies. Organizations
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incorporated in the United States show increased operational cash inflows (or decreased
outflows) for CGOV and DIV strengths and CGOV concerns, and decreased inflows (or
increased outflows) for COM strengths. Organizations incorporated outside the United States,
on the other hand, show increased cash inflows for COM concerns and both strengths and
concerns in EMP, whereas CGOV strengths reduce inflows/increase outflows. The contribution
of EMP strengths to cash inflows are especially highly weighted for non-US organizations (Beta
= .244, p < .001) in contrast to US firms (Beta = .027, p < .05). Good economic years mirror the
overall model (although CGOV concerns seem to be more weighted in their ability to increase
cash inflows/decrease cash outflows). In years with a bad or recovering economy, however, only
CGOV concerns are significant (and contribute to increased cash inflow/decreased cash
outflow).
Overall, the sensitivity analyses have indicated potential areas for future research into the
influence of key stakeholder groups, and their particular associated CSP concerns, on
organizational CFP. There are differences between net profit and net loss organizations, and
during a bad or recovering economy, suggesting that scrutiny may increase in areas of nonfinancial performance during times of financial difficulties. Future research could pursue this
implication and seek to determine if there are specific, predictable CSP components or issues
that become critical during organizational performance failures. A preliminary analysis also
suggested that country of incorporation also influences the level of association between CSP and
CFP measures. A recent survey of European investors (Novethic 2010) supports this implication
in finding that investors in different countries use different methods of evaluating organizations
(e.g., performance monitoring, positive “best in class” screening, negative screening, etc.).
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Conclusion

There were mixed results for the first set of hypotheses, with the measurement level
explaining the greatest amount of variance in CFP outcomes varying across CFP measures. CSP
measured at the issue level (H1c) appears to measure the greatest degree of variance in REV as a
measure of CFP. This might suggest that customers, the stakeholder group most directly
responsible for REV, are focused on specific issues that are important to them or are widelyreported. Measures of net cash flows, on the other hand, seem to have more variance explained
with a CSP measure of directionality within components (H1b). This might indicate that net
cash flow measures are still at too aggregated of a level and that the CSP-CFP relationship might
differ across items contributing to cash flow. Additionally, the CFP measures are not clearly
associated with a single group of stakeholders, but rather related groups and this might also
affect the degree of sensitivity in the measurement level. Finally, variance in changes in stock
price are not significantly explained by CSP, supporting Wood and Jones’ (1995) suggestion that
prior research findings were contradictory due to mismatches among CSP and financial outcome
variables.
I suggest that these findings provide evidence that CSP does contribute to CFP, but that
the link is not necessarily direct, nor is it the same for all types of financial performance. CSP
might most clearly be linked at the issue level with REV, which is then contained within OPSCF
at the directional level. By the time cash flows contribute to PRCHG, CSP shows no significant
ability to explain variance within stock market measures. The CSP-CFP relationship seems to be
stronger as CFP is less aggregated and reflects fewer stakeholder groups. Future research could
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concentrate in these areas by examining the major accounts contributing to cash flow measures
and their association both with CSP outcomes and with stakeholder groups.
There were clear differences in patterns of association across CFP outcome measures for
both directional and issue-based measurement levels, suggesting that different CFP outcomes
capture the interests of differing stakeholder groups. Patterns varied in terms of which CSP
aspects were related to a given outcome measure (RQ2b) as well as relative strengths for the
same CSP aspect on different CFP outcomes (RQ2a). The sensitivity of the individual outcome
measures to CSP measures also varied: within the significant models INVCF was the least
sensitive (adjusted R2 = .005 at a directional level of measurement) and REV the most sensitive
(adjusted R2 = .049 at an issue-based level of measurement), further supporting RQ2a.
Company profitability might affect how stakeholders evaluate CSP. Profitable
companies might be assessed by performance within CSP categories, except for revenue which is
affected by customer focus on salient issues. Non-profitable companies, however, might be
assessed with a greater weight placed on negative performance and more sensitivity to CSP in
stock market reactions. Stakeholders in non-US incorporated companies might assess CFP at an
overall component level whereas stakeholders in US incorporated companies place greater
weight on negative performance. These differences might be related to differences in the degree
to which social and environmental performance is regulated among the United States and other
countries. During years with a poor or recovering economy, CSP appears to be significantly
related to change in stock prices and might be used to differentiate organizations. This also
might reflect prior findings (Blacconiere and Patten 1994) that better CSR disclosure in the face
of an industry crisis resulted in less of a stock price downturn. INVCF might no longer be
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significantly related to CSP during an economic recovery if corporate investment itself is being
constrained due to the economic environment.
Limitations of this study include the limited sample size across economic conditions.
Future extensions could examine changes in CSP-CFP relationships both over time and across
varying economic environments. Additionally, further work is needed in moving to a more
disaggregated level of CFP measure and attempting to associate specific stakeholder groups to
specific measures. This study has begun the process by grouping stakeholders into associated
groups, but continued analysis would be very helpful. The clear-cut differences among
organizations incorporated within and outside the United States also indicate that future research
in comparative CSR disclosure and performance would be fruitful and provide important insights
into public policy, stakeholder relations, and corporate strategy. At a more specific level, it
could be interesting to apply these models at industry levels to determine if relationships and
sensitivity vary significantly and predictably across industries. Finally, this study has sought to
answer methodological issues related to measurement levels, stakeholder-measure relationships,
and variance within CSP-CFP relationships. As such, the study is descriptive and focused on
contemporaneous associations. The logical next step is to take the evidence for CSP-CFP
relationships found herein and work towards a predictive model of the influence of CSP on
subsequent CFP, including the important question of the length of time among organizational
choices in CSR action, CSP outcomes, and the final CFP outcomes.
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Tables

Table 2: Number of Strength and Concern Items within each KLD STATS Component
Component
Community
Corporate Governance
Diversity
Employee Relations
Environment
Human Rights
Product

Number of strength items
7
6
8
6
6
3
4
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Number of concern items
4
6
3
5
7
4
4

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for CSP and CFP Measures
CFP measures
Price Change
Cash Flows from Financing#
Cash Flows from Investing#
Cash Flows from Operations#
Revenue#
#Scaled by total assets
Aggregated measurement level
Overall CSP
Component measurement level
COMM
CGOV
DIV
EMP
ENV
HUM
PRO
Directional measurement level
COM(+)
Out of 7
COM(-)
Out of 4
CGOV(+)
Out of 6
CGOV(-)
Out of 6
DIV(+)
Out of 8
DIV(-)
Out of 3
EMP(+)
Out of 6
EMP(-)
Out of 5
ENV(+)
Out of 6
ENV(-)
Out of 7
HUM(+)
Out of 3
HUM(-)
Out of 4
PRO(+)
Out of 4
PRO(-)
Out of 4
Issue-based measurement level
Factor Minimum Maximum Factor
COM1
-2.0344
12.2774
DIV1
COM2
-6.1012
12.5653
DIV2
COM3
-1.6470
16.7751
DIV3
CGOV1 -1.0223
16.2148
EMP1
CGOV2 -3.1654
2.7064
EMP2
CGOV3 -2.3922
18.6047
EMP3
CGOV4 -9.6857
13.1123
EMP4

N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

7950
8124
8124
8124
8128

.1078
.0010
-.0626
.0701
.8580

4.95327
.18036
.15048
.20046
.78861

-.98
-4.70
-.99
-8.24
-.33

417.57
1.69
4.91
.75
13.18

8138

-0.6268

2.23768

-11.00

15.00

8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138

0.0015
-0.2518
0.1698
-0.2443
-0.0686
-0.0424
-0.1911

0.4842
0.7789
1.2665
0.8960
0.6566
0.2284
0.5978

-2.00
-4.00
-2.00
-4.00
-5.00
-3.00
-4.00

4.00
2.00
7.00
5.00
4.00
1.00
2.00

8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138
8138

0.11
0.11
0.19
0.44
0.60
0.43
0.30
0.54
0.15
0.22
0.01
0.05
0.05
0.24

0.423
0.333
0.419
0.639
1.043
0.515
0.621
0.725
0.512
0.657
0.073
0.240
0.224
0.580

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
3
3
4
7
2
5
4
4
5
1
3
2
4

Maximum
12.6702
2.0693
8.3137
6.2804
7.8973
6.9442
2.1227

Minimum
ENV1
ENV2
ENV3
HUM1
HUM2
HUM3
PRO1
PRO2
PRO3

Minimum
-1.1215
-4.4195
-14.9919
-1.2508
-0.9692
-2.2125
-3.5483

For all factors, n = 8138, mean = 0, SD =1.0
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Maximum
-1.3058
-1.8011
-4.1942
-1.2832
-0.7785
-5.9985
-1.3752
-7.3884
-2.0409

Maximum
8.0342
10.5080
13.8777
20.6706
16.0790
23.8207
6.8940
10.0229
13.7260

Table 4: Pattern and Structure Matrices for Principal Component Analysis on Individual KLD
STATS Components
Panel A: Community
1
.650
.614
.549

COM _str_G
COM_str_B
COM_str_D
COM_con_A
COM_con_B
COM_str_C
COM_con_D
COM_con_X
COM_str_X
COM_str_F
COM_str_A

Pattern Matrix
2

3

1
.635
.611
.593

Structure Matrix
2

.563
-.500
.496
-.420

.420

3

.549
-.510
.477
-.434
.610
.608
.537
.486

.581
.581
.585
.517

Panel B: Corporate Governance

CGOV_str_F
CGOV_str_E
CGOV_str_D
CGOV_str_A
CGOV_con_B
CGOV_con_G
CGOV_str_X
CGOV_con_X
CGOV_con_J
CGOV_con_F

Pattern Matrix
2
3

1
.732
.693
.623

4

1
.710
.703
.659

.746
-.726

Structure Matrix
2
3

.725
-.731
-.425
.643
.606
.571

-.446

4

.401
.597
.622
.591

.772

.768

Panel C: Diversity

DIV_str_E
DIV_str_D
DIV_str_F
DIV_str_G
DIV_str_A
DIV_str_B
DIV_con_B
DIV_str_C
DIV_con_A
DIV_str_X
DIV_con_X

1
.704
.686
.648
.561

Pattern Matrix
2

3

-.657
-.637
.624
-.554
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Structure Matrix
2

3

-.620
-.645
.639
-.607
.597
-.597
.528

.432

1
.723
.702
.644
.616

.626
-.556
.545

Panel D: Employee Relations

EMP_str_A
EMP_str_G
EMP_con_B
EMP_str_D
EMP_str_X
EMP_str_C
EMP_con_X
EMP_con_A
EMP_str_F
EMP_con_D

Pattern Matrix
2
3

1
.756
.625
.571

4

1
.709
.656
.621

.718
.651
.590

Structure Matrix
2
3

4

.470
.705
.662
.593

.693
.692

.688
.690
-.742
.696

-.742
.692

Panel E: Environment

ENV_con_B
ENV_con_A
ENV_con_F
ENV_con_D
ENV_con_X
ENV_str_D
ENV_str_G
ENV_str_B
ENV_str_C
ENV_str_X
ENV_str_A
ENV_con_E

1
.750
.673
.630
.607
.448
.427

Pattern Matrix
2

3

-.410

1
.750
.697
.555
.659
.448
.504

.648
.604
.566
.449

Structure Matrix
2

3

-.412

.463
.695
.621
.530
.443

.837

.836

Panel F: Human Rights

HUM_str_X
HUM_con_G
HUM_con_X
HUM_str_G
HUM_con_F
HUM_con_C

1
.769
.699
.624

Pattern Matrix
2

3

.812
.788

Structure Matrix
2

3

.807
.792
.945
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1
.743
.701
.654

.947

Panel G: Product

PRO_con_D
PRO_con_X
PRO_con_E
PRO_con_A
PRO_str_B
PRO_str_A
PRO_str_X
PRO_str_C

1
.671
.658
.625
.497

Pattern Matrix
2

3

.682
.636
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Structure Matrix
2

3

.674
.647
.738
.601

Loadings below .4 have been suppressed

1
.675
.647
.628
.510

.721
.618

Table 5: Hierarchical Regression of Measurement Models across CFP Outcome Variables
Model
PRCHG
FINCF
1: Overall CSP (baseline)
F
2.436
.025
Adj R2
.000
.000
2: Component CSP to Overall (H1a)
F
1.191
18.592***
Adj R2
.000
.015
Δ R2
.001
.016***
3: Directional CSP to Component (H1b)
F
1.097
14.093***
Adj R2
.000
.022
Δ R2
.001
.008***
4: Issue CSP to Directional (H1c)
F
.258
7.199***
Adj R2
-.002
.017
Δ R2
-.001
-.004

INVCF

OPSCF

REV

2.286
.000

.174
.000

56.949***
.007

5.235***
.004
.004***

6.664***
.005
.006***

40.744***
.033
.027***

3.861***
.005
.003*

6.212***
.009
.005***

30.676***
.049
.016***

3.492***
.007
.003

3.967***
.008
.000

28.307***
.072
.024***

Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 6: Pearson Correlations among Factors and Component Scores (2-tailed)
Predictor
Overall
COM
CGOV
DIV
EMP
ENV
HUM
PRO
Predictor
Overall
COM
CGOV
DIV
EMP
ENV
HUM
PRO

COM1 COM2
.291
.150
***
***
.519
.312
***
***
-.094
.099
***
***
.380
-.072
***
***
.138
-.015
***
.091
.156
***
***
-.182
.223
***
***
-.253
.099
***
***
EMP1
EMP2
-.044
.418
***
***
-.040
.235
***
***
-.090
-.086
***
***
.170*** .296***
.055
.500
***
***
-.208
.140
***
***
-.180
-.056
***
***
-.162
-.021
***

COM3 CGOV1 CGOV2 CGOV3 CGOV4 DIV1
.158
.253
.228
-.104
-.120
.307
***
***
***
***
***
***
.268
.192
-.064
.073
.279
-.017
***
***
***
***
***
-.043
.157
.901
-.299
-.265
-.170
***
***
***
***
***
***
.260
.297
-.245
.200
.026
.613
***
***
***
***
*
***
.065
.106
.100
.009
.005
-.006
***
***
***
.028
.078
-.123
.088
.006
.006
*
***
***
***
-.147
-.199
.125
-.232
-.093
-.251
***
***
***
***
***
***
-.194
-.213
.185
-.266
-.108
-.304
***
***
***
***
***
***
EMP3
EMP4
ENV1
ENV2
ENV3 HUM1
-.266
-.246
-.241
.346
-.054
-.151
***
***
***
***
***
***
.028
-.107
.177
-.049
-.015
.010
*
***
***
***
-.161
.045
-.089
-.056
-.025
-.074
***
***
***
***
*
***
.177*** -.109*** .166*** .308***
.013
.101***
-.507
-.598
.107
-.022
.004
-.007
***
***
***
*
-.103
.047
-.642
.522
-.052
-.260
***
***
***
***
***
***
-.221
.081
-.314
-.139
-.055
-.572
***
***
***
***
***
***
-.228
.076
-.233
-.107
-.047
-.178
***
***
***
***
***
***

Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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DIV2 DIV3
-.456 -.169
***
***
-.138
.055
***
***
.119
-.121
***
***
-.851 -.070
***
***
-.035 -.118
**
***
-.063
-.010
***
.066
-.051
***
***
.150
-.164
***
***
HUM2 HUM3
.072
-.059
***
***
.172
-.057
***
***
-.055
-.038
***
**
.174*** .036**
-.018

.018

.093
***
-.402
***
-.090
***

-.059
***
-.397
***
-.012

PRO1
-.173
***
.100
***
-.222
***
.327***
-.029
**
-.078
***
-.240
***
-.910
***

PRO2
.171
***
.077
***
-.072
***
.137***
.078
***
.100
***
-.070
***
.182
***

PRO3
.126
***
.070
***
.011
.095***
.020
.082
***
-.022
*
.089
***

Table 7: Pearson Correlations among CSP Predictors and CFP Outcomes (2-tailed)
Panel A: Overall and Component Scores to Outcomes
Outcome variable Overall COM CGOV DIV EMP
-.031
-.018
-.005
-.008
-.004
PRICECHG
**
.098
-.090
-.002
-.011
.002
FINCF
***
***
-.044
.048
.017
.019
-.001
INVCF
***
***
-.055
.052
-.005
-.005
.002
OPSCF
***
***
-.083
-.085
.036 -.154
-.009
REV
***
***
**
***

Panel B: Directional Scores to Outcomes
COM COM CGOV
Outcome variable
(+)
(-)
(+)

ENV

HUM

PRO

-.001

.001

.003

-.003

.031
**

.021

.008

.053
***
-.024
*
-.029
**

-.011
-.015

-.036
**
-.057
***

PRICECHG

-.008

-.004

-.013

.001

-.007

-.005

-.001

FINCF

-.035
**

-.029
**

-.023
*

.012

-.012

-.001

.039
***
-.045

.002

.003

.000

-.021

.023
*
-.051
***

.037
**
-.052
***

.025
*
-.035
**

-.090
***
.036
**
.060
***
.046
***

-.058
***

INVCF

-.135
***
.053
***
.083
***
.080
***

EMP
(-)
.037
**
-.052
***

-.006

.051
***

.003

-.019

.041
***
.173
***

.041
***
.023
*

.043
***
.033
**

OPSCF
REV

CGOV
(-)

DIV
(+)

DIV
(-)

EMP
(+)

-.003
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ENV
(+)

ENV
(-)

HUM
(+)

HUM
(-)

PRO
(+)

PRO
(-)

.004

.005

-.002

-.001

.001

-.003

-.045
***

-.032
**

-.019

-.035
**

-.041
***

.002

-.007

.008

.040
***
.059
***

.029
**
.023
*

-.071
***
.028
*
.041
***

.019
.017

.012

Panel C: Factor Component Scores to Outcomes
Outcome variable COM1 COM2 COM3 CGOV1
-.008
-.004
-.003
.000
PRICECHG
-.035
.036
-.030
-.030
FINCF
**
**
**
**
.029
.012
-.008
-.008
INVCF
**
.023
-.056
.036
.034
OPSCF
*
***
**
**
-.065
-.083
.012
.006
REV
***
***

Outcome variable
PRICECHG
FINCF
INVCF
OPSCF
REV

CGOV2
-.008
.090
***
-.031
**
-.055
***
-.088
***

CGOV3
.000
-.075
***
.048
***

CGOV4
.000
-.025
*
.033
**

.031**

-.003

.018

-.034
**

EMP1
.014
-.048
***

EMP2
-.004
-.047
***

EMP3
.012
-.062
***

EMP4
.000
.028
*

ENV1
.004
-.030
**

ENV2
.006
-.046
***

-.018

.014

-.005

-.007

-.020

.017

.059
***
.081
***

.037
**

.061
***
.163
***

-.017

.041
***

.012
***

.021

.032
**
.025
*

-.009

Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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ENV3
.007
-.024
*
.029
**

HUM1
.003

.005

.020

.025
*

-.020

-.012
-.011

DIV1
-.003
.073
***
.022*
.050
***
.024
*

DIV2
.005
.072
***
-.046
***
-.039
***
-.056
***

DIV3
-.004
-.026
*

HUM2
-.005
-.039
***

HUM3
-.001

.006

-.011

.035
**
.097
***

-.005

.012
.092

.008
.016
.066
***

PRO1
-.002
-.067
***
.025
*
.040
***
.003

PRO2
.002
-.044
***

PRO3
-.005

.012

-.005

.026
*
.023
*

.003

.001
.011

Table 8: Patterns of Significance for CFP Outcomes Regressed on Directional CSP Predictors
FINCF

INVCF

Beta

t

COM(+)

.034

2.552
*

-.006

COM(-)

.001

.062

CGOV(+)

-.028

CGOV(-)

-.118

DIV(+)

-.041

DIV(-)

.024

EMP(+)

-.027

EMP(-)

-.025

ENV(+)

.008

-2.366
*
-9.532
***
-2.968
**
2.102
*
-2.148
*
-2.135
*
.062

ENV(-)

.015

1.102

-.028

HUM(+)

-.005

-.408

HUM(-)

.008

PRO(+)
PRO(-)

-.013
-.021

OPSCF

t

REV

Beta

t

-.459

-.029

-2.148
*

-.089

-.015

-1.262

.012

1.022

-.081

.006

.526

.023

1.940

-.027

.053

4.218
***

.067

.017

1.247

.033

-.041

-3.550
***

.006

.557

.005

-.004

-.292

.027

2.091
*

-.038

.003

.260

.016

1.385

.167

-.007

-.002

-.148

.019

.007

.527

.001

.067

.002

-.547
-2.095
*
.144

-3.031
**
14.374
***
1.455

.006

.488

.008

.676

-.016

-1.256

.007

.520

.046

-1.078
-1.610

.002
.021

.207
1.607

.007
-.001

.600
-.112

.011
-.020

.686
3.727
***
.981
-1.615

Beta

5.387
***
2.349
*

Beta

.058
.063

t
-6.687
***
-6.779
***
-2.316
*
4.787
***
4.600
***
.413

Betas reported are standardized coefficients
Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
PRCHG did not produce a significant F-value for the model. However, EMP(-) was significantly
related to PRCHG, Beta = .042, t = 3.507***
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Table 9: Patterns of Significance for CFP Outcomes Regressed on Item-level CSP Predictors
FINCF
Beta

t

INVCF
Beta
t

COM1

.021

1.551

-.011

COM2

.018

1.463

.029

COM3
CGOV1

.011
-.001

-.023
-.008

CGOV2

.057

-.022

-1.865

CGOV3

-.051

.862
-.054
4.791
***
-4.061
***

2.404
*
-1.854
-.570

CGOV4

-.013

-1.136

.027

DIV1

-.015

.015

DIV2

.050

-.959
4.383
***

DIV3

.000

EMP1

-.028

EMP2

-.020

EMP3

-.031

EMP4

.018

ENV1

.032

ENV2

.008

2.198
*
.571

ENV3

-.017

-1.561

.026

HUM1

.013

1.074

HUM2

-.013

HUM3

.054

-.792

4.286
***
2.405
*
.933
-3.518
***

OPSCF
Beta
t
-.012
-.041
.009
.004
-.030

-.905
-3.361
**
.752
.281
-2.548
*

REV
Beta
-.109
-.072
-.014
-.008
-.066

.005

.410

.005

-.009

-.809

-.040

.003

.181
-2.068
*

.007

t
-8.356
***
-6.174
***
-1.127
-.588
-5.758
***
.387

3.218
**
1.742
3.272
**

-.002

-.009

-.815

.094

-1.321

-.017

-1.159

-.044

.679
2.362
*

-.011

-.839

-.011

-3.710
***
.490
-4.252
***
3.193
**
6.180
***
-.144
12.512
***
8.662
***
-3.072
**
-.857

.001

.107

.017

1.607

-.010

-.841

-.002

-.187

-.033

-1.140

.001

.108

.015

1.301

.088

.002

.168

-.007

-.637

.003

.258

-.005

PRO1

-.019

-1.429

.013

.991

.004

.328

-.031

PRO2
PRO3

-.022
.006

-1.802
.565

.009
-.009

.758
-.795

.006
.001

.460
.101

.007
.021

.036
-2.146
*
-1.676
-2.579
*
1.637

-.041

-.024

-.004

-.373

.001

-.019

-1.455

.043

.003

.268

.021

-.014

-1.175

.040

-.006

-.533

-.020
.009

Betas reported are standardized coefficient
Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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.121

-.048
.036
.079

.148

-2.835
**
7.676
***
-.430
-2.391
*
.561
1.926

Table 10: Sensitivity Analyses of Hierarchical Regressions of Measurement Models across CFP Outcomes Partitioned on
Profitability, Country of Incorporation, and Economic Conditions
Panel A: Split by Performance
Model
PRCHG
Net Profit
Net Loss
1: Overall CSP (baseline)
9.503
F
1.414
**
Adj R2
.000
.004
2: Component CSP to Overall (H1a)
F
Adj R2
2

ΔR

1.012

1.913

.000

.003

.001

.002

FINCF
Net Profit
Net Loss

INVCF
Net Profit
Net Loss
4.394
*
.001

.869

1.754

.364

.000

.000

.000

9.238
***
.010
.011
***

9.389
***
.025
.027
***

4.380
***
.004
.005
**

2.433
*
.004

8.079
***
.041
.019
***

2.875
***
.005

2.222
**
.007

.002

.006

3.258
***
.022
-.015
*

2.667
***
.007

1.555
*
.005

.003

.002

.005

OPSCF
Net Profit
Net Loss

REV
Net Profit
Net Loss

.001

43.216
***
.007

16.278
***
.007

11.110
***
.012
.013
***

3.566
**
.008
.010
**

30.314
***
.034
.028
***

14.517
***
.039
.035
***

11.603
***
.025
.014
***

3.122
***
.013

24.181
***
.053
.020
***

10.993
***
.057
.021
***

12.074
***
.042
.019
***

1.675
*
.007

19.535
***
.068
.017
***

11.209
***
.092
.038
***

1.977

2.807

.000

3: Directional CSP to Component (H1b)
F
Adj R2
2

ΔR

.988

1.472

.000

.003

6.479
***
.013

.001

.003

.004

.008

4: Issue CSP to Directional (H1c)
F
Adj R2
2

ΔR

.241

1.134

.000

.001

4.643
***
.014

-.001

.003

.003
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-.002

Panel B: Split by Country of Incorporation
Model
PRCHG
USA
Non-USA
USA
1: Overall CSP (baseline)
F

2.465

FINCF
Non-USA

USA

INVCF
USA

.000

-.004

6.212
***
.005
.005
***

3.259
**
.063
.074
*

39.455
***
.033
.026
***

9.634
***
.204
.227
***

6.159
***
.009
.006
***

3.810
***
.134

28.452
***
.046
.014
***

6.353
***
.228

.026

3.701
***
.008

2.585
***
.134

5.995
***
.327

.017

.000

.036

27.872
***
.073
.027
***

1.030

1.737

.103

.204

Adj R
.000
.001
2: Component CSP to Overall (H1a)

.000

.000

.000

-.004

17.467
***
.014
.015
***

5.046
***
.107
.130
***

4.903
***
.003
.004
***

13.823
***
.022
.009
***

3.018
***
.100

3.515
***
.004

1.991
*
.052

.016

.002

.054

2.141
**
.100

3.329
***
.007

.038

.004

Adj R2
2

ΔR

1.169

.845

.000

-.005

.001

.022

REV
Non-USA

67.353
***
.008

.000

F

USA

4.052
*
.013

1.164

2

OPSCF
Non-USA

1.712
.021
.050

.005

3: Directional CSP to Component (H1b)
F
Adj R2
2

ΔR

1.073

.892

.000

-.006

.001

.026

.091

.043

4: Issue CSP to Directional (H1c)
F
Adj R2
2

ΔR

.253

.549

-.002

-.050

6.890
***
.017

-.001

.007

-.004
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1.274

.123

Panel C: Split by Economic Condition
Model
PRCHG
2007 2008
2009
2007
1: Overall CSP (baseline)
5.201
F
.615 1.839
.182
*
Adj
.000
.000
.002
.000
R2
2: Component CSP to Overall (H1a)
2.985
9.207
F
.632 1.538
**
***
Adj
-.001 .001
.005
.021
R2
.006
.024
Δ R2
.002
.003
*
***
3: Directional CSP to Component (H1b)
1.847
2.755
7.103
F
.627
*
***
***
Adj
-.002 .004
.009
.031
R2
.013
Δ R2
.002
.006
.006
**
4: Issue CSP to Directional (H1c)
2.126
4.223
F
.122
1.519
**
***
Adj
-.008 .010
.004
.027
R2
Δ R2

-.003

.008

-.001

-.001

FINCF
2008

2009

2007

INVCF
2008

2009

2007

2.465

3.773

.319

2.527

.214

.441

.001

.001

.000

.001

.000

7.435
***

4.158
***

3.184
**

2.833
**

.016

.008

.006

.018
***

.009
***

5.132
***

2009

2007

REV
2008

2009

.174

.335

18.478
***

21.876
***

16.701
***

.000

.000

.000

.007

.008

.006

1.010

4.323
***

2.156
*

1.851

13.915
***

13.226
***

14.729
***

.005

.000

.009

.003

.002

.033

.030

.034

.008
**

.006
*

.003

.011
***

.006
*

.005

.029
***

.025
***

.030
***

3.697
***

2.247
**

2.223
**

.902

3.545
***

1.896
*

2.202
**

11.373
***

10.048
***

10.350
***

.021

.013

.007

.006

.000

.013

.005

.006

.052

.044

.045

.007

.008

.004

.004

.002

.008

.004

.006

.021
***

.016
***

.014
***

3.031
***

1.678
*

2.483
***

1.836
**

1.109

3.039
***

1.166

1.262

10.381
***

9.081
****

9.717
***

.017

.006

.013

.007

.001

.005

.001

.002

.076

.064

.067

-.001

-.004

.009

.004

.004

.007

.000

-.001

.027
***

.023
***

.025
***

Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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OPSCF
2008

-

.109
***

.072
***

.066
***

.040
***

-

.081
***

.069
***

.050
***

-

.046
*

.076
***

+
Non USA

.088
***

.068
***

.130
***

.040
***

.093
***

.152
***

.085
***
.030
*

.111
***

.034
*
.114
***

.093
***

.040
***

.055
**

.087
***
.051
**

.385
***

.156
*

.037
**
.357
***

.030
*
.330
**
.161
*

-
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PRO3

.031
*

.066
**
.078
***

PRO2

PRO1

HUM3

HUM2

HUM1

ENV3

ENV2

ENV1

EMP4

.148
***

.033
**

.055
**

.036
**
.097
***

.088
***

.070
**

+
USA

.054
***

.133
***
.096
***

.094
***

.037
**

+
Net Loss

.148
***

.044
**
.042
**

.117
***

EMP3

.079
***

EMP2

.036
**
.048
***

+
Net Profit

EMP1

+
Complete

DIV3

DIV2

DIV1

CGOV4

CGOV3

CGOV2

CGOV1

COM3

COM2

Model

COM1

Table 11: Comparison of Significant CSP Relationships for Revenue across Sensitivity Analysis Partitions

-

.106
***

.097
***

.063
**

-

.107
***

.059
**

.071
***

.042
*

-

.060
**

.065
**

.051
**

.149
***

.094
***

.084
***

.070
**

.151
***

.105
***

.084
***
.080
**

Standardized coefficients reported
Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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PRO3

PRO2

PRO1
.048
*

.091
***

.053
**

HUM3

HUM2

HUM1

ENV3

ENV2

ENV1

.100
***
.040
*

.038
*
.119
***

.084
***

.043
*

+
2009

.147
***

.047
*

+
2008

EMP4

.076
**

EMP3

EMP1

.046
*

EMP2

DIV3

DIV2

DIV1

CGOV4

CGOV3

CGOV2

CGOV1

COM3

COM2

COM1

Model

+
2007

Table 12: Comparison of Significant CSP Relationships for Net Cash Flows across Sensitivity
Analysis Partitions

.118
***

.041
**

.038
*

.050**
.086
***

-

.042
*

+
Net Loss

+

USA

Non
USA

.052
*

.173
***

.030
*

.122
***

.032 *

-

.041
**

.047
*

2007

.139
***

-

2008
-

.027
*

.243
***

+

+

.027
*
.214
**

+
-

.062
**
.109
***

.066
**

.050
*

+
2009

-

.110
***

.052
*
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PRO (-)

PRO (+)

HUM (-)

HUM (+)

ENV (-)

.025
*

ENV (+)

EMP (-)

DIV (-)

DIV (+)

EMP (+)

.028
*

+

.027
*

.024
*

Complete

Net
Profit

CGOV (-)

.034 *

CGOV (+)

COM (+)

+

COM (-)

Direction

Model

Panel A: FINCF

Complete
Net Profit
Net Loss
USA
Non USA
2007
2008
2009

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

PRO (-)

PRO (+)

HUM (-)

HUM (+)

ENV (-)

ENV (+)

EMP (-)

EMP (+)

DIV (-)

DIV (+)

CGOV (-)

CGOV (+)

COM (-)

COM (+)

Direction

Model

Panel B: INVCF

.053 ***
.041 ***

.028 *

.056 ***

.035 *
.030 *

.047 *
.065 **

.065 **

.037 **

.029 *

.053 ***

.213 **
.082 ***
.048 *
.062 **
.044 *
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.048 *

Complete
Net
Profit

Net Loss

.100
***

.028
*

.081
***

.041
**

.087
***
.027
*

+

Non
USA

.244
***

.085
***

+

2008

+

.244
***
.179
*

-

-

.033
*

.028
*

+

2007

.071
***

.050
*

.047
*

.050
*
.065
**

2009

+

PRO (-)

PRO (+)

HUM (-)

HUM (+)

.039
*
.066
***
.052
*

-

-

ENV (-)

.027
*

.034
*

+

USA

ENV (+)

.057
**

EMP (-)

.070
***

EMP (+)

.033
*

DIV (-)

.067
***
.029
*

+
-

DIV (+)

+

CGOV (-)

CGOV (+)

COM (-)

COM (+)

Direction

Model

Panel C: OPSCF

.063
**

-

Standardized coefficients reported
Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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.162
*

.055*
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CHAPTER THREE: THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT: RESILIENCE IN
STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENTS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE
Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to propose a new construct of resilience to explain why
organizations choosing to engage in greater voluntary social disclosure will suffer less of a
downturn (or recover more quickly) than others facing the same conditions. Prior research has
shown that voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) information might reduce reaction to
an industry disaster (Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Patten and Nance 1998), might be able to
repair damaged legitimacy (Milne and Patten 2002), is more closely allied to exposure risk and
public pressure via industry membership and size (Patten 1991), and is negatively related to the
associated CSR performance, especially for less regulated industries (Patten 2002). Resilience,
then, is the degree to which organizations providing voluntary CSR disclosure are insulated
against performance shocks.
Simply providing a single CSR disclosure is not likely to be sufficient to produce
resilience. A history of disclosure prior to the related performance shock (Blacconiere and
Patten 1994; Patten and Nance 1998) is important, as is the individual exposure to risk due to
location (Patten and Nance 1998), size (Patten 1991; Patten and Nance 1998), industry (Patten
1991, 2002; Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Patten and Nance 1998), or investment horizon (Milne
and Patten 2002). The qualitative characteristics of the disclosure are equally important,
including information credibility (O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley
2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath,
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Roebuck, and Simnett 2011) and the verbal tone used in the disclosure (Cho, Roberts, and Patten
2010). The extent to which disclosure correlates with actual performance will also produce
organizational trustworthiness (Ullmann 1985; Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 2009), with repeated
evidence over time strengthening the effect.
Resilience is the degree of protection from unexpected poor performance. This assumes
that the organization has an overall track record of competence and compliance with legal and
regulatory requirements and the poor performance in question is unexpected and might be due to
events outside of management control. Prior studies have indicated that greater voluntary CSR
disclosure insulates an “innocent” organization against industry disasters (Blacconiere and Patten
1994; Patten and Nance 1998) and that greater voluntary financial disclosure might have
insulated companies to a degree against the economy-wide shock of the Wall Street Crash of
1929 (Barton and Waymire 2004). This paper is motivated by a desire to understand the
mechanism by which prior disclosure resulted in resilience to an industry disaster and the
relevant information characteristics that influenced the mechanism involved. In this paper I
examine resilience to an industry scandal in which the organization of interest is not directly
implicated, but which nevertheless has resulted in a significant market downturn for the entire
industry and increased regulatory uncertainty.
Globalization, liberalization of markets, and recent economic crises have increased the
degree of interdependence and international exposure across industries and increased uncertainty
and public scrutiny as a result (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Tomkins 2001; Doh and Guay
2004; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007). Widespread advances in information technology
have increased the extent and timeliness of information available to investors, and the spread of
86

the Internet has made the ease of access to this information greater. The Internet, global media,
and the recent expansion of societal attention to social and environmental issues have contributed
to the demand for disclosure and a focus on matching CSR claims to actual performance (Brown
and Deegan 1998; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Berthelot, Cormier, and Magnan 2003;
Cormier, Gordon, and Magnan 2004; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Aerts and Cormier
2009). The combination of increased risk exposure, economic uncertainty, and public scrutiny
emphasizes the importance of the role credible information, in the form of voluntary CSR
disclosures, might play in investor decisions in the face of unexpectedly poor performance. The
study contributes to the literature by introducing the concept of resilience and further exploring
the role voluntary CSR disclosure plays in organizational performance. I also contribute by
examining the information characteristics of voluntary disclosures which lead to subsequent
resilience, via intervening perceptions of organizational legitimacy, extending prior research that
examined the role between disclosure and post-shock financial performance.
Using a 2 x 2 between-participants design with 100 non-professional but experienced
investors, I first examine the relationship between information characteristics (accuracy x
completeness) and perceived legitimacy. I subsequently test the relationship between perceived
legitimacy and resilience to unexpectedly poor performance. I find that accuracy of voluntary
disclosures significantly influences perceived legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy then
significantly positively influences resilience following an industry shock.
The paper is organized into five sections. Section two reviews relevant literature and
develops the hypotheses for the theorized model. Section three describes the research design,
setting, and measures used. Section four presents the analysis of the survey data. Section five
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concludes with a summary of key research findings and a discussion of the implications of these
findings for future research.

Literature Review and Research Questions

Information characteristics of voluntary disclosures affect stakeholder perceptions of the
organization (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). Because the disclosures are voluntary,
differences in transparency are reflected in organizational choices in how much to report and
how to present the information, with greater accuracy and completeness contributing to higher
quality disclosures. The demonstrated openness and honesty beyond the legal requirements of
mandated disclosures influences stakeholder perceptions of organizational legitimacy (Lindblom
2010). Perceived legitimacy influences actions taken or choices made in interactions with that
organization, particularly in the face of crises or unexpectedly poor performance (Figure 2).
Organizations choosing to issue higher-quality voluntary disclosures should be perceived as
more legitimate and greater legitimacy should result in greater resilience to crises and downturns.
In the experimental model (Figure 3), higher quality disclosures are those with CSR
voluntary reports with greater reporting accuracy and completeness. These characteristics should
strongly influence perceived legitimacy through assessments of disclosure credibility,
organizational stability, and management integrity. Perceived legitimacy should then result in
greater resilience available to cushion the effects of performance shock in the form of higher
assessments of investment quality or less disinvestment following an industry shock. It also
might be reflected in greater investor patience in waiting for the organization to recover
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financially, with greater resilience producing a “premium” of allowed time for recovery beyond
initial expectations of the time required.

Disclosure Quality

There are several, interrelated information characteristics that determine the quality of
voluntary disclosures. Prior research has considered accuracy, completeness, and timeliness to
be among the most salient characteristics leading to high-quality disclosure (O’Dwyer and Owen
2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley 2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Kothari, Li, and
Short 2009; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011). In
this study, I concentrate on the degree of accuracy and completeness in a voluntary CSR
disclosure as the experimental environment does not lend itself to timeliness manipulations.
Disclosures that are high in accuracy will report items clearly, using specific language
and quantitative measures that are then able to be compared to performance across time and
across organizations. Disclosures that are high in completeness will include reports of positive
achievements and admission of negative performance and will report across a wide range of
areas covering social, environmental, governance, and strategic concerns and not simply “cherry
pick” those areas that are most visible or have the best performance. Better completeness in
disclosure will support perceptions of accountability and honesty and support perceptions of a
lack of image management.19 Greater accuracy in disclosure will support perceptions of honesty,
consistency, and management control and will contribute to comparability. Greater accuracy

19

Greater completeness might also support perceptions of management’s competence in being aware of, and
monitoring, multiple aspects of non-financial performance.
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also supports perceptions of disclosure as incremental information provision to assist in decision
making (as opposed to image management). Therefore, the first hypotheses are:
H1a: Voluntary disclosure accuracy will be positively associated with
perceived organizational legitimacy.
H1b: Voluntary disclosure completeness will be positively associated with
perceived organizational legitimacy.
H1c: Voluntary disclosures with both high accuracy and high
completeness will result in the greatest perceived organizational
legitimacy.
H1d: Voluntary disclosures with both low accuracy and low completeness
will result in the least perceived organizational legitimacy.

Legitimacy

Organizational legitimacy is a reflection of the degree to which organizational actions,
goals, and values reflect those of society at large (e.g., responsible use of scarce resources,
ethical treatment of employees, fair dealing with customers, etc.). Legitimacy is especially
reflected in organizational actions and accountability that go beyond regulations and mandatory
requirement; thus, voluntary disclosure should help form stakeholders’ perceptions of
organizational legitimacy. Organizations which are perceived as more legitimate should be those
which are considered to demonstrate credibility in reporting and trustworthiness in actions and
intentions. Voluntary disclosures should support assessments of credibility and trustworthiness
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through the information characteristics chosen for reporting, with higher quality disclosures
leading to greater perceived legitimacy.

Credibility

Once the decision has been made to engage in discretionary reporting, the organization
must make a series of choices that will determine the credibility of the information.20 These
decisions will determine what the organization discloses, who the key recipients are, when the
information is disclosed, where the information is disclosed, and how the information is reported.
To a great extent, these decisions are determined by why the organization chooses to engage in
voluntary disclosure. The reasons involved can range from pure impression management to pure
incremental information provision, although most organizations fall somewhere along this
continuum and display mixed motives. Impression management attempts to hide poor
performance, to present a false impression of the organization’s goals and values, or to control
external information search (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Arya and Mittendorf 2005; MerklDavies and Brennan 2007; Lindblom 2010). Incremental information provision, on the other
hand, assumes that the firm is signaling behavior because this allows it to (1) differentiate itself
from competitors based on true performance, (2) reduce contracting costs, (3) and/or manage
diverse stakeholder interests (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Koonce and Mercer 2005;
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Lindblom 2010).

20

Mandatory reporting is less able to influence perceived credibility because it does not involve a decision whether
to report or, in the majority of cases, what, when, where, and how to report.
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Stakeholders are well-aware that organizations are likely to engage in some degree of
impression management and as a result the credibility of voluntary disclosure is harder to
establish due to the degree of managerial discretion involved (Berthelot, Cormier, and Magnan
2003; O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009). The voluntary nature of CSR
disclosure causes problems with consistency, comparability, completeness, the degree to which
specific or qualitative data are provided, and reliability. Consequently, voluntary disclosure is
often met with skepticism as to the degree to which it provides incremental information versus
an attempt at image management through “spin” in reporting (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007;
Kothari, Li, and Short 2009). The difference between the two extremes of disclosure intent is
determined by the attributed degree of credibility in that disclosure. Greater credibility is
associated with higher-quality disclosure, based on key information characteristics of accuracy
and completeness (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).

Trustworthiness
Trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman 1995, 713). Trustworthiness reflects the degree to which an organization will
continue to perform as expected without constant monitoring or intervention. Two items adapted
from Mayer and Davis (1999) are used to capture this quality. The first measures the extent to
which the organization itself is perceived to be stable and predictable in its operations and
results. The second measures the extent to which organizational management is expected to
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exhibit integrity and resist moral hazard pressures by acting in the long-term interests of
stakeholders.
Organizational trustworthiness determines whether the stakeholder makes the initial
decision to engage in a transaction or enter into a relationship based on expectations of future
behavior and assessments of associated risk. Resilience is derived from this but reflects the post
hoc use of prior assessments of trustworthiness in current performance assessments and
determinations of future partnerships. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) posit three
antecedents to trustworthiness. Ability trust encompasses judgments of basic organizational
competence. Integrity trust includes concepts related to legal and regulatory compliance,
governance, structures, and ethical behavior. Benevolence trust reflects demonstrated
organizational actions that indicate a desire for a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship and
includes issues of transparency, equity, respect, and accountability; these are characteristics that
go beyond legal and regulatory requirements. Ability and integrity trust – sometimes referred to
as “thin” trust (Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra 2009) – reflect a basic level of legitimacy,
or compliance with (but no more than) legal expectations (Lindblom 2010). Ability, integrity,
and benevolence (“thick” trust) reflect compliance above and beyond basic legal expectations
and incorporate social values and norms, thus increasing perceptions of legitimacy (Vosselman
and van der Meer-Kooistra 2009; Lindlbom 2010).

Resilience

Resilience functions as a repository of goodwill towards an organization, or the belief
that poor outcomes are (1) honest mistakes (not questions of incompetence or illegal/unethical
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behavior), (2) at least partially due to extenuating circumstances, or (3) the result of reasonable
attempts to develop a new area of organizational learning or expertise which did not work out as
expected. As such, it is highly dependent on the perceived credibility of prior disclosures and the
perceived trustworthiness of the reporting organization and its management. This study extends
Blacconiere and Patten’s (1994) findings that organizations engaging in prior CSR disclosure
suffered less of a decrease in their stock price following an industry disaster. I extend this stream
of research by suggesting that prior disclosure insulated the reporting organizations from the
industry shock by establishing them as more legitimate. I concentrate on accuracy and
completeness as the underlying determinants of higher-quality voluntary disclosures, with
higher-quality disclosures leading to perceived legitimacy which subsequently produces
resilience to an unexpected performance downturn.
Resilience will be reflected in multiple aspects of the stakeholder-organization
relationship. It can lead to a greater or longer-term allocation of resources, decreased
governance costs, or smaller required returns. Resilience might appear both as judgments (in reassessments following unexpected outcomes leading to less of a penalty applied or greater
acceptable performance variability) and as actions (in the decision to buy or sell investments or
in longer recovery times allowed prior to divestiture).
Resilience operates mainly through the mechanism of decreasing relational risk (Das and
Teng 2001), which then dampens the volatility of reaction to unexpected bad news, permitting
recovery from (honest) mistakes, learning curves, industry issues, and economic downturns.
During times of unexpected market turbulence, resilience can insulate the organization, because
the decreased relational risk permits the absorption of greater environmental uncertainty (Barton
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and Waymire 2004). Resilience is a cumulative account and will change over time and might be
depleted or damaged if voluntary information becomes non-credible or is reduced. Newer
organizations, which have not yet had the opportunity to establish a track record of relational
outcomes, might still be able to establish resilience by disclosing greater amounts of (or higher
quality) voluntary CSR disclosure.
Unexpected poor performance outcomes might be the result of internal or external
factors. External factors include uncertainty in the environment and the actions of others and are
beyond direct control of organizational management. Examples of such factors include a general
economic downturn, stock market crashes, natural disasters, or industry related disasters or
scandals that do not directly involve the organization. Prior research has included industry
issues, such as the Exxon Valdez (Patten and Nance 1998) or the tragedy at Bhopal (Blacconiere
and Patten 1994); political issues, such as elections in South Africa (de Villiers and van Staden
2006); and overall economic shocks, such as the 1929 market crash (Barton and Waymire 2004).
Internal factors include mistakes, incompetence, and fraud, as well as more benign internal issues
such as learning curves, estimates in the face of new technology or markets, or reasonable
assumptions that turned out to be incorrect.
In this study, I choose to focus on an industry shock because CSR issues have been
shown to be significantly related to industry (Ullmann 1985; Patten 2002; Margolis, Elfenbein,
and Walsh 2007). Further, industry-related downturns might be caused by external shocks –
industry disasters which do not involve misbehavior by the specific organization studied – and
influenced by internal characteristics, practices, or conventions common to all industry members.
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The research cited above has done much to establish that organizations perceived as more
accountable to society (by the decision to engage in voluntary CSR disclosures) have not
suffered as greatly (or have recovered more quickly) during economic downturns or industry
crises. Consequently, after an industry shock I expect revised assessments of quality,
disinvestment decisions, and expected future performance will be related to perceived legitimacy
derived from the information characteristics of the organization’s voluntary disclosure. Those
organizations that, prior to the industry crisis, were perceived as exhibiting greater legitimacy
should be granted the benefit of the doubt regarding their involvement in and ability to control
conditions leading to an industry wide shock.
The construct of resilience is reflected in multiple aspects. Perceived investment quality
of all members of an industry might decline following an industry shock, but organizations
enjoying the benefit of resilience might still be considered higher quality investments, paralleling
Blacconiere and Patten’s (1994) finding that prior-disclosing organizations experienced less of a
stock price decline in the wake of an industry disaster. Perceived quality and expectations of
future performance should interact to affect volatility, with resilience leading to less
disinvestment following the crisis. Additionally, expectations of future performance should be
affected such that investors are willing to show greater patience in waiting for a partial or full
recovery in economic performance following an industry crisis, even beyond their initial
expectations for time required. In all cases, investor evaluations of quality and future
performance expectations should be positively associated with perceived legitimacy.
H2: Perceived organizational legitimacy will be positively associated with
resilience.
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Research Methods

Experimental Design and Administration

This study uses a 2 x 2 between-participants design (Figure 4) for the initial hypothesis,
followed by regression analysis for the second hypothesis. The manipulated independent
variables consist of two information characteristics leading to a high-quality voluntary
disclosure: accuracy and completeness. Endogenous organizational characteristics are held
constant in the case to isolate the effect of disclosure quality on non-professional investor
judgments and actions. An industry shock (in which the case organization is not directly
involved) is used to measure change in investor judgments and consequent actions which
represent the construct of resilience. To control for individual differences among participants in
the level of acceptable investment risk which might affect perceptions of the investment and
subsequent decisions, a validated scale measuring risk appetite specifically in a business setting
is used as a covariate in the analysis (Sitkin and Weingart 1995).
After logging in to the site, reading the summary explanation of research required by the
IRB, and indicating their willingness to participate, respondents were asked a series of screening
and demographic questions. Those that passed the screens then received the experimental
materials (Appendix A) and were informed that they had inherited 10,000 shares in Dryad
Forestry, Inc., a large, growth-and-income timber and forestry-products company listed on the
New York Stock Exchange. The company was reported to be considered a good addition to the
participant’s investment portfolio by their investment advisor. The amount was reported to
double the participant’s investment portfolio and was selected to be large enough for serious
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consideration but not so large as to be perceived as unbelievable. Participants were prompted to
think of a long-term investment account, as prior research has indicated significant differences
between investment decisions based on short- and long-term strategy and the consequent
appraisal of a risk-reward relationship (Milne and Patten 2002).
All participants next received Part One, containing basic background and industry
information for Dryad, along with excerpts from its financial reports (including audit opinion,
analyst recommendation and earnings forecast, and outstanding litigation or regulatory issues).
The background information included the manipulation of completeness and accuracy, with each
group receiving a different excerpt from Dryad’s Sustainability Report. After reading the
excerpted financial and CSR performance reports, participants were asked to evaluate the overall
quality of an investment in Dryad (PRE), the credibility of the Sustainability Report (CRED),
and general comfort with investment stability (STABL) and management integrity (INTEG).
In Part Two, participants were told of an industry scandal that did not involve
misbehavior by Dryad, but which negatively impacted economic performance across the industry
and increased uncertainty as to future regulatory impacts in response to the crisis. The
description was accompanied by an excerpt from an article from the business press.21
Participants were then told they had the opportunity to shift any portion of their investment in
Dryad to an indexed mutual fund linked to the S&P 500. They were asked to re-evaluate their
perception of investment quality following the crisis (POST) and report what percentage (in
deciles) of their portfolio they would shift to the market-linked fund (SHIFT). They were also

21

Prior research (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009) has indicated that investors perceive the business press to be
significantly more credible than either management or analysts; hence the decision to reinforce the information on
the industry crisis and Dryad’s non-involvement in the illegal behavior using an article from the business press.
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asked to estimate the time required for Dryad to make both a partial (EPART) and a full
(EFULL) recovery of the drop in net income following the industry crisis, and the maximum
time they would be willing to wait for Dryad to actually make a partial (WPART) and full
(WFULL) recovery. Manipulation check questions followed regarding Dryad’s role in the
industry crisis and the information characteristics contained in the manipulated Sustainability
Report. The experiment concluded with the six items of the Business Risk Propensity Scale
(Sitkin and Weingart 1995).
The experimental materials were pilot tested twice. PhD faculty and eight doctoral
students participated in the first round, and changes in phrasing and organization were made
based on their input. The resulting materials were then pretested with a group of 35 master’s
level business students. Two items were added for clarification, and minor editing was
conducted to improve readability for a non-academic audience. Following Institutional Review
Board (IRB) approval of revisions, the experimental materials were programmed on a new
hosting website, Qualtrics (www.Qualtrics.com), and the panel company, EMpanel Online
(www.EMpanelOnline.com), began the screening process.

Participants

The success of an organization depends upon multiple groups of stakeholders. Because
stakeholder groups vary in preferences for CSR components and in emphasized aspects of
financial performance (Jones 1995; Wood and Jones 1995; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997;
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Lindblom 2010), I restrict this study to a single stakeholder
group, non-professional investors. This group has considerable, hidden influence due to their
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choices in mutual funds and stocks held within investment and retirement portfolios, which are
often measured at the aggregated, analyst-centered level.
To test the hypotheses, I used experimental data collected from non-professional
investors provided by a professional panel service, EMpanel Online. The company screened
participants from its registrants based on (1) age (greater than 18 years), (2) non-professional
status, (3) possession of an investment or retirement account, (4) at least some degree of
participation in the management of that account, (5) comfort reading financial statements, and
(6) use of financial or investment media. To be included in the experiment, participants also had
to pass the manipulation checks, pass an attention check item embedded in the experiment, and
take a reasonable amount of time to complete the experiment. During the screening process, 623
prospective participants passed the initial screenings. After attention (186 failed), manipulation
(322 failed), and time checks (14 failed), 101 individuals completed the instrument.22 The final
participant pool consists of 100 participants who were randomly distributed in each of the four
cells, with 25 participants per cell.23
Participants were 57% male, predominantly in age ranges from 40 to 59 years, 38% held
an undergraduate degree, and predominantly employed in manufacturing (12%),
finance/accounting/insurance (14%), and “other” (33%). The majority of participants (56%)
reported that they were solely responsible for the management of their portfolio, reported
22

Within each sample, the pattern of failed manipulation checks resulted in an interesting discovery: participants
were easily able (only 25% manipulation check failure) to recognize a very high quality disclosure (high accuracy
and high completeness), but had difficulties (manipulation failure ranging from 53% to 58% across the cells)
distinguishing between information characteristics for low quality (low accuracy and low completeness) and mixed
disclosures. In general, failed manipulations consisted in failure to distinguish one of the characteristics, suggesting
that accuracy and completeness might not be sharply distinguished in participant perceptions of high quality
disclosure.
23
Due to a math error in quota adjustments, there were initially 26 good completes in Cell C. One participant was
randomly deleted to equalize cell populations.
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experience was evenly split between “some” (46%) and “considerable” (47%), 43% reported an
average portfolio of $100,001 to $500,000, 61% were “definitely” likely to invest in the next 12
months, and participants tended to be optimistic (48%) or neutral (38%) about the market (Table
13). Correlation analysis indicated that there were no significant differences among groups in
relation to either measured or manipulated variables.

Variable Measures

Manipulated Variables

The construct representing the information characteristics influencing voluntary
disclosure quality consists of two manipulated variables: ACCURACY and COMPLETENESS.
Information characteristics of specificity, completeness, and accuracy have been found to be
important in determining perceived voluntary disclosure quality and credibility (O’Dwyer and
Owen 2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley 2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Kothari,
Li, and Short 2009; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett
2011). Operationalization of these measures has included third-party assurance (Simnettt,
Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011), the use of credible
frameworks or standardized reporting to ensure consistency and completeness (O’Dwyer and
Owen 2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley 2005), the use of specific, quantifiable measures
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007), and the inclusion of both positive and negative information
(Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).
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In this study, ACCURACY is manipulated as the degree to which the Sustainability
Report contains specific language with quantifiable, comparable measurements (High Accuracy)
versus vague language and non-verifiable or non-quantifiable measures which could not be
compared to prior years’ or other organizations’ performance (Low Accuracy) (Cho, Roberts,
and Patten 2010).24 COMPLETENESS is operationalized as the inclusion of items within the
Sustainability Report across a range of non-financial performance areas and the disclosure of
both positive and negative performance within these areas (High Completeness). Low
Completeness, on the other hand, reports only a few areas within the Sustainability Report and
only discloses good performance (O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; O’Dwyer, Unerman, and Bradley
2005). The combination of accuracy and completeness determines the degree to which the
voluntary disclosure can be considered high quality.

Measured Variables

There are two groups of measured variables that address the constructs of Legitimacy and
Resilience, with both constructs having multiple measures. ANCOVA analysis of the effect of
information characteristics on the legitimacy construct is used to test the first hypotheses. A
regression of the construct of resilience on the legitimacy construct tests the second hypothesis.

24

As an example, the high accuracy condition might contain wording such as “achieved our goal of a 5% increase in
philanthropic contributions” while the low accuracy conditions might report this as “increased philanthropic
contributions”.
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Legitimacy

Legitimacy is operationalized as three measures reflecting societal expectations for
organizational credibility and trustworthiness. Credibility (CRED) of the Sustainability Report
(CRED) directly reflects perceived honesty and transparency of the information disclosed.
Trustworthiness is a measure of willingness to be vulnerable to unmonitored/uncontrolled
outcomes and is assessed by two items. Investor comfort level with the unmonitored investment
(STABL) reflects perceptions of organizational stability. Investor comfort level with
management’s intentions or unmonitored actions (INTEG) reflects perceptions of management
integrity. All three items are measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very believable/very
comfortable) to 7 (very doubtful/very uncomfortable).
Factor analysis confirmed that all three measures loaded onto a single construct,
explaining 59.805% of variance. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy were
mediocre for both the overall model (KMO = .652) and for individual items (lowest KMO = .635
for CRED and INTEG). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p < .001) confirmed that items are
correlated, but all correlations were well under .80 and the determinant of the correlation matrix
was .646, well above the required .000001 level (Field 2009) to establish lack of
multicollinearity. Factor scores were therefore retained for use as the dependent variable
representing the legitimacy construct.
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Resilience

The Resilience construct is operationalized by four measures representing perceived postcrisis quality of investment25, disinvestment percentage, and a “buffer” allowed for both partial
and full recovery in organizational net income following an industry crisis beyond original
expectations for required recovery time. Post-crisis quality of investment (POST) is measured on
a Likert scale ranging from 1 (an excellent investment – low risk and great long-term potential)
to 7 (a very poor investment – high risks and a lot of uncertainty about long-term growth
potential). Disinvestment is measured by an item asking for percentage (by decile) of Dryad
holdings participants would choose to shift to a market-indexed mutual fund following the
industry crisis (SHIFT). Both POST and SHIFT are then reverse coded for ease of
interpretation, such that higher values reflect greater assessments of quality and a greater
percentage of the investment retained.
Participants are asked two items to evaluate the flexibility allowed Dryad in recovery,
should that recovery not occur within the original estimate of time required, assuming they
adopted a “wait and see” strategy. These measures represent a “premium”, or additional buffer,
allowed for recovery and the degree of acceptable volatility in future expectations. Expectations
of the time required for a partial recovery of at least 10% of the post-crisis decline in net income
are subtracted from the length of time investors are willing to wait for a partial recovery to
produce the first premium measure (PREMPART). Both expected time and the time investors
are willing to wait are measured on a four point scale: (1) one month or less, (2) six months or
25

A pre-crisis assessment of quality is used as a covariate to control for individual differences in perceived risk (see
following section).
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less, (3) one year or less, and (4) more than one year. The same measure is taken for the allowed
buffer for a full recovery of the level of net income prior to the crisis (PREMFULL). Expected
time and the time investors are willing to wait for full recovery are measured on six point scales:
(1) one month or less, (2) six months or less, (3) one year or less, (4) between one and three
years, (5) more than three years and up to five years, and (6) five years or more.
Factor analysis confirmed that all four measures loaded onto a single construct,
explaining 64.007% of variance. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy were
good for both the overall model (KMO = .741) and for individual items (lowest KMO = .716 for
SHIFT). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p < .001) confirmed that items are correlated, but all
correlations were under .80 and the determinant of the correlation matrix was .240, well above
the required .000001 level (Field 2009). Factor scores were therefore retained for use as the
dependent variable representing the resilience construct.

Covariates

Individual psychological aspects affecting risk appetite might be potentially significant.
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) specifically included both individual risk propensity and
perceived risk in their seminal model of organizational trust. The Business Risk Propensity
Scale (BRPS), which measures individual risk propensity in business settings (Sitkin and
Weingart 1995), is incorporated to control for differences in participant risk appetite that might
affect assessments of investment quality and subsequent decisions. The BRPS scale has been
validated (Huff et al. 1997) and used in prior literature and is based on 7 point Likert scales (1 =
“Much less than others” to 7 = “Much more than others”) with a midpoint of 4 reflecting a
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neutral value. Factor analysis indicated that all 6 items loaded onto a single construct which
explained 56.02% of variance. The overall KMO score was .816 (“great” according to Field
2009) and individual scores were no less than .730. Bartlett’s test was significant (p < .001) and
the determinant of the correlation matrix was .085. The resulting factor score is used as a
covariate in both the ANCOVA and the regression analysis.
An initial assessment (PRE), using the same scale as POST, was also taken following the
manipulation of information characteristics but prior to informing the participants of the industry
crisis. This measure is entered as a covariate during the regression of resilience on legitimacy to
control for individual differences in initial quality evaluations and perceived risk. As with
POST, initial scores for PRE were subsequently reverse-coded for ease of interpretation. Using
PRE as a covariate is preferred to a difference measure of the change in perceived quality due to
its greater sensitivity.

Model

The initial stage of the model reflects the influence of information characteristics of
voluntary disclosure on judgments of legitimacy. This stage is evaluated by a ANCOVA
analysis of the 2 x 2 experimental design, with the BRPS factor score as a covariate and the
legitimacy factor score as the dependent variable:
Legitimacy = ACCURACY + COMPLETENESS + BRPS.

(2)

The second stage reflects the influence of legitimacy on resilience to unexpectedly poor
performance following an industry crisis. This stage is evaluated by regressing the factor score
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for resilience on the legitimacy factor score. The BRPS factor score and PRE (reverse coded)
are used as covariates to adjust for individual differences in risk propensity and perceived risk
(Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995).
Resilience = Legitimacy + PRE + BRPS

(3)

Following initial results, follow up tests are conducted to determine the sensitivity of
individual components of the factor scores used as outcome measures.

Results

Variable Descriptive Statistics

Table 14 presents descriptive statistics. For the overall sample, individual items tend to
be optimistic (above the midpoint), with a wide range of reported variables. For individual cells,
the legitimacy items (CRED, STABL, and INTEG) exhibit the hypothesized relationship, with
high quality disclosure (Cell A: high accuracy/high completeness) consistently showing the
greatest mean and the low quality disclosure (Cell C: low accuracy/low completeness)
displaying the lowest mean. The initial quality rating (PRE) also shows this pattern. However,
the items used to measure the construct of resilience (POST, SHIFT, PREMPART,
PREMFULL) do not display consistent or clear relationships, suggesting that information
characteristics of voluntary disclosures are not directly associated with resilience. As a general
validity check, POST scores are lower than PRE scores for overall and individual cell means,
indicating that respondents perceived a drop in investment quality following an industry crisis.
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The two constructed measures (PREMPART and PREMFULL) show identical means in
the overall sample, but considerable variation among the four cells. Based on cell means, high
completeness seems to contribute to a greater willingness to wait for a partial recovery, whereas
willingness to wait for full recovery seems to strongly (and negatively) differentiate the low
quality disclosure (low accuracy/low completeness). Factor scores, by construction, have a mean
of 0.000 and a standard deviation of 1.000 for the overall sample. Individual cell scores suggest
that information accuracy might be associated with legitimacy assessments (both high accuracy
cells display positive scores, and both low accuracy cells display negative scores).
Completeness, on the other hand, seems to be associated with resilience, such that both cells with
high completeness have positive factor scores for resilience, whereas both conditions with low
information completeness display negative factor scores.
For the perceived legitimacy factor score, and for the individual measures contained
within that factor score, H1c and H1d are both supported. Greatest perceived legitimacy occurs
in cell A (high accuracy/high completeness) and least perceived legitimacy occurs in cell C (low
accuracy/low completeness). Likewise, the greatest assessments of credibility, stability, and
management integrity are found in cell A and the lowest assessments are in cell C.

Influence of Information Characteristics on Perceived Legitimacy

Higher quality (greater accuracy and completeness) voluntary disclosures should produce
greater investor assessments of legitimacy. The accuracy and completeness of reported CSR
items in Dryad’s Sustainability report are manipulated (high vs. low) to produce perceptions of
quality. Using ANCOVA analysis (Table 15), with the BRPS factor score as a covariate to
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control for individual risk preferences and the legitimacy factor score as the outcome variable,
the model was found to be significant, F(4, 95) = 3.320, p < .05. There was a significant effect
of accuracy, F(1, 95) = 10.168, p < .01, on the factor score for legitimacy. Examining parameter
estimates, low accuracy, when compared to high accuracy conditions, will significantly decrease
overall perceived legitimacy (t = -2.170, p < .05). Consequently, H1a is supported and H1b is
not supported.

Influence of Perceived Legitimacy on Resilience

Greater perceived legitimacy should produce greater resilience to unexpectedly poor
performance, as investors are willing to offer reporting organization the “benefit of the doubt” as
to the cause of the poor performance and expectations for future recovery. The factor score for
resilience was regressed on the perceived legitimacy factor score (Table 16), with PRE and
BRPS scores as covariates to adjust for individual differences in risk perceptions and risk
appetite.26 The model itself significantly explains variance in resilience, F(3, 96) = 8.201, p <
.001, adjusted R2 = .179. Within the model, legitimacy (t = 3.469, p < .01) significantly and
positively affected the outcome variable, with a standardized Beta of b = .381. Consequently,
H2 is supported, with greater legitimacy producing greater resilience to unexpected poor
performance following an industry crisis.

26

Results were nearly identical if the factor score for resilience was regressed on the individual items comprising the
factor score for legitimacy, PRE, and BRPS, F(5, 94) = 5.332, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .180, and if resilience was
regressed on the factor score for legitimacy, PRE, BRPS, and accuracy and completeness, F(5, 94) = 5.415, p <
.001, adjusted R2 = .182.
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Conclusion

The relationship between information characteristics of high quality disclosure and
resilience to unexpectedly poor performance following an industry crisis operates through
perceptions of organizational legitimacy. In this case, the construct of perceived legitimacy is
specifically operationalized as perceived disclosure credibility, organizational stability, and
management integrity. In evaluating voluntary CSR disclosures, investors should tacitly
incorporate perceptions of organizational honesty, integrity, and transparency, and these
evaluations determine the extent to which the investor perceives the reporting organization as a
responsible and contributing member of society. In turn, the degree of assessed organizational
legitimacy determines the degree of latitude granted organizational performance in terms of postcrisis assessed quality of investment, disinvestment, and acceptable recovery time (all measures
of the construct of resilience). Voluntary disclosures and the information characteristics
incorporated therein do not have a direct influence on resilience, but appear to operate through
perceived legitimacy, with higher quality disclosures (specifically in terms of accuracy) leading
to higher investor perceptions of organizational legitimacy.
Initial ANCOVA analysis indicated that information characteristics leading to high
quality voluntary disclosures did significantly explain variation in perceived legitimacy.
Accuracy appears to be the primary driver of perceived legitimacy. Individual cell means for
factor scores of legitimacy also demonstrated a difference between high and low accuracy, with
high accuracy producing positive perceived legitimacy and low accuracy leading to negative
legitimacy scores. Consequently, the hypothesis that greater accuracy is associated with greater
perceived legitimacy is supported (H1a). The hypothesized relationship between reporting
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completeness and perceived legitimacy is only unsupported supported for the measure of
credibility. The hypothesized interaction of accuracy x completeness is partially supported. The
interaction was non-significant in the ANCOVA model. However, the individual cell means for
legitimacy factor scores do show the hypothesized relationships, with the greatest perceived
legitimacy associated with high accuracy and high completeness (cell A, H1c) and the least
perceived legitimacy associated with low accuracy and low completeness (cell C, H1d). In the
second step of the model, regressing a resilience factor score on perceived legitimacy scores was
also able to explain a significant part of the variation in resilience, supporting H2. Interestingly,
individual cell means for resilience also suggested that greater completeness in disclosures was
associated with greater resilience.
The results suggest that, when faced with a choice, organizations should devote resources
to ensuring accurate, quantitative measures of reported indicators that also support comparability
and consistency in reporting. It would seem that investors prefer a few measures done well and
precisely to a broad range of issues with vague or incomplete measurement. The significant
association of accuracy with perceived legitimacy would also imply that organizations should
emphasize quantifiable, consistent, and comparable reporting and avoid “feel good” prose
designed more for information management than information provision. Nevertheless, after
controlling for perceived legitimacy, completeness of disclosure does appear to be associated
with greater resilience to performance shocks.
The implication is that high quality voluntary disclosure can benefit organizational
financial performance during exogenous shocks by its effect on perceived legitimacy.
Organizations demonstrating incorporation of societal values, such as transparency,
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accountability, and truthfulness, in their reporting are perceived as more credible and
trustworthy, and, thus, more legitimate. The costs of more extensive, detailed reporting are
offset by the benefits of resilience, or the degree to which investors are willing to wait for
recovery or maintain current positions in the organization’s stock despite performance shocks.
Results suggest that management should emphasize openness and stakeholder engagement to
address the long-term interests of all key groups (not just management and/or shareholders).
Mean factor scores for resilience across conditions suggest that this openness might be supported
by reporting completeness, incorporating both positive and negative performance and multiple
performance areas.
This study focused on only two characteristics of information quality. Future work
should continue to explore the factors producing high-quality voluntary disclosures to understand
how information characteristics interact with cognitive, affective, and behavioral user
characteristics in affecting organizational performance. As future research increases the number
of information characteristics and potential measures of these characteristics, the model could
profitably be studied using a structural equation modeling approach. The focus in this
experiment was on non-professional investors, a large but understudied group often directly
affected by non-financial performance through direct experience with an organization and whose
financial influence is often buried inside aggregated data for mutual fund companies or analyst
reports. Future research could move beyond this single group to compare the effects of
information characteristics on the judgments and actions of other key stakeholder groups
following unexpectedly poor performance.
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There are some additional limitations with this study that could be addressed in future
versions. Completeness might not have been sufficiently apparent to the participants without a
contrasting CSR disclosure. Future research projects could ask participants to rank a series of
CSR disclosures based on the degree of completeness to explore this information characteristic
in more detail. The nature of the experiment also might not have provided sufficient time
between a pre-industry crisis quality assessment and post-crisis quality assessment. Future
research might address this via an experimental markets-type experiment over several months
using repeated measures analysis. Finally, the allowed buffer measures might not be sufficiently
sensitive as the participants were not asked for their expectations regarding financial recovery of
other organizations affected by the industry crisis. Future research could also concentrate on this
area, specifically examining the degree of volatility allowed in expected performance.
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Tables
Table 13: Demographic Description of Sample Population

Age

Gender

Industry in
which
respondent
employed

Responsibility
for
management
of portfolio

21-29 years
30 – 39 years
40 – 49 years
50 – 59 years
60 or older
Male
Female
Manufacturing
Finance/Accounting/Insurance
Marketing/Sales/Retail
Agriculture/Forestry/Fisheries
Personal Services
Transportation/Logistics
Law/Military/Security
Health Care/Medicine
Government/Not for profit
Education
Information Service/Technology

6
16
35
26
17
57
43
12
14
5
1
3
2
1
7
3
9
8

Engineering/Aeronautics

1

Retired
Other
Self
Self + advisor

1
33
56
32

Self + spouse

Experience with
investing

Average portfolio size

Likely to invest (in any
vehicle other than real
estate) in next 12 months

Perception of market

Highest degree earned

12

n = 100, numbers represent percentages
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Very little
Some
Considerable
Expert
Under $10,000
$10,000 - $100,000
$100,001 - $500,000
$500,001 - $1,000,000
Over $1,000,000
Not at all
About 50/50
Definitely
Optimistic
Pessimistic
Neutral
Don’t know/No opinion
High School
Some
college/Associate’s
degree
Undergraduate degree
Some graduate school
Graduate/Professional
degree

4
46
47
3
4
24
43
18
11
2
37
61
48
13
38
1
2
19
38
10
3
1

Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Overall
Sample

Overall, assuming you were not concerned about
balancing your stock portfolio, how would you rate
this company? (PRE)1
How believable did you find Dryad’s Sustainability
Report? (CRED)1
Under normal economic conditions, and without
considering a need to balance your portfolio, how
comfortable would you be holding this investment
and not monitoring it regularly? (STABL)1
If there was a crisis and you could not monitor
management’s actions, how comfortable would you
be that top management would do what’s in the best
long-term interests of the company and its
stakeholders, and not simply in their short-term
interest? (INTEG)1
Overall, assuming you were not concerned about
balancing your stock portfolio, how would you rate
this company? (POST)1
If you were not concerned with diversifying your
investments, and if you had the opportunity to do so
without transaction costs, what percentage of your
original, inherited investment in Dryad would you
shift to a market-indexed mutual fund? (SHIFT)1
If you were to choose a “wait and see” strategy, and
assuming that all industry stocks recovered at the
same rate, what is the maximum time you would be
willing to wait to see a partial recovery in Dryad
stock of at least 10% of the fall in Net Income?
(WPART) – All else being equal, how long would
you expect it to take for Dryad Stock to show a
partial recovery of at least 10% of the recent decrease
in Net Income? (EPART) = (PREMPART)2

Cell Mean (S.D.)

Range

High
Accuracy/
High
Completeness

High
Accuracy/
Low
Completeness

Low
Accuracy/
Low
Completeness

Low
Accuracy/
High
Completeness

5.420
(0.843)

4.00

5.560
(0.821)

5.520
(0.963)

5.200
(0.913)

5.400
(0.646)

7

5.530
(0.999)

5.00

6.040
(0.790)

5.720
(0.936)

5.000
(1.041)

5.360
(0.952)

7

5.290
(1.289)

6.00

5.600
(1.354)

5.480
(1.358)

5.000
(1.384)

5.080
(0.997)

7

4.990
(1.227)

5.00

5.280
(1.173)

5.160
(1.179)

4.560
(1.227)

4.960
(1.274)

7

4.770
(1.563)

6.00

4.640
(1.655)

4.680
(1.651)

4.920
(1.441)

4.840
(1.573)

10

7.960
(2.881)

9.00

8.200
(3.215)

7.840
(2.968)

7.960
(2.606)

7.840
(2.868)

34

0.210
(0.977)

5.00

0.320
(0.852)

0.120
(1.269)

0.040
(0.935)

0.360
(0.810)

Max.
Scale

Mean
(S.D)

7
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Overall
Sample
Max.
Scale

Mean
(S.D)

55

0.210
(0.880)

If you were to choose a “wait and see” strategy, and
assuming that all industry stocks recovered at the
same rate, what is the maximum time you would be
willing to wait to see a full recovery to the level of
Net Income prior to the industry scandal? (WFULL)
– All else being equal, how long would you expect it
to take for Dryad stock to show a full recovery of the
recent decrease in Net Income? (EFULL) =
(PREMFULL)2
Summated score for Business Risk Propensity Scale
(BRPS)3

42

Factor score for Business Risk Propensity Scale
(BRPS)

n/a

Factor score for Legitimacy
Factor score for Resilience

n/a
n/a

Cell Mean (S.D.)

Range

High
Accuracy/
High
Completeness

High
Accuracy/
Low
Completeness

Low
Accuracy/
Low
Completeness

Low
Accuracy/
High
Completeness

6.00

0.240
(0.831)

0.280
(1.061)

0.000
(0.866)

0.320
(0.748)

20.800
(5.260)

19.560
(6.378)

20.800
(6.416)

22.040
(6.017)

-0.013
(0.893)
0.428
(0.769)
0.045
(0.948)

-0.190
(1.065)
0.205
(1.041)
-0.037
(1.219)

-0.006
(1.071)
-0.481
(1.071)
-0.093
(0.989)

0.210
(0.981)
-0.152
(0.896)
0.086
(0.860)

20.800
29.00
(6.008)
Factor Scores
0.000
4.758
(1.000)
0.000
4.603
(1.000)
0.000
5.222
(1.000)

1

Reported statistics represent reversed scores for ease of interpretation. Higher values indicated greater ratings of quality,
credibility, stability and trustworthiness and a greater percentage of retained investment.
2
Higher scores indicated a greater amount of time investors were willing to wait for recovery beyond initial expectations of
time required.
3
Higher scores indicate a greater tendency to accept risk in business situations.
4
There are 4 ordinal categories in both EPART and WPART, so the maximum difference would be 4 (more than one year) – 1
(one month or less).
5
There are 6 ordinal categories in both EFULL and WFULL, so the maximum difference would be 6 (five years or more) – 1
(one month or less).
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Table 15: Statistical Results for Tests of Information Characteristics’ Effect on Perceived
Legitimacy
ANCOVA Results for H1a and H1b
Source of Variance
Type III SS df F-value p-value
Overall Model with Factor Score for Legitimacy
Model
12.141
4
3.320
.014
Independent Variables:
Accuracy
10.168
1 11.121
.001
Completeness
1.786
1
1.953
.165
Accuracy*Completeness
.068
1
.075
.785
Covariate:
BRPS
.131
1
.144
.706
Error
86.859
95
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Table 16: Statistical Results for Tests of the Effect of Perceived Legitimacy on Resilience
Regression Results for H2
F(3, 96)
Overall model

Sig.

8.201
.000
Unstandardized
Independent Variables
t-stat
Coefficient
Intercept
-.707
-.994
Legitimacy
.381
3.469
PRE
.131
1.003
BRPS
.012
.130

Adjusted
R2
.179
Sig.
.323
.001
.319
.897
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CHAPTER FOUR: IN BAD COMPANY: VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
AND PRESERVING CREDIBILITY DURING EXTERNAL CRISIS
Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to explore voluntary disclosure choices used by
organizations in response to an exogenous credibility crisis. Such a crisis occurs when an
external source of assurance for (mandatory) organizational information loses its own legitimacy,
especially when that source of assurance is a member of the institutional framework supporting
economic markets. If the third party is not perceived to reflect the values and norms of society,
then its own credibility suffers. The assurance offered by such a third party is inherently noncredible and consequently the “innocent” disclosing organization might be perceived as less
credible even if the disclosing organization itself has done nothing to merit this skepticism.
Voluntary disclosure, as a signal of greater transparency and by the inclusion of non-mandated
reporting that nonetheless reflects areas of performance of concern to society as a whole, might
be used by organizations as a means of preserving their own legitimacy in the face of a crisis
affecting the institutional framework surrounding mandatory financial reports.
Public accounting firms and their attestation of the reliability of mandatory financial
reporting were intended to protect the public interest by independent, credible examination of
organizational disclosures. As such, they serve as a key component of the institutional
framework supporting the capital market and overall economy. US audit firms suffered a severe
shock to credibility after the Enron/Andersen scandal in 2001 – 2002 and the emergence of other
scandals involving all of the major public accounting firms. Concurrently with accounting
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scandals and regulatory oversight failure, corporations, audit firms, and legislators were
perceived to be in collusion and compromised by lobbyist activity (Bazerman, Loewenstein, and
Moore 2002; Bazerman et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2006). This study is the first to examine how
organizations attempt to use voluntary reporting, as a means of signaling transparency and
credibility, to preserve legitimacy in the face of an external threat involving the institutional
framework of the market itself. I contribute to the academic literature by theorizing regarding
the role voluntary disclosure and credibility-enhancing disclosure choices play in organizational
legitimacy. I also contribute to practitioner understanding of how voluntary disclosure choices
might serve to insulate an “innocent” organization from scandals affecting the surrounding
institutional environment.27
By examining patterns of voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)28 disclosure
choices (whether to engage in voluntary disclosure and whether to enhance credibility through
the use of independent assurance and/or reporting frameworks) within the S&P 500 around the
Enron scandal, I shed light on how firms use information disclosure to affect their perceived
legitimacy. Discretionary reporting strategies might be conceptualized as choices involving both
the elements of discretionary reporting used (increased disclosure, reporting framework, thirdparty assurance) and the combination of those elements used (for example, the use of CSR
disclosure alone versus the use of CSR disclosure within a reporting framework). Using
qualitative data of CSR disclosure strategies used by the S&P 500 over an eight year period, I

27

Throughout the rest of this chapter, “institutional environment” is to be understood to specifically refer to those
institutions supporting the capital market and overall economic environment. These institutions consist principally
of governmental and professional regulatory bodies, professional associations, financial exchanges, and the public
accounting firms. This chapter extends Chapter 3, The Benefit of the Doubt, where the exogenous shock affecting
organizational credibility and legitimacy was due to a crisis within the same industry.
28
Corporate Social Responsibility includes aspects of organizational social, environmental, and ethical performance.

127

find that the use of both CSR disclosure and a reporting framework increases steadily and
significantly across all time frames while the use of third-party assurance remains steady and
extremely minimal. I also find that the use of auditors as third-party assurance providers is never
more than 50% and drops significantly during the crisis period. Finally, I find that the
combination of CSR disclosure with one means of credibility enhancement (primarily the use of
a reporting framework) accelerates following the crisis while CSR disclosure alone remains
fairly steady (although at a high level).
The next section presents the theorization of the role of voluntary CSR disclosure choices
in establishing organizational legitimacy. The key role of information credibility in establishing
that legitimacy is postulated and a theory of organizational behavior in the face of an exogenous
threat to legitimacy centered on the institutional framework is presented. The following sections
outline the methodology used, analyze the findings, and conclude with a discussion of limitations
and future research directions.

Development of Theory and Research Questions

Legitimacy is based on compliance with expected norms of legal/economic behavior and
societal values which might not be incorporated into legislation (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).
This implies that there is both a basic level of legitimacy, supported by mandatory disclosure
(determined and vouched for by the institutional framework),29 and “full” legitimacy, supported
by voluntary disclosure. Full legitimacy is largely theoretical; most organizations will fall
29

Details of the mandatory framework, the emphasis on individual components, the expectations of corporate
responsibility to society, and the degree of involvement in the marketplace will vary with culture and over time (Doh
and Guay 2006; Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Ioannou and Serafeim 2010).
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somewhere along the continuum between basic and full legitimacy, which is also referred to as
the “legitimacy gap” (Lindblom 2010).
The use of voluntary CSR disclosure to signal differing compliance with societal values
is especially evident in the United States, where very little mandated reporting exists with regard
to CSR performance and/or disclosure. The KPMG International Survey of Corporate
Responsibility Reporting (2008) highlights the increasing focus of US organizations on CSR
disclosure: among the 100 largest US companies by revenue, CSR reporting rose dramatically
from 32% in 2005 to 74% in 2008. The range of definitions, methodologies, and reporting
formats within CSR disclosures complicates assessments and comparison of organizational
performance, as does the extent of managerial discretion in reporting and a severe organizational
aversion to reporting the “wrong answer” (Gray 2010).30 Because US CSR disclosure is not
required to be audited, the credibility of such disclosure remains in question.31 In response to
this issue, external sources of credibility enhancement might be utilized, such as an independent
reporting framework or the use of a third-party assurance provider. Third-party assurance
providers might be public accounting firms,32 consulting firms specializing in CSR assurance
and possessing the necessary technical skills to assess environmental impacts, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which might also provide certifications for the organization
to display (e.g., Fair Trade, the Forestry Stewardship Council, etc.). Within the United States,
public accounting firms aggressively positioned themselves as the primary providers of third-

30

I.e., one that either discloses poor performance or inaccurately reflects stakeholder concerns and therefore leads to
negative consequences.
31
A recent study found that of US organizations engaging in environmental reporting only 3% used external
assurance of those reports (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009).
32
A notable study (O’Dwyer, Owen, and Unerman 2011) examined the process by which audit firms positioned
themselves as legitimate third-party assurers of CSR disclosures.
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party assurance (Power 1997, 2003; O’Dwyer and Owen 2005); consequently, a credibility crisis
affecting public accounting firms might result in a shift to other forms of credibility enhancement
of voluntary disclosure during the crisis.

Role of Voluntary Disclosure in Legitimacy
The success of the legitimation process depends on stakeholders’ knowledge of the
organization’s efforts to reflect social norms in its outcomes, processes, and procedures and their
interpretations/perceptions of the organizational information provided (Milne and Patten 2002;
Cormier, Gordon, and Magnan 2004). Thus, organizations will engage in voluntary disclosure in
order to bring this information to public attention and/or to differentiate themselves from
competitors, especially organizations whose behavior is in fact reflective of societal norms but is
largely unobservable to the (probably misinformed) public (Buhr 2002; Lindblom 2010).33
Consequently, legitimacy theory is an appropriate lens to examine organization choices in
disclosure (Chen and Roberts 2010). The revolution in information technology, the growth of
the Internet, and the liberalization of the global marketplace have increased stakeholder demand
and the availability of information from other, independent sources (Freeman, Harrison, and
Wicks 2007). This, in turn, creates pressures for the organization to increase voluntary CSR
disclosure as a way of controlling information (Arya and Mittendorf 2005) or in an effort to
avoid being perceived as secretive, or less than transparent. Increased disclosure implicitly

33

In fact, communication of organizational behaviors does not have to be originated by the organization itself, as
many companies know to their great discomfort. In the Internet era, organizational (mis)deeds are quickly
communicated world-wide with rapid effects on reputation, profits, and stock price (Brown and Deegan 1998;
Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks 2007; Aerts and Cormier 2009).
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acknowledges the desire of stakeholders for information and that key stakeholder groups have
interests and concerns that are not covered by mandatory reporting. As a result, the decision to
engage in voluntary CSR disclosure supports legitimacy through increased transparency. 34
Organizational choices in voluntary CSR disclosure represent signaling behavior to
establish or repair public legitimacy. Brown and Deegan (1998) found that when media
coverage of environmental issues threatened legitimacy in environmentally sensitive industries,
those industries responded by increasing the extent of disclosure. CSR information will vary
across voluntary disclosers in terms of its quality, depth, breadth, completeness, and timeliness
(Adams, Hill, and Roberts 1998; Patten 2002; Cormier, Gordon, and Magnan 2004; Aerts and
Cormier 2009) and some organizations might initiate CSR in a proactive, direct engagement with
stakeholders whereas others simply do so to manage legitimacy (Chen and Roberts 2010).
Organizational decisions that determine what information is included in voluntary CSR
disclosure, as well as when it is disclosed and how it is measured and reported, will determine the
perceived legitimacy of the organization, especially in relation to its competitors. Mere
publication of information is not enough to ensure legitimacy. The process depends on the
credibility of the information as well as its availability.

34

This does not automatically assume that increased disclosure is completely honest, accurate, or open. In this case,
transparency is narrowly defined as simply the provision of additional desired information beyond that required by
GAAP. Issues of honesty, openness, and accuracy are addressed through the means utilized to enhance the
credibility of information disclosed.
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Role of Information Credibility in Legitimacy

Legitimacy not only depends on the information provided in voluntary CSR disclosure,
but also on the public’s perception of the credibility of this information. Credibility of disclosure
is driven by its perceived accuracy and completeness (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Aerts
and Cormier 2009; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).35 Completeness can be both the inclusion of
positive and negative performance and the extent of coverage across a range of stakeholder
concerns (O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). One means of ensuring
completeness is to utilize an accepted framework. An accepted framework developed by an
independent third party also provides consistency in definitions and stakeholders to assess the
degree of reliability of the information disclosed (and/or of the systems used to produce that
information), conferring legitimacy through information credibility (Doh et al. 2010). In 2005,
KPMG reported that 660 companies throughout 50 countries had adopted the framework
supplied by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). By 2008, the majority of the Global 250 and
N100 companies were found to use the GRI Guidelines (KPMG 2008).
Public accountants, despite concerns regarding their technical competence in nonfinancial fields (Power 1997), have reportedly been the preferred source of third-party assurance
for US corporations (Solomon 2000; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck,
and Simnett 2011), most probably due to their familiar role as auditors of financial statements
(O’Dwyer, Owen, and Hession 2005). One study found that companies seeking to enhance CSR
disclosure were more likely to use assurance, although it did not seem to matter whether the
35

Timeliness (and manipulation of timing of disclosure) is also a potentially important element in credibility; at least
one study (Aerts and Cormier 2009) finds that proactive environmental disclosures seem to be completely
discounted as impression management.
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assurance provider was a professional auditor and the use of auditors is minimal (Simnett,
Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009).36 For the period 2002 – 2004, out of 40,993 firm-years, 2,113
provided sustainability reports, with 31% of those being assured and 42% of those assured (n =
275) using auditors (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009).37 The key point is that third-party
assurance provides information credibility in voluntary disclosures, but the choice of third-party
assurer is not necessarily automatically a public accounting firm nor is third-party assurance
necessarily the main source of information credibility.

Role of External Credibility in Legitimacy

Legitimacy is not simply a matter of the degree of the accuracy, completeness, and
truthfulness of information provided by a reporting organization, but also of the credibility of the
source of assurance that the information is accurate, truthful, and complete. The fundamental
source of organizational information signals to stakeholders is mandatory financial reporting and
the credibility of that information is supported by the institutional framework as embodied in
public accountants. When the credibility (and even legitimacy) of the institutional framework is
shaken, organizational legitimacy will be threatened even if the reporting organization itself has
done nothing to damage its own credibility and the economy will be disrupted (Kothari, Li, and
Short 2009). When the credibility of mandatory disclosures is compromised, a legitimacy gap
(Lindblom 2010) develops between what society expects and what the institutional framework is
36

A follow-up study found that US financial analysts perceived CSR disclosures assured by professional auditors to
have greater credibility than those assured by other sources, although this did not hold with UK and Australian
analysts (Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011).
37
It should be noted that this represents a 5.15% CSR disclosure rate, but of the total 40,993 international companies
only 1.6% used assurance and only 0.7% used auditor-based assurance.
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perceived to be capable of assuring. Voluntary CSR disclosure might reduce this gap and
establish (comparatively greater) legitimacy. However, the public is often skeptical of voluntary
disclosure intent and truthfulness (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). Increased disclosure
partially increases perceptions of completeness, but credibility enhancement choices, such as the
use of reporting frameworks and third-party assurance, provide a greater degree of comfort
regarding the completeness and accuracy of the information provided. Nevertheless, a threat to
the credibility of the institutional framework increases uncertainty in the market and the
legitimacy gap and can have significant performance implications for the “innocent”
organization which may experience credit shortages or decreases in stock price as investors and
creditors reassess the risk and decision-usefulness of reported information. This will be
especially powerful in conditions of greater economic uncertainty or in the face of industryrelated disasters.
CSR accounting and reporting have emerged in an environment of increasing public
attention to organizational behavior and its impact on society. Failure to address issues of
concern might result in public pressure to increase regulation. To some extent, increased
voluntary disclosures function as a means of staving off future increases in regulation by
demonstrating an organization’s concern with issues of CSR and thus the organization’s
alignment with societal values (Walden and Schwartz 1997; Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 1998;
Buhr 2002). Credible public disclosures bridge the gap between the (functioning) regulatory
environment and internal management actions and support the public interest (Power 1997). The
source of credibility assurance must be perceived as independent and credible itself, however, or
alternative sources will be sought. In the wake of Enron, the success of organizations such as
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GRI, Fair Trade, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), and AccountAbility, among others, has provided alternative sources of
third-party information assessment and assurance in response to stakeholder skepticism
regarding the credibility and independence of public accountants and the overall institutional
environment.

Development of Research Questions

Voluntary CSR disclosures provided to stakeholders are intended to bridge the legitimacy
gap between institutional and societal values through demonstrated transparency and respect for
societal values and concerns. The intent of the disclosure provided is evaluated by individual
stakeholders based on reputation, prior experience, and perceptions of organizational motivation
and interacts with informational content (completeness and accuracy) to produce evaluations of
credibility. Credibility is especially dependent on external validation, so the use of an
independent reporting framework (e.g., the GRI Guidelines) and/or the use of third-party
assurance become important sources of credibility enhancement and support evaluations of
organizational legitimacy. The combination of framework-and-assurance might be especially
potent as it mirrors the structure of the familiar financial reporting format. In short,
organizations have three options to increase perceived legitimacy: (1) increase the amount of
information provided, (2) use a reporting framework to enhance credibility, or (3) use third-party
assurance to enhance credibility. Further, a combination of options might provide different
levels of voluntary disclosure intensity.
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Organizations that had not previously engaged in voluntary CSR disclosure are still
affected by a credibility crisis centered on public accounting firms as such a crisis affects the
credibility of (auditor-assured) mandatory disclosures. Non-voluntary disclosing organizations
in especially socially- or environmentally-sensitive industries (or those whose financial
statements had formerly been audited by Andersen) might face an increased threat to their
legitimacy and choose to begin engaging in voluntary disclosure in response. There should be no
reduction in voluntary CSR disclosure as this would signal decreased transparency, increase
information uncertainty, and produce greater costs to the organization.38 Following the
credibility crisis, increased use of meaningful voluntary disclosure should continue due to the
sunk costs involved in management systems developed to provide the disclosure and the negative
effect on reputation that would accompany a subsequent decrease in transparency. For CSR
disclosures consisting largely of unsupported “feel good” statements (e.g., “We support the
environment”, “We care about our community”) and representing image management more than
the provision of incremental information, however, the use of such voluntary disclosure might
decrease following the resolution of the crisis as there have been no significant investments into
management systems and no significant reputation for openness and accuracy of reporting has
been established. The first research question addresses this basic state as the frequency of CSR
voluntary disclosure as both a component choice (all instance of CSR disclosure) and an
intensity level (organizations choosing only to provide CSR disclosure without any other means
of enhancement).

38

It is, however, possible that very high levels of market uncertainty might lead to non-rational behavior where all
firms reduce signaling behavior and wait for the instability to resolve. This should appear only when the source of
the threat is not clear, which was not the case with the Enron crisis.

136

RQ1a: To what degree will S&P 500 organizations provide voluntary
CSR disclosures before, during, and after an exogenous legitimacy
threat?
RQ1b: To what degree will S&P 500 organizations provide voluntary
disclosures alone (without additional credibility enhancements)
before, during, and after an exogenous legitimacy threat?
Information credibility depends on assessments of accuracy and completeness supported
by external, independent sources. Theoretically, stakeholders should prefer less, but more
accurate, information to large amounts of misleading or meaningless information (see Chapter
Three for evidence of this preference). Third-party assurance functions to provide at least a
degree of comfort regarding information accuracy (sampled information found to be accurately
reported) and uses procedures and providers familiar to the organization from the auditing of its
financial statements.39 This would suggest that under most threats to legitimacy an organization
might seek to enhance credibility by adopting third-party assurance even before the use of a
framework (and the associated extensive adoption of managerial systems). A basic source of
credibility enhancement is the use of a reporting framework to emphasize the completeness and
extent of information, however, without the problematic (in terms of high-annual cost, assurance
of only targeted areas, and questions of competence to assure more scientific/technical
performance issues) question of third-party assurance. Because they also increase consistency
and comparability, stakeholders might prefer the use of reporting frameworks to third-party

39

Theoretically, it might also provide a degree of comfort regarding the completeness of the information provided
(an accurate representation, omitting no salient facts) but in practice third-party assurance of CSR disclosures tends
to be confined to specific, limited subtopics that are more easily quantified and verifiable.
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assurance. Further, during a crisis centered on institutional providers of assurance, organizations
previously utilizing third-party assurance might choose to shift their emphasis from third-party
assurance to an independent framework. Following resolution of the crisis, and given the sunk
costs involved in supporting either third-party assurance or a reporting framework, the likelihood
is that the use of either option will continue.
RQ2a: To what degree will those S&P 500 organizations engaging in
voluntary CSR disclosure before, during, and after an exogenous
legitimacy threat utilize an independent reporting framework to
enhance credibility?
RQ2b: To what degree will those S&P 500 organizations engaging in
voluntary CSR disclosure before, during, and after an exogenous
legitimacy threat utilize third-party assurance to enhance
credibility?
When credibility enhancement is considered as a measurement of intensity, and not
simply the individual components, two options are possible. Either option is dependent on the
initial decision to increase transparency by providing voluntary CSR disclosure. Once that
decision is made, reporting organizations can choose to provide a disclosure with one source of
credibility enhancement, either a reporting framework or third-party assurance (CSR-OR), or to
provide voluntary disclosure with two sources of credibility enhancement, a reporting framework
and third-party assurance (CSR-AND). When the credibility crisis is focused on public
accountants, and if auditors are the usual source of third-party assurance of voluntary disclosure,
CSR-OR organizations should prefer to add a framework. For organizations already using one
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method but perceiving a need to enhance legitimacy, the most likely option is to add the second
method.
RQ3a: To what degree will S&P 500 organizations provide voluntary
CSR disclosures with one source of credibility enhancement, either
a reporting framework OR third-party assurance, before, during,
and after an exogenous legitimacy threat?
RQ3b: To what degree will S&P 500 organizations provide voluntary
CSR disclosures with two sources of credibility enhancement, both
a reporting framework AND third-party assurance, before, during,
and after an exogenous legitimacy threat?
Finally, within the subcategory of organizations choosing to use third-party assurance,
what will be the source of that third-party assurance? In a legitimacy threat centered on public
accounting firms, organizations previously using auditors to provide third-party assurance of
voluntary information are likely to shift to a different source of third-party assurance. The audit
profession has claimed to be pre-eminently qualified to provide assurance on voluntary CSR
disclosures due to experience in performing financial audits, although at least one study finds
that consultants are more likely to assess completeness and consistency than are auditors
(O’Dwyer and Owen 2005). Alternatives to auditor-based third-party assurance exist in the use
of external consultants or NGOs, which might also provide certifications for the organization to
display on their packaging, advertising, or website.
RQ4: To what degree will those S&P 500 organizations using third-party
assurance of voluntary CSR disclosure before, during, and after an
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exogenous legitimacy threat utilize public accounting firms to
provide that assurance?
A summary of these predictions for CSR component choice is presented in Table 17. No
predictions are made for CSR intensity.

Research Design and Methodology

Population

The population for this study consists of the S&P 500 for the period 1998 to 2005. This
population captures the largest actively traded companies in the United States listed on either the
NYSE or NASDAQ exchanges. Composition of the S&P 500 does change slightly from year to
year and within years (consequently, the sample ranges from n = 503 to n = 526), but relative
rank within the index is not important. For certain of the statistical tests used in this study, it is
important that the cell sizes are equal and that the same companies are in each cell: in such
instances, the population is restricted to those organizations present in each of the eight years (n
= 337). Concentration on large-cap, publicly traded companies and US markets restricts the
sample to organizations that are most likely to be affected by an exogenous legitimacy threat
centered on the institutional framework supporting the US market and on the largest public
accounting firms which provide assurance of their mandatory financial disclosures. These
organizations cover a range of industries and should better reflect an exogenous legitimacy threat
and not simply perceived risk from an implicated industry or market segment. This is an
exploratory study of organizational behavior in the aggregate during a credibility crisis, not a
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case study of individual organization reactions. Therefore, the focus is on the overall frequency
of CSR components or intensity levels utilized within each time segment within the entire S&P
500, rather than on changes within individual organizations; the study is descriptive, rather than
predictive.

Research Design and Methods

When the Enron scandal surfaced in 2001, audit firms entered a turbulent period of
accounting scandals, independence crises, and prosecution that continued through the collapse of
WorldCom and the dissolution of Andersen in 2002 (Table 18). There had been warning signals
in prior years, and other incidents followed, but the years 2001 – 2002 produced a crisis of
confidence in the entire audit profession and resulted in vocal societal and governmental pressure
for increased industry regulation. This study examines corporate voluntary CSR disclosure
behavior across the period 1998 – 2005, divided into three groups: pre-crisis, crisis, and postcrisis. There might be a lagged period before firms are able to implement systems and internal
processes to change reporting behaviors and biennial voluntary reporting cycles are common
during the test period, so each group consists of at least two years.
Using frequency counts of the behavior of interest across the period, the patterns of US
voluntary CSR disclosure behavior before, during, and after a credibility crisis involving audit
firms are examined. Largely exploratory in nature, the study utilizes graphical analysis of
relationships between qualitative variables and tests of changes in frequencies and proportions
over time. As the data are categorical and only partially independent, non-parametric tests are
utilized. Friedman’s non-parametric ANOVA is initially used to determine whether there are
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significant differences in either the use of individual components or in intensity levels across the
entire test period. Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests are then used to test for difference in reporting
choices or intensity levels among the three testing groups (pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis). Finally,
two-proportion z-tests of changes in frequency are used to determine which specific components
or intensity levels are significantly different. The significance level used is α = .05 (adjusted
using Bonferroni corrections where appropriate) with one-tailed tests.
Data for this study come from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and
CorporateRegister.com websites. GRI not only has developed one of the most widely adopted
and endorsed frameworks for CSR reporting, but also maintains a database of organizations
using the framework and subscribing to GRI procedures. The reporting framework features
profile disclosures, performance indicators, and management disclosures designed to be adopted
incrementally across key areas of CSP. The original G1 Guidelines (launched in 2000) were
much less elaborate, but the G2 Guidelines (released in 2002) introduced distinctions within
levels of reporting frameworks and encouraged the additional use of third-party assurance.40 The
CorporateRegister.com website contains a unique, proprietary database of all known CSR
reports, including listings of frameworks utilized, source of external assurance, and .pdf files of
historical reports. For each year of the period 1998 – 2005, each of the S&P 500 companies for
that year is checked to see if they published voluntary CSR disclosures, which might consist of
“sustainability,” “environmental,” “social,” “citizenship,” or any other reporting title that is
discretionary, primarily involves non-financial performance, and includes information reflecting
CSR. A categorical nominal variable is coded for each firm-year for the presence of each
40

The current GRI Guidelines are in version G3.1 (2011), replacing G3 (2006). The release of G4 is projected for
May 2013.
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potential CSR component choice (CSR Disclosure, Framework, Assurance, Auditor Assurance)
and a categorical ordinal variable is used to reflect the selected intensity level (CSR-ONLY,
CSR-OR, CSR-AND).
Independent variables are simply the years of the study or the grouping variables (precrisis, crisis, post-crisis) to which the years belong. Dependent variables are measures of the
frequency with which individual CSR components or CSR intensity levels were utilized. As
these are categorical variables with counts, the calculation of means is meaningless; however,
frequencies can be compared across unequal cell sizes. CSR components are coded (0 = not
present, 1 = present) for each potential choice: the production of a CSR disclosure (CSR) the use
of an independent reporting framework (FRAMEWORK), the use of third-party assurance
(ASSURE), and the use of an auditor, specifically, as third-party assurer (AUDITOR).
FRAMEWORK and ASSURE are nested within CSR (an organization must produce a CSR
disclosure in order to use a framework or third-party assurance, but there are CSR-disclosing
organizations that provide neither framework nor third-party assurance); AUDITOR is nested
within ASSURE. For any firm-year, there might be more than one component.41
The measure for CSR disclosure intensity is based on the assumption that the
combination of individual components to produce legitimacy is more telling than simple counts
of components present. Three levels of intensity, reflecting progressively greater efforts to
signal legitimacy, are coded as ordinal variables. CSR-ONLY (coded “1”) are those
organizations which produce a CSR disclosure alone, with no additional source of credibility
enhancement (neither a reporting framework nor third-party assurance). Organizations which
41

For example, a single company with (1) a CSR disclosure using both (2) a framework and (3) third-party
assurance, with the third party assurer being (4) a public accounting firm will have a count in all four components.
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use one method of credibility enhancement, either a reporting framework or third-party
assurance (CSR-OR), are coded “2”. Organizations using both methods of credibility
enhancement, a reporting framework and third-party assurance (CSR-AND), are coded “3”. For
any given firm-year, there can be only one level of intensity, although intensity might change
across firm-years.
Certain industries might be more sensitive to the credibility crisis than others, due to
greater perceived risk, exposure to environmentally/socially sensitive areas, or association with
organizations directly implicated in the crisis. Information on each organization’s industry
membership, quality rating, financial statement auditor, and relative risk was obtained from
Compustat or CRSP. Additionally, since a credibility crisis involving public accounting firms
(and thus the credibility of the audited financial statements) might affect financial performance,
measures of total assets, revenues, and net income for each firm-year were also tracked.

Analysis and Discussion

The initial time period of interest was estimated to be between 1998 and 2005 to bracket
a period of increasing auditor-focused crises, with 1998 and 2005 both containing no significant
crises (refer to Table 18). However, there are two factors that might influence where and how
the time frame is broken into related periods: this introduction of the GRI first generation
framework in 2000 and a possible time-lag effect for reporting. Graphing the frequency of CSR
disclosure components across each year of the study (Figure 5), there appear to be three distinct
periods for CSR: an increase across 1998 – 2001; a plateau for 2002 – 2003; and an increase
again for 2004 – 2005. However, there appear to be four periods for FRAMEWORK: relatively
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low and flat for 1998 – 1999; an increase during 2000 – 2001; a plateau during 2002 – 2003; and
an increase during 2004 – 2005. ASSURE (and within this component AUDITOR) displays a
consistently low frequency with no clearly discernible pattern.
Organizational signaling behavior consists not only of individual components, but also of
a measure of intensity in how those components are combined. A visual inspection of the
frequency of CSR disclosure intensity across the time frame (Figure 6) seems to indicate that
there are four distinct periods. For CSR-ONLY organizations, there is a low but increasing
period in 1998 – 1999; a sudden increase but relatively flat period in 2000 – 2001; and a slight
increase but relatively flat period from 2002 – 2005. For CSR-OR organizations, 1998 – 1999 is
relatively flat; there is an increase across 2000 – 2001; 2002 – 2003 plateaus at a higher level;
and 2004 – 2005 displays another sharp increase in frequency. There were no CSR-AND
organizations until 2000; the frequency of this intensity level remains relatively flat from 2000 –
2002 and then increases slowly through 2005.
Based on the graphed frequencies, the eight-year testing period is grouped into four 2year periods. The period 1998 – 1999 functions much as a “base line,” prior to the introduction
of the GRI framework and (allowing for a one year reporting lag) prior to major accounting
scandals. The following period, 2000 – 2001, represents a pre-crisis period, with the presence of
accounting scandals but without the widespread public skepticism and regulatory backlash that
occurred in the wake of Enron. Disclosures released during 2002 – 2003 represent the crisis
period in reactions to Enron (2001), WorldCom (2002), and the fall of Andersen (2002). Finally,
2004 – 2005 represents a post-crisis period, following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
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creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and a decrease in the
number of auditor-based scandals.

CSR Components

The research questions in this study concentrate on increases in specific behaviors shown
in response to an exogenous legitimacy threat that can be perceived to threaten an organization’s
reporting credibility and overall legitimacy. Counts of the frequency of each of four behaviors
(CSR, FRAMEWORK, ASSURE, AUDITOR) are tabulated and two-proportion z-tests for
differences in frequencies are used to check for significant changes across the grouping periods.
There are clear increases in both CSR and FRAMEWORK across all years (Table 19, Panel A).
ASSURE, however, only begins to increase (and that a minimal level) during the post-crisis
years, while AUDITOR fluctuates but remains extremely limited and never returns to the 1998
level of 50% of ASSURE.
The increase in the absolute use of CSR disclosure and of an independent reporting
framework is significant for changes across all four periods (Table 20, Panel A). Neither the use
of third-party assurance nor of auditor provided third-party assurance of the CSR disclosure is
significant for any of the time periods. As there is some ambiguity in the years 2000 – 2001, an
alternate analysis was conducted using only three periods (baseline, crisis, post-crisis) with
identical results for trends in CSR component frequency.
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CSR Intensity

Individual components of voluntary disclosure are not necessarily of most interest.
Instead, the combination of these components differentiates organizational behavior in
demonstrations of transparency and credibility. Consequently, the analysis continues by looking
at CSR disclosure intensity across the groups centered on the crisis period. We would expect to
see an increase in disclosure intensity in response to increased legitimacy pressure during the
crisis. Following the crisis, behavior will depend on perceived effectiveness of credibility
enhancement versus transparency and perceptions of relative effectiveness between
FRAMEWORK and ASSURE. The frequency counts for each intensity level across the study
period are given in Table 19, Panel B. As the data are not independent, but are ordinal repeated
measures, Friedman’s non-parametric ANOVA is used to test for significant changes across the
entire period for the restricted set (n = 337), Χ2(3) = 108.498, p < .001.42 Next, Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests (based on negative ranks)43 is used to follow up the initial finding, using both a
3- and 4-group analysis.44 Voluntary CSR disclosure intensity significantly increases across
every period, from the base period (1998) to pre-crisis (2000), z = -5.458, p < .001, r = 0.210;
from pre-crisis to crisis (2002), z = -3.238, p < .001, r = 0.125; and from crisis to post-crisis
(2005), z = -3.887, p < .001, r = 0.150. If the analysis is conducted using only three periods
(comparing 1998 to 2002), the significant increase is even more apparent, z = -6.458, p < .001, r

42

It is not appropriate to additively combine frequency counts of ordinal data or to calculate a mean. Therefore, the
analysis uses the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2005 as the representative years of each sample. 2005 is used to
bracket the final year of the study period, but if 2004 is used to represent the post-crisis period, the analysis does not
change.
43
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests based on negative ranks indicate an increase in later periods and will produce a
negative z-score.
44
Bonferroni corrections were applied and all effects are reported at a .0125 level of significance.
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= 0.250. Although there is a significant increase across all three periods in the intensity of
disclosure period, the effect size for the initial movement from base period is much larger than
from crisis to post-crisis, indicating a sharp increase in intensity, most probably as organizations
adopted the newly-available GRI G1 framework in 2000 and the improved G2 version in 2002.
Finally, a series of two-sample z-tests for differences in proportion for each level of
intensity is conducted across the grouping periods (Table 20, Panel B). These tests use the entire
sample of S&P 500 firms across all 8 years. CSR-ONLY shows a significant increase from
baseline to pre-crisis periods, Χ2(1) = 10.29, p = .001, but does not significantly increase in
subsequent periods. CSR-OR shows significant increases across all groups, with the greatest
increase occurring in the final crisis to post-crisis stage, Χ2(1) = 10.46, p = .001. There are no
instances of CSR-AND until 2000, and the frequency of organizations at this intensity level is
quite small across time, producing non-significant results across all periods.

Sensitivity Analyses

It is possible that factors endogenous to an organization might render that organization
more vulnerable to exogenous threats and thus produce different patterns of CSR disclosure
behavior. Four contextual factors (Andersen-audited, membership in certain industries, quality,
and risk) were used to partition the data and compare findings (Table 21). The exogenous crisis
in this study centers around two devastating audit failures and the subsequent dissolution of
Andersen. It is possible, therefore, that all disclosures from organizations with financial
statements audited by Andersen at any point during 1998 – 2002 might be treated with more
skepticism. Friedman’s ANOVA was significant for the Andersen group (n = 63, Χ2(3) =
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12.810, p < .01), indicating a significant relationship overall between time period and disclosure
intensity. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (with Bonferroni correction), however, demonstrated no
significant differences between pairs of groups. To untangle these conflicting results, twosample z-tests for differences in proportion were conducted for each level of CSR disclosure
between each grouping period. These results indicated that Andersen-audited organizations
showed a significant increase between pre-crisis and crisis periods for both CSR-ONLY (Χ2(1) =
4.800, p < .05) and CSR-OR (Χ2(1) = 14.470, p < .001). For organizations which were not
audited by Andersen at any point during the study period, overall intensity level changed
significantly across all three groups at the p < .01 level or better. CSR-ONLY and CSR-AND
significantly increased from both baseline to pre-crisis and pre-crisis to crisis (p < .05 or better),
while CSR-OR significantly increased across all three groups (p < .01 or better).
Industry membership has been shown to be an important covariate for CSR research
(Margolis and Walsh 2001). Additionally, financial firms and public utilities are frequently
excluded from research data because it is felt that the highly regulated nature of their industries –
which results in extensive, detailed mandatory reporting and restrictions on management actions
– might give non-typical results. Two separate analyses were run on the data to test for a
significant effect for either of these groups. Organizations with Industry Segment Codes relating
to the energy industry (n = 38) had a significant Friedman’s ANOVA, Χ2(3) = 8.792, p < .05, but
insignificant Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for overall intensity between groups, unless tested
between baseline and crisis, z = -2.352, p < .05. None of the individual z-tests were significant.
Organizations in the financial services and utilities sectors (n = 79) also had a significant
Friedman’s ANOVA, Χ2(3) = 24.920, p < .001, but had significant Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests
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between both baseline to pre-crisis, z = -3.153, p = .001, and pre-crisis to crisis, Χ2(1) = 2.324, p
< .05. These results were driven by significant differences in CSR-ONLY between baseline and
pre-crisis, Χ2(1) = 7.239, p < .01. In contrast, the remaining part of the sample in both instances
displayed significant increases in overall intensity across all groups at p < .01 or better, and an
identical pattern of CSR-ONLY significantly increasing from baseline to pre-crisis and CSR-OR
significantly increasing from both pre-crisis to crisis and crisis to post-crisis at p < .05 or better.
Organizational characteristics such as quality and risk might also affect sensitivity to
exogenous shocks. Using the S&P Quality ratings from Compustat, organizations were divided
into high quality (A+, A, A-, B+) and low quality (B, B-, C, D). The low quality group (n = 138)
had a significant Fisher’s ANOVA, Χ2(3) = 37.298, p < .001, with Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests
indicating significant increases in overall intensity across all three groups (baseline to pre-crisis,
z = -3.900, p < .001; pre-crisis to crisis, z = -1.874, p < .05; crisis to post-crisis, z = -2.148, p <
.05. These differences were driven by significant increases in CSR-ONLY from baseline to precrisis, Χ2(1) = 3.466, p < .05, and in CSR-OR from crisis to post-crisis, Χ2(1) = 4.563, p < .05. In
both instances, when comparing baseline to crisis the increase was also significant at the p < .05
level. The only difference in this pattern with high quality organizations (n = 198) was that
CSR-OR also significantly increased from pre-crisis to crisis at the p < .05 level.
Using Betas from the CRSP database, a high risk group was formed based on Beta values
greater than 1.5 (n = 66). Friedman’s ANOVA was significant, Χ2(3) = 23.749, p < .001, with
Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test indicating the significant increase was concentrated in the baseline
to pre-crisis period, z = -3.051, p < .001, or, alternatively, baseline to crisis, z = -3.368, p < .001.
CSR-ONLY from baseline to pre-crisis, Χ2(1) = 5.893, p < .05, drove these results. In
150

comparison, all other organizations showed significant increases in overall intensity across all
groups (p < .001 or better) and showed significant increases in CSR-ONLY from baseline to precrisis (p < .05) and CSR-OR from crisis to post-crisis (p < .01).

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to explore whether organizations change their signaling
behavior in response to exogenous crises in which the reporting organizations are not themselves
directly implicated, but which might nevertheless impact the credibility of their disclosures,
voluntary and otherwise. The expectation is that organizations would change voluntary
disclosure behavior in an attempt to increase transparency and credibility and reinforce their
claims to be a legitimate, trustworthy entity. An initial analysis confirmed that there was a
change over time in voluntary disclosure behavior, with three to four distinct groups during the
study period. The questionable group, years 2000 – 2001, also brought to light an important
point. Voluntary CSR disclosure behavior not only consists of the individual components (CSR,
FRAMEWORK, ASSURE), but also of the degree of intensity of voluntary disclosure behavior
created by the combination of these components. Intensity consists of three levels: CSR-ONLY
(transparency), CSR-OR (credibility), and CSR-AND (credibility). Table 22 summarizes the
research findings for both CSR components (Panel A) and CSR intensity (Panel B).
Components of voluntary disclosure seem to group 2000 – 2001 with 1998 – 1999, and
there is a clear increase in the use of CSR disclosure between 1998 (pre-crisis) and 2002 (crisis),
a plateau during the crisis, and another increase in the use of CSR disclosure between 2002 and
2005 (post-crisis). Further testing indicated that both increases were significant, with the
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majority of the pre-crisis to crisis change occurring during the common baseline years of 1998 –
1999. Thus, to answer RQ1a, absolute use of CSR disclosure rises over time, up to a crisis;
plateaus during a crisis; and then continues to increase following the resolution. The plateau
during the crisis period might reflect a pause to allow reporting organizations to assess the
magnitude and source of the crisis and determine the best means of response.
The use of independent reporting frameworks also showed a similar pattern, although the
pre-crisis period 1998 – 2001 is clearly broken into two periods, the baseline (1998 – 1999) and
pre-crisis (2000 – 2001), most probably due to the introduction of the GRI G1 framework in
2000. There is a significant increase in FRAMEWORK between all three groups, with an
increase prior to a crisis, during a crisis but at a slower rate, and then escalating again post-crisis
(RQ2a).
On the other hand, neither the use of third-party assurance (RQ2b) nor the use of an
auditor to provide such assurance (RQ4) demonstrate any significant change across the period
and remain at quite minimal levels. Interestingly, and in contrast with prior findings, the use of
auditors as a proportion of third-party assurance providers is not as high as expected, with a
range of 50% (1998) to 17% (2003). Although changes in AUDITOR did not reach significance,
primarily due to the extremely small number of cases, during a crisis centered on public
accounting firms, AUDITOR fell dramatically between the pre-crisis and crisis period, and then
recovered partially (29% of third-party assurance utilized) by 2005 in the post-crisis period.
Audit firms never regained their formal share of overall ASSURE, indicating continued
skepticism of their ability to enhance credibility following a legitimacy crisis based on auditors
as a member of the institutional framework.
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Voluntary CSR disclosure intensity across the testing period might be a better way of
conceptualizing organizational response to a perceived legitimacy threat. Visual inspection of
these three ordinal measures across the time period confirmed the grouping patterns exhibited by
CSR components. Organizations issuing a CSR disclosure alone (with no additional source of
independent credibility enhancement) increased from baseline (1998 – 1999) to pre-crisis (2000
– 2001) and then largely stabilized (RQ1b). The level of CSR-OR intensity grew sharply during
the pre-crisis period, held at a plateau during the crisis, and then accelerated post-crisis (RQ3a).
There were no instances of CSR-AND during the baseline, but starting in 2000 instances began
to appear in very small numbers and then began to increase (while never reaching significance)
post-crisis (RQ3b). Overall, it appears that there was a sudden increase in transparency efforts
around 2000, with subsequent increases in disclosure intensity mainly coming from efforts to
establish transparency and credibility. CSR-OR behavior increased in significance, largely
replacing CSR-ONLY around 2000, possibly due to the introduction of the G1 Guidelines.
When comparing baseline to crisis, there were significant increases across all levels of intensity,
but following the crisis only CSR-OR continued to be significant. It is also noteworthy (see
Table 19, Panel B) that within the CSR-OR level, the overwhelming majority of organizations at
this level are using an independent reporting framework (92% by 2002 and 98% by 2005).
Sensitivity tests for the influence of organizational-level factors on these overall
relationships showed some interesting differences. Organizations whose financial statements
were audited by Andersen did increase CSR-ONLY and CSR-OR behavior between pre-crisis
and crisis periods, suggesting a response to an increased legitimacy threat. Prior to 2001, all
CSR-OR for Andersen-audited organizations was based on third-party assurance; in 2001 there
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was a shift, with one of the three CSR-OR instances using a framework; there were no instances
of CSR-OR disclosures released in 2002 or 2003 using third-party assurance. In contrast, other
organizations showed increased CSR-ONLY and CSR-AND across baseline, pre-crisis, and
crisis periods and CSR-OR across all three periods. This would suggest that the Andersen
audited organizations increased reporting behaviors in response to an increased legitimacy threat,
while non-Andersen organizations steadily continued to increase voluntary disclosure, possibly
to differentiate themselves from the Andersen-tainted organizations. It also appears that between
crisis and post-crisis, non-Andersen firms determined both that (a) transparency alone was not
sufficient to preserve legitimacy and that (b) third-party assurance did not significantly add to
credibility, probably due to public skepticism of auditor independence.
The influence of industry segments is even more of a contrast. Organizations
concentrated in the vulnerable energy sectors, or the highly regulated financial services and
utilities sectors, showed no significant changes, with the exception of an increase in CSR-ONLY
reporting between the baseline and pre-crisis periods for financial services/utilities which
appears to be driven by philanthropy reports released by banks. All other organizations first
significantly increased CSR-ONLY behavior between baseline and pre-crisis and then
significantly increased CSR-OR behavior between pre-crisis and crisis and again between crisis
and post-crisis periods. There are two possible explanations for this result: (1) energy, utilities,
and financial services are so highly regulated that mandatory reporting is deemed sufficient to
assess organizational behavior, or (2) organizations not in those segments are signaling their
differential reflections of societal values. Further, it appears that the majority of organizations
first tried increased transparency, but then switched intensity behavior to CSR-OR in response to
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a crisis. Apparently real benefits were perceived from this behavior, as the significant increase
in CSR-OR intensity behavior continues into the post-crisis period.
When partitioned along S&P quality ratings, the high quality group shows a significant
increase between baseline and pre-crisis for CSR-ONLY, which is then replaced by CSR-OR
between pre-crisis and crisis and again between crisis and post-crisis, as before. Low quality
organizations, on the other hand, also increased transparency efforts from baseline to pre-crisis,
and then made no significant changes in behavior until a tardy increase in CSR-OR intensity
level between crisis and post-crisis. Apparently, lower quality organizations are associated with
a reluctance to provide credibility-enhanced voluntary disclosures. When partitioned on risk
based on Beta values, higher risk organizations only show a significant increase in transparency
efforts (CSR-ONLY) between baseline and pre-crisis and no efforts to provide credibilityenhanced voluntary disclosures.45 Lower risk organizations (all organizations with a Beta < 1.5),
on the other hand, show increased transparency (CSR-ONLY) efforts for both baseline to precrisis and pre-crisis to crisis periods, and credibility-enhancement efforts (CSR-OR) between
baseline and again between pre-crisis and crisis and crisis and post-crisis. This would suggest
that lower risk is associated with responding to an exogenous crisis by first increasing
transparency, followed by enhancing the credibility of those disclosures. It should also be noted
that lower risk organizations were those that adopted credibility enhancement measures (CSROR) earlier than any of the others.

45

What is truly interesting is that this pattern exactly mirrors those of organizations in the Financial
Services/Utilities sector, down to the finding that only in these two groups do we find no instances of CSR-AND
intensity behavior whatsoever. As 67% of the organizations within the Financial Services/Utilities sectors are
associated with Financial Services, this suggests that Financial Services were considered to be high risk, a
conclusion borne out by subsequent events.
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One of the persistent questions in prior research is whether CSR disclosure is driven by
the size or profitability of the organization, or whether a focus on CSR within the company leads
to increased size and profitability due to increased efficiency and effectiveness. Although
solving this “chicken-or-egg” riddle is beyond the scope of this study, it is informative to
examine CSR disclosure intensity behaviors by relative size or profitability. Size is
operationalized by total assets (a widely used proxy across literatures and profitability by net
income).
When intensity level is graphed against mean total assets across the entire study period
(Figure 7), several patterns are apparent. Smaller organizations do indeed tend to be associated
with no CSR reporting; the very smallest organizations between 2000 and 2004, however, are
associated with CSR-AND intensity levels. An examination of the specific companies
displaying CSR-AND behavior (Table 23) reveals that few consistently use this method (Baxter
International, Newmont Mining, Starbucks), but for the majority the “extra enhancement” is
suspiciously coincidental with a potential or recent scandal (and taking into account necessary
lag time to produce the report). This would suggest that third-party assurance is not regarded as
adding long-term value, but is, instead, used for the purposes of image management and shortterm credibility enhancement. The largest organizations, on the other hand, are consistently
associated with CSR-OR behavior, with the exception of a single year (2001). By 2002, CSRONLY is associated with mid-range organizations. It is interesting to note that the chart suggests
that the rate of change in the size of organizations is greatest for those choosing CSR-OR
behaviors, whereas the size of those organizations choosing not to engage in any CSR disclosure
behavior remains fairly level across time.
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Behaviors accounted for by CSR-AND intensity levels are somewhat difficult to interpret
due to the relative non-persistence of organizations within the category: a single entrance or exit
can drastically alter the measure of mean size or profitability for that year. Setting aside CSRAND, and using net income to differentiate organizations by profitability, we see a clear dip in
mean net income across all other intensity levels from 2001 – 2002, with organizations choosing
not to use CSR disclosure being associated with a net loss in 2002 (Figure 8). While we cannot
infer causation from this, it is a clear indication that organizations using greater transparency and
enhancing the credibility of their voluntary CSR disclosures are associated with far greater
profitability during legitimacy threats to the surrounding institutional framework.
Overall, firms not providing CSR disclosure remain associated with a consistently low
level of profitability across time. CSR-ONLY firms are also fairly stable, recovering from the
across-the-board dip in profitability during 2001 and 2002. CSR-OR organizations are nearly
equivalent to CSR-ONLY prior to 2001, suggesting that credibility enhancements were not
considered necessary (both CSR-ONLY and CSR-OR contain CSR reports). However, in 2001,
the profitability of CSR-ONLY firms exceeds CSR-OR, possibly hinting at a backlash against
third-party assurers (16% of the CSR-OR category at this point).
By 2002, when the use of a reporting framework accounts for 92% of the CSR-OR
behavior, the profitability of CSR-OR organizations surpasses CSR-ONLY companies and
continues at a positive rate of growth. By 2004, CSR-OR behavior is clearly associated with the
highest profitability levels, CSR-ONLY with mid-range levels, and organizations choosing not to
provide voluntary CSR disclosure are associated with the lowest profitability levels. Overall,
organizations utilizing CSR disclosure appear to enjoy greater profitability than those which
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choose not to do so, and those firms choosing also to incorporate a reporting framework see
greater rates of growth in profitability.

Conclusion

This study has looked at qualitative characteristics of voluntary CSR reporting behavior
for firms confronting an exogenous legitimacy threat centered on the institutional framework.
Public accounting firms are a critical component of that framework through their role in assuring
mandatory financial statements. The public skepticism regarding auditor independence in the
wake of Enron and the fall of Andersen created a climate of mistrust towards all organizational
disclosures. Lack of credibility in the institutional framework created a legitimacy gap between
societal expectations of corporate behavior and institutional enforced expectations and created a
credibility crisis for the “innocent” reporting firms which had not been directly involved in the
scandal. Although this study is an initial exploration of this area, the research questions
addressed are of great relevance in the current environment of global uncertainty and volatile
economic conditions. If “innocent parties” are able to insulate themselves through their
voluntary disclosure behaviors from the increased risk and uncertainty caused by exogenous
forces beyond their control, the importance of this question for practitioners and corporate
stakeholders is evident.
An examination of discretionary reporting behaviors over an eight year period
surrounding the 2001 – 2002 Enron/Andersen crisis supports this study’s suppositions. In
regards to individual CSR disclosure components, the use of third-party assurance is very limited
and the proportion of that assurance provided by auditors remains insignificant and decreases
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during the crisis period. In regards to CSR disclosure intensity levels, the results are even
clearer. Organizations sought to demonstrate their commitment to societal norms and values by
first increasing the amount of voluntary disclosure and then, as the crisis deepened, by enhancing
credibility of voluntary disclosures through the use of an independent reporting framework. The
perceived efficacy of this strategy was great enough that following the crisis, the frequency of
organizations engaging in CSR-OR intensity behavior continued to increase at a strong rate of
growth and CSR-AND behavior slowly began to make an appearance. Additionally, lower
quality/higher risk organizations seem to choose lower levels of CSR disclosure (including no
CSR disclosure) or to delay in adopting credibility enhancement measures. Smaller, less
profitable organizations are associated with no CSR disclosure whereas, by 2002, the largest,
most profitable organizations are associated with CSR disclosure with credibility enhancement.
There are several limitations of this study. First, overall numbers for third-party
assurance (and, within that group, auditor provided assurance) are very small, making it difficult
to meaningfully test changes in frequency of behavior over time. These numbers need to be
treated cautiously as an indicator of overall trends but with the realization that they are
statistically negligible. Also, the first generation of GRI Guidelines was released for comment in
1999 and became available in 2000 and this fact per se might have contributed to the increase in
the use of reporting frameworks between the baseline and pre-crisis periods. The use of the S&P
500 allowed us to look at a group of economically powerful companies which are exposed to a
range of stakeholder interests and pressures; however, this might also produce a dispersion of
stakeholder power which insulated them somewhat from legitimacy pressures. Further, due to
the study population, tests of the association of CSR intensity behavior with size and profitability
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of firms is also restricted to the largest, most profitable firms in the US market. Finally, the
categorical nature of the data restricts the types of testing possible, as do the unequal numbers of
reporting organizations within the S&P 500 during each period.
Future extensions of this study would help to clarify some of the associations, especially
extensions which might be able to examine general growth over time in disclosure behaviors
versus those resulting from specific events. It would be interesting to compare reporting
behaviors from small and mid-sized organizations to see if there is a difference in vulnerability
to legitimacy pressures. Extending the study to behavior around the 2008 market collapse and
general economic crisis would be informative. Finally, an examination of lagged financial
performance would be helpful in determining the subsequent effect of CSR disclosure choices.
The continued examination of how voluntary disclosure behavior (and associated stakeholder
perceptions of credibility and trustworthiness) might insulate the organization against external
crises has the potential to be extremely useful to regulators, stakeholders, and organizational
management faced with the uncertainty inherent in an interdependent global marketplace.
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Figure 5: Frequency of CSR Disclosure Components across Time Period
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Tables

Table 17: Research Predictions
Expected
Change

Crisis: 2001 - 2002

Expected
Change

Post-Crisis: 2005

Disclosing companies/
total companies

<

Disclosing
companies/ total
companies

?

Disclosing companies/
total companies

Framework/ total
disclosing companies

<

Framework/ total
disclosing companies

<=

Framework/ total
disclosing companies

Assurance/ total
disclosing companies

><

Assurance/ total
disclosing companies

<=

Assurance/ total
disclosing companies

>

Auditor assurance/
total assuring
companies

?

Auditor assurance/ total
assuring companies

Pre-Crisis: 1998

Auditor assurance/
total assuring
companies
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Table 18: Major Accounting Scandals 1999 – 2004
Year
1999

Waste Management

Companies
Andersen

Accounting firms

2000

MicroStrategy, Computer Associates, Xerox

PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG

2001

Enron

Andersen

2002

Adelphia, AOL, Bristol-Myers Squibb, CMS
Energy, Duke Energy, Dynergy, El Paso
Corporation, Global Crossing, Halliburton,
ImClone, Kmart, Nicor, Reliant Energy, Tyco,
WorldCom

Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst &
Young, KPMG,
PricewaterhouseCoopers

2003

Royal Ahold, Parmalat, HealthSouth, Nortel, tax
shelter fraud

Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,
Grant Thornton, KPMG

2004

AIG

PricewaterhouseCoopers
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Table 19: Frequency of CSR Disclosure Components and Intensity Levels for S&P 500 1998 –
2005
Panel A: Frequency of CSR disclosure component by year
1998 1999 2000
S&P 500 population
508
510
526
CSR disclosure
45
54
78
Use of framework*
1
3
9
Use of third-party assurance*
6
3
4
Use of auditor for third-party assurance*
3
1
1
Panel B: Frequency of CSR disclosure intensity level by year
1998 1999 2000
CSR disclosure only
38
48
66
CSR disclosure with framework OR
7
6
11
assurance
Percentage of CSR-OR using framework as
method of credibility enhancement

CSR disclosure with framework AND
assurance

2001
512
88
18
5
1

2002
515
97
25
4
1

2003
505
96
28
6
1

2004
507
114
43
5
2

2005
503
121
52
7
2

2001
67

2002
70

2003
66

2004
70

2005
68

19

25

26

40

47

14%

50%

73%

84%

92%

92%

98%

98%

0

0

1

2

2

4

4

6

*Values are nested: framework and third-party assurance are proportions of CSR disclosure for
each period and use of auditor is a proportion of third-party assurance.
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Table 20: Two-Proportion z-test for Change in Frequency across Periods
Panel A: CSR component
Baseline to pre-Crisis
CSR disclosure
Use of framework
Use of third-party assurance
Use of auditor for third-party
assurance
Panel B: CSR intensity

CSR report only
CSR report with framework OR
assurance
CSR report with framework AND
assurance

17.98***
8.972**
1.319

Pre-Crisis to
Crisis
3.065*
6.459**
0.010

Crisis to Post
Crisis
5.760**
7.873**
0.001

1.000

0.014

0.489

Baseline to preCrisis
10.29***

Pre-Crisis to
Crisis
0.123

Crisis to Post
Crisis
0.047

6.531**

6.057**

10.461***

2.966

1.058

1.048

Test statistic is Χ2 (1) for all cases
Exact Significance (one-sided): p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***
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Table 21: Sensitivity Analyses Using Two-Proportion z-tests for Change in Frequency for CSR Intensity Levels across Groups

Sample size
CSRONLY

CSR-OR

CSRAND

Baseline to PreCrisis
Pre-Crisis to
Crisis
Crisis to PostCrisis
Baseline to PreCrisis
Pre-Crisis to
Crisis
Crisis to PostCrisis
Baseline to PreCrisis
Pre-Crisis to
Crisis
Crisis to PostCrisis

Entire
Sample

Andersen
auditeda

Energy
sectorb

Financial services/
utilities sectorc

Low
qualityd

High
qualityd

High
riske

Low
riske

336

63

38

79

138

198

66

270

10.29***

0.000

1.754

7.239**

3.466*

5.428*

5.893*

4.305*

0.123

4.800*

0.060

0.918

0.0992

0.074

0.000

0.217

0.047

0.878

0.244

0.318

1.216

0.158

1.234

0.013

6.531**

0.000

0.347

1.006

1.833

0.677

1.008

1.630

6.057**

14.470***

0.214

1.026

0.852

4.168*

1.871

3.3032

10.461***

1.260

0.157

0.149

4.563*

5.036*

2.877

6.733**

2.966

---

--

--

--

1.003

--

1.002

1.058

2.032

--

--

1.004

0.000

--

0.335

1.048

1.008

1.013

--

0.337

0.336

--

0.674

Pearson Chi-square reported for two-sample z-test of difference among proportions at significance levels: p < .05 *, p < .01 **,
p < .001***
a
Andersen audited organizations are those which had Andersen as financial statement auditor at any time during the period
1998 – 2002
b
S&P ISC codes used to indicate involvement in Energy sector: 170, 375, 380, 382, 385, 390, 705, 710, 720
c
S&P ISC codes used to indicate involvement in Financial Services or Utility sector: 462, 463, 705, 710, 715, 720, 725, 810,
815, 817, 820, 822, 823, 825, 830, 835, 837, 840, 845, 850
d
Based on S&P Quality rating from Compustat, where A+, A, A-, B+ = high quality; B, B-, C, D = low quality
e
High risk companies are those with a Beta ≥ 1.5
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Table 22: Summary of Findings
Base line: 1998 - 1999
Relation
Panel A: CSR components
Disclosing companies/
<
total companies
Framework/ total
<
disclosing companies
Assurance/ total
=
disclosing companies
Auditor assurance/ total
=
assuring companies
Panel B: CSR intensity
CSR disclosure only
<
CSR disclosure with
framework OR
<
assurance
CSR disclosure with
framework AND
=
assurance

Pre-Crisis: 2000 - 2001 Relation
Disclosing companies/
total companies
Framework/ total
disclosing companies
Assurance/ total
disclosing companies
Auditor assurance/ total
assuring companies
CSR disclosure only
CSR disclosure with
framework OR
assurance
CSR disclosure with
framework AND
assurance

<
<
=
=
=
<

=
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Crisis: 2002 - 2003
Disclosing companies/
total companies
Framework/ total
disclosing companies
Assurance/ total
disclosing companies
Auditor assurance/ total
assuring companies
CSR disclosure only
CSR disclosure with
framework OR
assurance
CSR disclosure with
framework AND
assurance

Relation
<
<
=
=
=
<

=

Post-Crisis: 2004 - 2005
Disclosing companies/
total companies
Framework/ total
disclosing companies
Assurance/ total
disclosing companies
Auditor assurance/ total
assuring companies
CSR disclosure only
CSR disclosure with
framework OR
assurance
CSR disclosure with
framework AND
assurance

Bristol-Myers
Squibb

Health Care

Dow
Chemical
Newmont
Mining
AES

Chemicals

X

X

X

2003

X

2005

Health Care

2004

Baxter
International

2002

Industry

2001

Company

2000

Table 23: Organizations Choosing CSR-AND Behavior

X

X
Series of accounting scandals of
manipulated earnings surfaced in
2002
Dioxin scandal came to light in
2002

X
X

Gold & Precious
Metals Mining
Power Producer

X
X

X

X

X

Nike

Retailer – Footwear

X

Gap

Retailer – Specialty
Apparel

X

Starbucks
Exxon
Applied
Materials
Office Depot

Restaurants
Oil (International)

X

Implicated in Enron scandals
2002 – 2004 intensive effort by
company to recover from child
labor scandal
2003 class action lawsuit by
sweatshop workers in Saipan
(unsafe working conditions,
unpaid overtime)
X
X

Semiconductors

X

Retailer – Specialty

X
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Comments

2003 foreign bribery scandals
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Introduction

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has its roots in the social activism of the 1960s
and 1970s. The early emphasis on social change agendas led to Milton Friedman’s (1970)
famous denunciation of such policies as “theft”. In more recent years, the emphasis has shifted
from business’s responsibility in shaping society in response to a social or political agenda, to
business’s accountability for operations (including long-lasting effects on surrounding
communities) and ethical behavior. Such a shift in understanding is not outside of Friedman’s
conception of management’s responsibility to “make as much money as possible while
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom (Friedman 1970, 33; emphasis added).” The latter part of Friedman’s statement is
often omitted, but it has clear parallels to the concept of organizational legitimacy, where the
social contract between business and society determines the allocation of scarce resources
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). In fact, the degree to which organizations move beyond mandated
behavior to incorporate “ethical custom” (and societal expectations for behavior) determines the
relative degree of legitimacy (Lindblom 2010).
The emphasis within CSR has also shifted over time. Whereas the 1960s tended to
emphasize social programs, the focus has shifted in recent decades to environmental,
sustainability, and ethical factors. This is not to say that environmentalism did not appear in
earlier periods. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) focused widespread public attention on the
issue of the long-term health effects of chemical contamination. The Love Canal crisis in the
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late 1970s intensified these concerns in the light of the effect on surrounding communities from
the irresponsible use and disposal of chemical waste, as did the dangerously rising mercury
levels in the Great Lakes. The Three Mile Island accident (1979) and the oil crises of 1973 and
1979 also contributed to an interest in alternative energy sources and increased energy efficiency.
During the 1980s an increasing dissatisfaction with quality, innovation, and competitiveness led
to attempts in the 1990s to expand organizational performance measures to capture aspects of
non-financial performance (Johnson and Kaplan 1991; Kaplan and Norton 1996; Elkington
1999) and to address the concerns of stakeholder groups beyond shareholders (Freeman 1984).
An increasing number of ethical scandals in the early years of the 21st century, following the
excesses of the 1980s, also produced a greater interest in questions of ethical behavior in
business, governance structures, and the role of independent boards in increasing accountability
and responsibility for organizational actions (Paine 2003). CSR, then, reflects an organization’s
stewardship and accountability to a broad audience. Stewardship and accountability, in turn,
influence organizational efficiency, effectiveness, and strategy.
The current business environment is one that increasingly embraces CSR, while making a
business case for doing so.46 While, admittedly, many organizations employ CSR reporting as
image management and fail to report anything of actual substance, others are making efforts to
report non-financial performance and learning as they go. These efforts are driven by solid,
performance-oriented reasons. Top management increasingly associates sustainability efforts
with gains in efficiency and innovation (KPMG 2011), superior long-term value creation

46

I note a recent trend to refer to these matters as “ESG” – Environment, Social, and Governance – reports, thus
distancing non-financial responsibility, performance, and reporting from the more activist-oriented perception of the
term CSR.
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(Generation 2012), and the ability to manage risks, enhance reputations, and identify potential
strategic opportunities (IIGCC et al. 2010), and obtain financial benefits from higher credit
ratings, lower cost of debt, and greater access to capital (Bauer and Hann 2010; Generation
2012). Researchers have also found that sustainable firms have significant increases in profits
and stock returns when compared to a matched sample (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011;
Generation 2012), significantly outperform organizations with lower sustainability in the longterm (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011), and have a clearer link between strategic decisions
and capital (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2010). Prior research has also speculated that the
growth of non-financial performance reporting is linked to the dramatic decline in tangible asset
market value from around 80% in 1975 to less than 20% in 2009 (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim
2011, Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus 2011). Measures, methodologies, and direct relationships are
not always clear, but there is increasing evidence that there is a “mutually reinforcing
relationship between financial and non-financial performance (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim
2011, 1)” and a significant market interest in the degree of organizational transparency regarding
CSR (Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus 2011).
Within the stream of research contained in this dissertation, I have examined the
relationship between financial and non-financial performance using a legitimacy perspective and
a focus on stakeholder groups. I have found evidence suggesting that stakeholder groups differ
in their emphasis on areas of non-financial performance and that the measurement level most
sensitive to variance in financial outcomes is dependent on the level of aggregation in the
outcome measure as well as the number of stakeholder groups associated with it and the ability
to isolate the interests of these groups (Study One). I have also found evidence that CSR
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disclosure has important effects on financial performance via an increased tolerance for
unexpected poor performance. CSR disclosure produces this increased tolerance (resilience) by
leading to greater perceived legitimacy (Study Two). Organizations seem to have at least an
intuitive grasp of the benefit of increased transparency, especially during threats to perceived
legitimacy caused by an external credibility crisis affecting the market’s institutional framework
(Study Three). During such an event, organizations might seek to protect their own legitimacy
by emphasizing their credibility and transparency, increasing the amount of CSR reporting, and
utilizing independent sources of credibility enhancement (primarily reporting frameworks).

The Relationship between Financial and Non-Financial Performance

There are many reasons behind the growth of CSR. Mandatory reporting by US GAAP
covers financial performance, but does not cover reporting of non-financial performance.47
Mandatory reporting also does not allow for flexible, evolving measures of non-tangible assets or
the incorporation of strategic initiatives, nor does it address non-economic concerns of key
stakeholder groups. Voluntary reporting (CSR, ESG, Sustainability, etc.) is able to address this
need, as well as demonstrate differential legitimacy in the degree to which organizations move
beyond mandated compliance to reflect societal expectations. It is not a costless process, but
organizations have found the benefits outweigh the costs.

47

There is an increase in reporting within the European Union and under IASB rules. However, reporting is not
mandatory in all countries, for all companies, or for all (or even the same aspects) of CSR performance. In many
cases, organizations can evade regulation by not listing on the country-based exchange, not engaging in certain
activities, or maintaining in-country employment below a certain threshold.
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Incentives to engage in CSR vary widely, and might range across items such as top
management’s personal convictions, organizational reputation, risk management, and financial
performance (Novethic 2010). Top corporate management publicly states that good corporate
citizenship makes a tangible contribution to the bottom line (BCCCC 2007) and that increased
disclosure adds business value (SustainAbility 2010). Institutional investors have gone through a
recent sea-change in their attitude to CSR disclosure; just a few years ago consideration of nonfinancial performance was regarded as a conflict with fiduciary duty, but a strategy that includes
non-financial performance assessment is now believed to maximize long-term client benefit
(Novethic 2010). Importantly, firms with better CSR performance and disclosure appear to have
significantly lower capital constraints (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009; Cheng, Ioannou, and
Serafeim 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and outperform equivalent, non-CSR firms in the stock
market (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). Greater access to capital appears to be the result
of reduced agency costs and increased revenue opportunities resulting from increased
stakeholder engagement and the reduced information asymmetry costs resulting from increased
transparency (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2010).
Market leaders appear to be setting the pace and standards of CSR reporting practices
(KPMG 2011). However, stakeholders are driving the need for CSR reporting. Investors and
consumers incorporate rankings into their decisions (often as a measure of risk), and the more a
company discloses, the better it is likely to score on these ratings, which often are based solely
on publicly-available information (SustainAbility and GlobeScan 2010).48 CSR, especially
48

According to a recent international survey of institutional and individual investors (Novethic 2010), 69% of
investors incorporate ESG into their asset management decisions and 38% believe ratings agencies (non-analyst
rankings) to be the most useful source of information. This supports findings from Kothari, Li, and Short (2009)
that analysts and management are not regarded as credible sources of information by investors.
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environmental performance and policies, affects exposure to legal, reputational, and regulatory
risk, influencing corporate solvency and credit, risk, and quality ratings (Bauer and Hann 2010).
Rankings are also highly volatile and stakeholders appear to regard CSR as dynamic, with an
emphasis on “what have you done lately?” in their evaluations (SustainAbility and GlobeScan
2010). Overall, change is constant and one measure or method does not address the needs of all
stakeholder groups at all times (SustainAbility 2011). Earlier discussions of CSR had objected
that attempts to increase disclosure would harm more transparent companies, especially if
organizations had to report less-than-ideal performance. However, recent surveys have indicated
that if it is not publicly reported, the organization is assumed to either be ignoring or failing in
the relevant CSR area and that stakeholders reward responsiveness, even in the face of poorer
performance (SustainAbility 2011).
In general, then, acceptance of the need for CSR disclosure is not the issue; rather, it is
the execution of CSR reporting that remains problematic (Accenture 2010). Organizations have
increasingly focused on CSR as an investment driving their business model for long-term
competitiveness and flexibility, rather than an additional cost (Porter and van der Linde 1995;
Environics 1999; KPMG 2011). The integration of CSR into core business values (and thus
long-term strategy) causes it to function as a long-term investment (KPMG 2011) and to drive
perceptions of organizational leadership and reputation (SustainAbility and GlobeScan 2010).
The adoption of CSR reporting and its integration with the long-term business model tend
to proceed in three distinct, overlapping phases (Generation 2012). First, organizations use CSR
reporting to align themselves with key stakeholders to enhance their strategic position through
brand enhancement, increased public trust and reputation, and improved competitive positioning.
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The second phase produces operational benefits as organizations realize that the stewardship
focus of CSR can reduce waste, increase energy efficiency, improve human capital benefits, and
generally lower the capital structure. Following prior stages of profit enhancement and cost
minimization, the final stage focuses on compliance and risk management, improving internal
control and governance, and increasing predictability and stakeholder confidence in
management’s integrity and ethical behavior. Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2011) hypothesize
that CSR-disclosing companies are perceived as less risky by the markets because greater
transparency decreases uncertainty about ability (and thus, expectations for future performance).
Increased organizational responsibility for actions, and subsequent results, is becoming a
global expectation (Environics 1999; Generation 2012). The Millennium poll in 1999 was the
largest global survey of public expectations of corporations, across 23 countries and 6 continents.
In all but three countries, responses from the majority of citizens presented a view of the proper
role of business as somewhere between Friedman’s profit maximization and the maximization of
stakeholder interests. Specifically, organizational behavior was expected to (1) demonstrate
commitment to societal values and contribute to societal goals; (2) insulate society from any
negative impacts of business operations or products; (3) share benefits with key stakeholders (not
shareholders alone); and (4) make profits by “doing the right thing” (Environics 1999). These
expectations closely echo legitimacy theory; organizations are expected to behave in a manner
that reflects and respects the implied societal contract in their allocation of resources and
permission to continue operating. This is not the radical view for supporting social engineering
that Friedman protested. Capitalism is supported, but capitalism held accountable for long-term
outcomes, behavior, and choices.
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...[W]hile the present form of Capitalism has proven its superiority, it is
nevertheless abundantly clear that some of the ways in which it is now
practiced do not incorporate sufficient regard for its impact on people and the
planet...These include short-termism, overreliance on GDP growth as a
primary metric of prosperity, diverting wealth into shadow banking and
financial engineering and away from addressing real needs...(and) also include
rising inequality, increasing volatility in the global financial market, and
growing contributions to the climate crisis perpetuated by a resistance to
internalize externalities. (Generation 2012, 6)
Public expectations for greater corporate responsibility in addressing social and
environmental challenges continue, with increasing regulatory pressure outside of the United
States to influence behavior in these areas (BCCCC 2007). However, large gaps remain between
organizational perceptions of responsibility and public expectations for organizational behavior:
55% of businesses and 79% of the public believe business has a responsibility to produce
sustainable products or use only sustainable materials; 35% of businesses and 62% of the public
believe business has a responsibility in preventing or resolving Human Rights issues (BCCCC
2007). Increasing public mistrust and skepticism from corporate ethical scandals and rising
anger over excessive CEO pay in the face of increasing economic marginalization of workers are
increasing pressure for government intervention and regulation, although confidence in
governmental leaders and belief in their ability to fairly enforce the social contract has been
severely eroded (Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore 2002; Bazerman et al. 2006; SustainAbility
and GlobeScan 2010). In order to preserve the functioning of a free market, and prevent
government control, there is an urgent need for organizations to shift their focus to long-term
economic value creation (a shift from “quarterly capitalism”), to address “real needs,”
incorporate all costs, and address the needs of all stakeholders (Barton 2011; Generation 2012).

182

Relationships with key stakeholders provide the critical interface between organizational
economic actions and legitimacy:
...society ultimately does require, in one way or another, that a company earns
the right to operate. When managers do not consider the impact of their
decisions on all stakeholders, not just shareholders, we believe that they are
putting this license to operate at risk. (Generation 2012, 8)
With the recognition of the importance of non-financial performance to overall organizational
outcomes, there has been a gradual shift towards stakeholder engagement,49 although there is a
wide range within the process used or extent of engagement (Novethic 2010). Stakeholder
engagement has also demonstrated both that stakeholders do consider non-financial factors
important (Environics 1999)50 and that there are considerable differences among CSR aspects of
interest between investors and other stakeholders (IFAC 2012).
Mainstream economic theory is heavily dependent on investors, to the point of implying
that organizations are more dependent for their existence on shareholders than they are on
customers (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). There is an obvious fallacy involved here, as
without customers to purchase the product or service the organization will cease to operate (or, at
the very least, to have a meaningful existence as more than a vehicle for “shadow banking”51).
Customers as stakeholders drive organizational profits and their interests and information

49

Stakeholder engagement is the process of specifically determining, from the stakeholders themselves, the areas of
both financial and non-financial performance of concern to key stakeholders and their desired measures and targets
for performance in these areas.
50
When asked to choose from a list of factors to describe their impression of individual companies, 49% of those
surveyed chose social responsibility items, 40% also chose quality or reputational items, and 32% used business
fundamentals (Environics 1999).
51
“Shadow banking” is the system of financial vehicles, practices, organizations, and networks that exist outside of
existing regulation (including regulation for monitoring or reporting exchanges). This is the realm of financial
instruments and deals structured to take advantage of loopholes in current regulations or between countries.
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demands should drive CSR performance and disclosure (Accenture 2010).52 Consumers
surveyed scrutinized corporations most in areas of employee health and safety, equal treatment
of all employees, bribery and corruption, environmental impacts, and the use of child labor.
Further, consumers held corporations accountable for their behavior in these areas before holding
them accountable for profitable operations or paying a fair share of taxes (Environics 1999).
For investors, on the other hand, CSR is focused more on measuring risk exposure and
potential rewards through strategy and innovation, and appears to function as an assessment of
management quality (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011; Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus 2011).
Regardless of the overwhelming focus on shareholders in corporate decision making, there is still
a mismatch between the CSR reporting provided by the organization and that demanded by
shareholders (Eccles, Searfeim, and Krzus 2011). Further contradicting the claim that investors
do not care about non-financial performance, Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus (2011) found that over
six months (using Bloomberg data) investors accessed a long list of environmental or social
performance metrics approximately 34 million times. Environmental factors, which can
dramatically effect legal liability or fines, future remediation risks, and access to critical
resources, are especially influential as risk factors in investment strategies: for example, 87% of
asset managers and 98% of asset owners consider climate change to be a material investment risk
(IIGCC et al. 2010).
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The stakeholder group of customers can affect ongoing organizational performance through means other than their
own purchasing power. A majority of consumers talk to others about corporate behavior, influencing potential
customers and other stakeholder groups, and one in five consumers reports boycotting or publicly speaking out
against a company (Environics 1999). The growth of internet consumer rating sites (e.g., Amazon.com’s customer
reviews or consumer ratings of personal services on Angieslist.com) has accelerated the speed and impact of
consumer opinions.
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It has been argued that explicitly incorporating CSR factors into corporate financial
models results in long-term, holistic business models better able to make resource allocation
decisions (Eccles and Serafeim 2011). Likewise, by engaging with stakeholders honestly, and
seeking to develop trust, credibility, and a long-term focus, organizations are able to avoid
increased costs to prevent opportunistic behavior (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). Shorttermism seems to be a significant factor in organizations that have poor CSR performance and/or
choose not to engage in CSR disclosure. The investment horizon of an organization’s investors
can ultimately end up affecting its decision making process and benchmarks. Companies appear
to be able to attract investors with different investment horizons based on their disclosure
policies (IFAC 2012), with sustainable organizations apparently attracting longer-term investors
(Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). An emphasis on short-term performance, chiefly through
quarterly earnings guidance, tends to attract momentum investors and results in much greater
volatility for the underlying stock (IFAC 2012). A survey of CIOs from top asset management
firms recently reported that only 20% have time horizons longer than a year and fully 55% have
time horizons of a quarter or less (Generation 2012).
A focus on meeting the demands of short-term focused investors also tends to lead to a
decrease in value through the failure to engage in long-term investments to support product or
process improvements and also tends to impose externality costs disproportionately on other
stakeholders; in essence, the organization trades short-term profits for long-term value (Eccles,
Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011; Generation 2012).53 The effect of the “pernicious orthodoxy of
short-termism” (Generation 2012) produces wide-ranging effects: managers use inappropriate
53

The International Federation of Accountants (2012) reported that 80% of CFOs would sacrifice future economic
value to satisfy investor expectations of short-term returns.
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discount rates, causing them to mistakenly reject profitable long-term projects, the return horizon
does not match the asset horizon, and managers reject positive NPV projects based on the effect
on analysts’ quarterly earnings estimates (Haldane and Davies 2011). Over 75% of managers
report they would give up economic value in order to smooth earnings (Haldane and Davies
2011) and extreme short-term CEO tenures with the accompanying IBG/YGB (“I’ll be
gone/You’ll be gone”, Knee 2006, 23) attitude towards maximizing their ability to cash out stock
options exacerbates the problem (Generation 2012).
The average holding period of securities was about 7 years and relatively stable from
1940 to the mid-1970s, but the rise of computer trading, especially High Frequency Transactions
(HFT), has caused holding periods to fall dramatically to only around 7 months (Barton 2011;
Generation 2012). From 1995 on, the decreased return horizon especially accelerated with the
emphasis on quarterly returns and performance reporting (Haldane and Davies 2011). HFT now
accounts for around 70% of consolidated US trading volume and is positively correlated with
stock price volatility, particularly during periods of market instability (Zhang 2010; Barton 2011;
Generation 2012). The combination of short-termism and stock price volatility encourages
market instability, especially in the presence of HFT (Generation 2012). In effect, HFT prevents
the market from efficiently incorporating financial fundamentals into asset prices (Zhang 2010).
Short-termism, and the market distortion it creates, causes inefficient capital allocation
for long-term investments (Generation 2012). However, firms with better CSR performance and
disclosure appear to have significantly lower capital constraints. Greater access to capital
appears to be the result of reduced agency costs and increased revenue opportunities resulting
from increased stakeholder engagement and the reduced information asymmetry costs resulting
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from increased transparency (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2010). Eccles, Ioannou, and
Serafeim (2011) hypothesize that CSR disclosing companies are perceived as less risky by the
markets because the greater transparency decreases uncertainty about ability (and thus,
expectations for future performance). CSR, especially environmental performance and policies,
affects exposure to legal, reputational, and regulatory risk, influencing corporate solvency, and
credit, risk, and quality ratings (Bauer and Hann 2010).

Conclusion

CSR performance and reporting function on several levels to enhance organizational
economic value. The linkage operates through intervening constructs which affect both cost
structures and revenues. CSR demonstrates incorporation of extra-legal societal values, hence
legitimacy, and engages across multiple stakeholder groups. Credibility and transparency
increase trustworthiness/reputation effects and decrease risk and uncertainty, significantly
decreasing contracting and agency costs. Recent surveys of managers, investors, professional
investment managers, consumers, and citizens have confirmed that CSR is perceived as a critical
component in the corporate business model and as contributing to superior performance – the
uncertainty remaining concerns tradeoffs, priorities, reporting mechanisms, and intervening
mechanisms. The stream of research within this dissertation seeks to explore the tradeoffs and
disclosure processes that link non-financial to financial performance.
Study one, Exploring the Interface, responds to Wood and Jones’ (1995) assertion that
CSR variables need to be appropriately matched with economic outcome measures, and that
those measures will differ across stakeholder groups and CSR areas covered. I find support for
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their argument, with a much clearer link between CSR and financial performance and nonmarket based measures, which also supports Zhang’s (2010) contention that the contemporary
stock market is “broken”, with short-termism and HFT leading to distortions in the incorporation
of information into accurate valuation. I find that measurement levels do vary across outcome
measures based on the degree of aggregation and the degree to which the outcome can be
associated with a predominant stakeholder group (Wood and Jones 1995; Cheng, Ioannou, and
Serafeim 2010). I also find confirmation that different stakeholder groups require different CSR
performance evaluations (IFAC 2012) and that, while environmental and social factors are fairly
direct in their association with economic outcomes, governance items are either non-significant
or contradictory (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2010; Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).
Study two, The Benefit of the Doubt, specifically explores the role of information
characteristics contributing to high-quality disclosures (accuracy and completeness) in producing
perceived legitimacy as operationalized by information credibility and organizational
trustworthiness. Perceived legitimacy then contributes to resilience in the face of unexpected
poor performance following an industry crisis. I find that accuracy is the primary driver in nonprofessional judgments of legitimacy, which seems to support the need for quantifiable measures
(with associated materiality and thresholds) that are consistent and comparable (IIGCC et al.
2010; IFAC 2012). I also find evidence for the role of perceived legitimacy as the link between
social responsibility and corporate image as displayed in voluntary CSR reporting and market
performance (BCCCC 2007; Accenture 2010).
Finally, study three, In Bad Company, examines the alteration of organizational
disclosure behavior in the presence of an exogenous threat to legitimacy. When the institutional
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framework supporting the economic environment and capital markets suffers from a credibility
crisis, organizations try to demonstrate their own legitimacy by increasing disclosure. More, the
majority of disclosing organizations also seek to specifically increase the credibility of their
disclosures via the use of independent third-party frameworks incorporating both accuracy and
completeness. Surprisingly, I find that the use of third-party assurance was extremely low
overall, and did not significantly increase over the crisis period, supporting findings by Eccles,
Ioannou, and Serafeim (2011). The corporate response to the Enron/Andersen scandal in 2001 –
2002, demonstrating an increase in CSR reporting, was repeated again during the economic
downturn in 2008, and thus confirms that organizations accelerate the introduction of CSR
disclosure during financial crises (Accenture 2010; Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011).
Taken together, these three studies forward our understanding of CSR reporting by
targeting three critical factors in organizational performance and disclosure. First, the CSP-CFP
relationship is not simple, is usually not direct, and operates at many levels. The more a CFP
outcome measure captures a single stakeholder group and the less it aggregates multiple
performance items, the more direct the relationship appears, often operating at the level of
stakeholder reactions to individual issues. In order to monitor and asses CSP performance and
outcomes, then, organizations should carefully select the appropriate economic measures. Stock
market performance, and stakeholder assessments based on stock performance, is very
insensitive to the influence of CSP on overall financial outcomes. Second, different stakeholder
groups emphasize different aspects of non-financial performance, which implies that an
organization’s ability to identify and engage with key stakeholder groups will produce superior
operational efficiencies and strategic direction. Third, the effect of CSP on corporate economic
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outcomes appears to work by enhancing legitimacy with stakeholders. The increased legitimacy
appears to be driven by perceived credibility of disclosure (linked to transparency), and the
accompanying effect on perceived trustworthiness of management. Credibility specifically
appears to be enhanced by information characteristics leading to high-quality disclosure
(accuracy and completeness) and by an independent, external source of credibility enhancement
such as a reporting framework. This implies that organizations can produce increased, long-term
value creation the more that they align corporate values with societal norms. It also implies that
organizations which are able to achieve this distinction will outperform their competitors who
are not able to do so, or be insulated from external crises or uncertainty to a greater degree. The
key, overall implications for management are three fold: (1) identify key stakeholders and
engage with them to identify their concerns, (2) use appropriate measures to monitor
performance in these areas so that the effect of CSR programs and policies is not lost in
surrounding “noise”, and (3) increase transparency in reporting this performance through
voluntary disclosure and credibility through the use of an independent, comprehensive reporting
framework.
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